The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Full Table of Contents

Click ▶➥ below each ToC heading to expand the list of paragraphs for that section.

Introduction

➥

Pre‑conflict strategy and planning

➥

The UK decision to support US military action

➥

UK policy before 9/11

➥

The impact of 9/11

➥

Decision to take the UN route

➥

Negotiation of resolution 1441

➥

The prospect of military action

➥

The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council
widens

➥

The end of the UN route

➥

Why Iraq? Why now?

➥

294

295

296

Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?

➥

The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military
action in Iraq

➥

The UK’s relationship with the US

➥

Decision‑making

➥

390

391

Collective responsibility

➥

Advice on the legal basis for military action

➥

The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of
resolution 1441

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view”

➥

The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003

➥

Cabinet, 17 March 2003

➥

Weapons of mass destruction
Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002

➥

Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

➥

Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

➥

The search for WMD

➥

Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq
The failure to plan or prepare for known risks

➥

The planning process and decision‑making

➥

➥

LOOTING IN BAGHDAD

➥

UK INFLUENCE ON POST‑INVASION STRATEGY: RESOLUTION 1483

➥

UK INFLUENCE ON THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

➥

A DECLINE IN SECURITY

➥

THE TURNING POINT

➥

Transition
UK INFLUENCE ON US STRATEGY POST‑CPA

➥

PLANNING FOR WITHDRAWAL

➥

THE IMPACT OF AFGHANISTAN

➥

IRAQIISATION

➥

Preparation for withdrawal
A MAJOR DIVERGENCE IN STRATEGY

➥

A POSSIBLE CIVIL WAR

➥

FORCE LEVEL REVIEW

➥

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

➥

Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?

➥

➥

➥

Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002

➥

801

Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September

➥

802

➥

803

➥

804

Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

➥

805

Iraq WMD assessments, pre‑July 2002

➥

806

Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

➥

807

Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

➥

808

The search for WMD

➥

809

➥

810

Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

➥

811

Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

➥

812

Military equipment (pre‑conflict)

➥

813

Planning for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq

➥

814

The invasion

➥

815

The post‑conflict period

➥

816

Reconstruction

➥

817

De‑Ba’athification

➥

818

Security Sector Reform

➥

819

Resources

➥

820

Military equipment (post‑conflict)

➥

821

Civilian personnel

➥

822

Service Personnel

➥

823

Civilian casualties

➥

824

Lessons

➥

825

826

The decision to go to war

➥

Weapons of mass destruction

➥

The invasion of Iraq

➥

The post‑conflict period

➥

Reconstruction

➥

De‑Ba’athification

➥

Security Sector Reform

➥

Resources

➥

Military equipment (post‑conflict)

➥

Civilian personnel

➥

Timeline of events
Before 2001

Night of 19/20 March: invasion of Iraq begins

2009 onwards

Establishing the Inquiry
Purpose of the Inquiry

➥

Support to the Inquiry Committee

➥

Avoiding conflicts of interest

➥

The Inquiry’s approach
Initial meetings

➥

Issues not addressed by the Inquiry

➥

Hearings

➥

Written evidence

➥

PUBLICATION OF THE MOST SENSITIVE DOCUMENTS

➥

MINUTES OF CABINET MEETINGS

➥

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE UK PRIME MINISTER AND US PRESIDENT

➥

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE AND THE LAW OFFICERS’ CONVENTION

➥

Open source material

➥

Submissions to the Inquiry

➥

INTERNATIONAL LAW SUBMISSIONS

➥

100

The actions of other governments

➥

The criticism of individuals and “Maxwellisation”

➥

Introduction

➥

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

➥

UK Iraq strategy

➥

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait

➥

Resolution 678 (1990)

➥

The Charter framework for the use of force

The 1991 Gulf Conflict

➥

Resolution 687 (1991)

➥

Legacy of the 1990-1991 Gulf Conflict
INTERNAL REPRESSION

➥

DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION

➥

The strategy of containment

➥

THE NORTHERN NO-FLY ZONE

➥

THE SOUTHERN NO-FLY ZONE

➥

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE NO-FLY ZONES

➥

ARMS EMBARGO

➥

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

➥

ENFORCEMENT AT SEA

➥

DETERRENCE BY FORCES STATIONED IN THE REGION

➥

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
Assessments of Iraq’s WMD capability before the Gulf Conflict

➥

Provisions of resolution 687

➥

Iraq’s response to resolution 687

➥

The discovery of Iraq’s nuclear programme

➥

Concealment of WMD activities

➥

The defection of Lieutenant General Hussein Kamil

➥

Events leading to the withdrawal of UNSCOM

➥

Tension in the Kurdish region

➥

Dr Albright’s Georgetown speech

➥

UNSCOM activity
UNSCOM REPORT, APRIL 1997

➥

A CHANGE OF TACTICS

➥

RESOLUTION 1115 (1997)

➥

MR RICHARD BUTLER SUCCEEDS MR ROLF EKÉUS

➥

IAEA REPORT, OCTOBER 1997

➥

RESOLUTION 1134 (1997)

➥

CONTINUED IRAQI NON-CO-OPERATION

➥

RESOLUTION 1137 (1997)

➥

Inspectors return to Iraq

➥

Liberal interventionism

➥

RESOLUTION 1154 (1998)

➥

➥

RESOLUTION 1194 (1998)

➥

UNSCOM AND IAEA REPORTS, OCTOBER 1998

➥

Iraq and VX

➥

US policy: regime change in Iraq

RESOLUTION 1205 (1998)

➥

UNSCOM and IAEA withdraw

➥

Operation Desert Fox

➥

LEGAL AUTHORISATION FOR OPERATION DESERT FOX

➥

After Operation Desert Fox

➥

The impact of Operation Desert Fox

➥

UNSCOM’s findings, January 1999

➥

The Amorim Review

➥

Mr Blair’s Chicago speech

➥

Cabinet discusses Iraq strategy, May 1999

➥

Resolution 1284 (1999)

➥

UNMOVIC begins work

➥

Introduction

➥

Before September 2000

➥

The erosion of the sanctions regime

Review of the UK’s strategy on Iraq, autumn 2000

➥

Challenges to the ban on air travel

➥

JIC Assessment, 11 October 2000: ‘Iraq after Saddam’

➥

JIC Assessment, 1 November 2000: ‘Iraq: Prospects for Co-operation’

➥

JIC Assessment, 23 November 2000: ‘Iraq: Regional Rapprochement’

➥

JIC Assessment, 1 December 2000:
‘Iraq’s Military Capabilities’

➥

Initial discussions with the new US Administration

➥

Review of the No-Fly Zones (NFZs)

➥

118

119

Response Options (ROs)

➥

120

JIC Assessment, 13 December 2000: ‘Impact of the NFZs on Iraqi
Persecution’

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, 23 February 2001

➥

169

Cabinet Office advice

➥

JIC Assessment, 14 February 2001:
‘Iraq: Economic Sanctions Eroding’

➥

No.10’s advice

➥

191

192

193

Attacks by coalition aircraft north of the southern NFZ, 16 February 2001

➥

194

195

196

Government statements on the 16 February attacks

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Camp David

➥

Developing a new policy on Iraq, spring 2001

➥

222

223

224

Defining the new UK policy framework

➥

225

The National Security Council and Principals Committee

➥

JIC Assessment, 8 March 2001: ‘Impact of Smarter Sanctions’

➥

Activity in the No-Fly Zones

➥

258

259

Discussions with the US

➥

Early negotiations on a smarter sanctions resolution

➥

JIC Assessment, 25 July 2001

➥

327

JIC Assessment, 25 July 2001:
‘Iraq: Continuing Erosion of Sanctions’

➥

328

329

Continuing concerns about the NFZs

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s review

➥

Discussions on a new contingency plan for the loss of an aircraft
in Iraq

➥

Developments in the US

➥

Introduction

➥

Roles and responsibilities
Cabinet

➥

Role of the Civil Service
THE CABINET SECRETARY

➥

PERMANENT SECRETARIES

➥

NO.10 CHIEF OF STAFF

➥

THE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE CO-ORDINATOR

➥

Departmental roles
The Cabinet Office

➥

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office

➥

The Secret Intelligence Service and C

➥

PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO KEY CUSTOMERS

➥

The Ministry of Defence

➥

ROLES WITHIN THE MOD

➥

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

➥

The Department for International Development

➥

Decision-making machinery pre-conflict

➥

139

140

141

The Defence and Overseas Policy Committee

➥

142

143

The conventions used in Cabinet minutes

The Ad Hoc Meeting (the War Cabinet)

➥

Official-level inter-departmental machinery
THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

➥

HE AD HOC GROUP ON IRAQ

➥

COBR(R)

➥

Creation of the Iraq Planning Unit

➥

Decision-making machinery post-invasion
The Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation

➥

The Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq

➥

The Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (Iraq)

➥

260

261

262

NSID(OD)

➥

263

264

Official-level inter-departmental machinery
THE IRAQ STRATEGY GROUP

➥

265

266

THE IRAQ SENIOR OFFICIALS GROUP

➥

267

268

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings
UK policy on Iraq in early September 2001

➥

The UN Security Council

➥

Mr Blair’s speech in Chicago, April 1999

➥

The impact of 9/11
The immediate response to 9/11

➥

The October 2001 “dossier”

➥

Operations in the No-Fly Zones

➥

Resolution 1382

➥

President Bush’s comments, 26 November 2001

➥

JIC Assessment, 28 November 2001: ‘Iraq after September 11 –
The Terrorist Threat’

➥

Development of UK strategy on Iraq
Mr Powell’s advice to Mr Blair, late November 2001

➥

FCO advice, 3 December 2001

➥

SIS advice

➥

Mr Blair’s paper for President Bush, 4 December 2001

➥

MOD’s initial response to international terrorism
The perspective in the US, December 2001

➥

Developments in January 2002

➥

Conclusions

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech and the UK response

➥

No.10’s response, mid-February 2002

➥

France’s position, mid-February 2002

➥

The UK diplomatic perspective

➥

MR BLAIR’S MEETING WITH MR ANNAN, 25 FEBRUARY 2002

➥

Development of the rationale for dealing with the threat
from Iraq

➥

JIC Assessment, 27 February 2002: ‘Iraq: Saddam Under the Spotlight’

➥

MOD advice to Mr Hoon, 27 February 2002

➥

Government statements on the need to deal with the threat from Iraq

➥

DRAFT PAPER ON WMD PROGRAMMES OF CONCERN

➥

223

224

225

Cabinet, 7 March 2002

➥

UN talks with Iraq, 7 March 2002
The Cabinet Office ‘Iraq: Options Paper’

➥

Attitudes of selected third countries, March 2002

➥

303

304

THE PROCESS FOR PRODUCING THE CABINET OFFICE ‘OPTIONS PAPER’

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s request to be kept informed

➥

Discussions with the US Administration, March 2002
MR BLAIR’S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY, 11 MARCH 2002

➥

SIR DAVID MANNING’S DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, 12 TO 13 MARCH 2002

➥

CABINET, 14 MARCH 2002

➥

390

SIR CHRISTOPHER MEYER’S ADVICE, MARCH 2002

➥

Preparations for Crawford
FCO advice on the role of the Iraqi opposition and the history of
weapons inspections

➥

JIC Current Intelligence Group Assessment, 15 March 2002: ‘The
Status of Iraqi WMD Programmes’

➥

Mr Blair’s minute, 17 March 2002

➥

429

430

431

The threat to the UK

➥

Advice from Cabinet Ministers
CABINET, 21 MARCH 2002

➥

MR HOON’S ADVICE, 22 MARCH 2002

➥

MR STRAW’S ADVICE, 25 MARCH 2002

➥

MR STRAW’S CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY POWELL, 25 MARCH 2002

➥

Mr Charles Kennedy’s letter, 26 March 2002

➥

508

509

Mr Powell’s advice, 28 March 2002

➥

Sir Christopher Meyer’s advice, 1 April 2002

➥

Advice on the economic effects of military action

➥

Chequers meeting, 2 April 2002

➥

➥

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Crawford,
April 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s meetings with President Bush at Crawford, April 2002

➥

College Station speech, 7 April 2002

➥

Reports to Parliament

➥

Cabinet, 11 April 2002

➥

The perceptions of key officials

➥

Mr Blair’s evidence

➥

Conclusions

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings
Development of UK policy, April to June 2002
A UK contribution to US-led military action

➥

JIC Assessment, 19 April 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 19 April 2002: ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes’

➥

Resolution 1409 (2002)

➥

Discussions with the US and France

➥

Definition of the UK’s objective

➥

Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, 5 June 2002

➥

The need to address the legal basis for military action

➥

Cabinet, 20 June 2002

➥

Development of UK policy, July 2002

➥

Mr Hoon asks for a collective discussion on Iraq

➥

Sir Kevin Tebbit’s advice, 3 July 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 4 July 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 4 July 2002: ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion’

➥

169

170

The Treasury’s concerns

➥

Mr Straw’s advice, 8 July 2002

➥

Sir Christopher Meyer’s advice, 9 July 2002

➥

182

183

184

Lord Goldsmith’s request for information

➥

Liaison Committee, 16 July 2002

➥

Cabinet Office paper, 19 July 2002: ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’

➥

NO.10 ADVICE, 19 JULY 2002

➥

Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s advice to Mr Straw

➥

The mood in Washington

➥

MOD advice to Mr Hoon

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting, 23 July 2002

➥

REQUEST FOR ADVICE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN’S MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND
INTENTIONS

➥

Sir Christopher Meyer’s view

➥

Mr Blair’s press conference, 25 July 2002

➥

FCO advice, 26 July 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s Note to President Bush, 28 July 2002

➥

SIR DAVID MANNING’S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s minute, 30 July 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 31 July 2002

➥

Conclusions

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

Advice for Mr Blair following his meeting of 23 July 2002
MOD advice on the military options, 26 July 2002

➥

The attitudes of allies

➥

UN inspections

➥

Iraqi regime cohesion

➥

JIC Assessment, 5 August 2002: ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes and Impact
of Military Action’

➥

Discussions with the US, August 2002
Developments in the US, early August 2002

➥

Iraq’s position

Mr Straw’s meeting with Secretary Powell, 20 August 2002

➥

The position at the end of August 2002
The legal view

➥

JIC Assessment, 21 August 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 21 August 2002: ‘Iraq: Saddam’s
Diplomatic and Military Options’

Dr Blix’s interview, 25 August 2002

➥

FCO advice, 27 August 2002

➥

The US perspective, late August 2002

➥

US national security document on Iraq, 29 August 2002

➥

176

177

MR BLAIR’S DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, 29 AUGUST 2002

➥

THE BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON’S VIEW, 30 AUGUST 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s decision to set out a public script on Iraq

➥

➥

The Sedgefield press conference, 3 September 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 3 September 2002

➥

262

263

264

JIC Assessment, 3 September 2002:
‘Iraqi Trade: A Tool of Influence’

US agreement to pursue “the UN route”

➥

Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s advice, 3 September 2002

➥

FCO advice, 4 September 2002

➥

Attack in Iraq, 5 September
FCO advice, 6 September 2002

➥

Sir David Manning’s discussion with Dr Rice, 6 September 2002

➥

Sir Christopher Meyer’s advice, 5 and 6 September 2002

➥

➥

President Chirac’s views, 6 September 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with Dr Blix, 6 September 2002

➥

President Putin’s views, 6 September 2002

➥

Saudi Arabia

➥

357

Military options

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, Camp David,
7 September 2002

➥

President Chirac’s interview, 8 September 2002

➥

➥

Mr Blair’s speech to the TUC, 10 September 2002

➥

The decision to recall Parliament

➥

471

472

473

Establishing the objectives of a UN resolution

➥

The UN General Assembly
MR ANNAN’S SPEECH, 12 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

PRESIDENT BUSH’S SPEECH, 12 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

MR DE VILLEPIN’S SPEECH, 12 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

RUSSIA AND CHINA’S COMMENTS ON IRAQ

➥

562

563

564

MR STRAW’S SPEECH, 14 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

566

567

THE UK GOVERNMENT’S POSITION

➥

Conclusions

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

US/UK discussion of a draft resolution

➥

Resolution 1284 (1999) and action to establish UNMOVIC

➥

Iraq’s agreement to the return of inspectors

➥

Discussion of US draft of 20 September 2002

➥

Agreement to offer UK military forces to the US for planning purposes

➥

Publication of the Iraq dossier
Cabinet, 23 September 2002

➥

➥

Parliamentary debates, 24 September 2002

➥

MR BLAIR’S STATEMENT, 24 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

ADJOURNMENT DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 24 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

Issues raised in the debate

➥

DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 24 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

223

224

MR STRAW’S EVIDENCE TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE,
25 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

Discussions between the US, the UK, France and Russia

➥

US/UK draft resolution, 25 September 2002

➥

237

238

239

US/UK draft resolution, 25 September 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s speech to the Labour Party Conference, 1 October 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s conversations with President Bush, 2 October 2002

➥

Continuing difficulties in securing agreement on a draft text
Iraq’s rebuttal of the UK dossier

➥

Discussions between Iraq, UNMOVIC and the IAEA about the return
of inspectors

➥

President Bush’s speech in Cincinnati, 7 October 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 10 October 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 10 October 2002:
‘International Terrorism: The Threat from Iraq’

➥

JIC Assessment, 11 October 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 11 October 2002:
‘Iraq: The Return of UN Inspectors’

Differences between the US, the UK, France and Russia remain
unresolved

➥

US Congressional authorisation for the use of force

➥

Security Council open debate, 16 and 17 October 2002

➥

The US offers compromise language for OP10

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, 17 October 2002

➥

Cabinet, 17 October 2002

➥

611

612

Legal views on the draft resolution

➥

LORD GOLDSMITH’S CONVERSATIONS WITH MR POWELL AND MR STRAW,
17 AND 18 OCTOBER 2002

➥

LORD GOLDSMITH’S MEETING WITH MR BLAIR, 22 OCTOBER 2002

➥

The UK’s draft strategic objectives

Discussion of the US/UK draft resolution of 23 October 2002

➥

US/UK draft resolution, 23 October 2002

➥

CIG Assessment, 28 October 2002

Decision to offer a land contribution to the US for planning purposes

➥

Final stages of the negotiation of resolution 1441

➥

CABINET, 7 NOVEMBER 2002

➥

800

801

802

MR STRAW’S CONVERSATION WITH LORD GOLDSMITH, 7 NOVEMBER 2002

➥

MR STRAW’S STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT, 7 NOVEMBER 2002

➥

Resolution 1441 (2002)

➥

Resolution 1441 (2002): summary of key operative
paragraphs

➥

844

845

846

Explanations of Vote

➥

Table 1: Key points from Explanations of Vote

Statements by the Permanent Members of the Security Council

➥

What was resolution 1441 intended to achieve?

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s role in the negotiation of resolution 1441

➥

The role of FCO Legal Advisers in the negotiation of resolution 1441

➥

Conclusions

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

The response to resolution 1441
Iraq’s response

➥

Cabinet, 14 November 2002

➥

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

➥

Concerns about the US view on the threshold for a material breach

➥

The Prague Summit, 21 November 2002

➥

Intelligence update, 21 November 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with Dr Blix, 22 November 2002

➥

Security Council, 25 November 2002

➥

145

146

147

Debate on resolution 1441, 25 November 2002

➥

CABINET, 28 NOVEMBER 2002

➥

Iraq’s declaration of 7 December and the response

➥

JIC Assessment, 6 December 2002: ‘Iraq: Military Options’

➥

Iraq’s declaration, 7 December 2002

➥

233

234

235

The UK’s initial response

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 13 DECEMBER 2002

➥

272

➥

273

MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, 16 DECEMBER 2002

➥

SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE’S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 2002

➥

MR STRAW’S STATEMENT, 18 DECEMBER 2002

➥

302

PRIME MINISTER’S QUESTIONS, 18 DECEMBER 2002

➥

MR HOON’S STATEMENT, 18 DECEMBER 2002

➥

309

310

311

JIC Assessment, 18 December 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 18 December 2002: ‘An Initial Assessment
of Iraq’s WMD Declaration’

➥

Meeting of the US National Security Council,
18 December 2002
Cabinet, 19 December 2002

➥

Security Council, 19 December 2002

➥

The need for a communications strategy

➥

The absence of a “smoking gun”

➥

Resolution 1452

Advice for Mr Blair in early January 2003

➥

Public statements, 7 and 8 January 2003
PUBLICATION OF THE UK’S POLICY OBJECTIVES

➥

MR HOON’S STATEMENT, 7 JANUARY 2003

➥

MR BLAIR’S SPEECH TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONFERENCE, 7 JANUARY 2003

➥

454

455

➥

456

PRIME MINISTER’S QUESTIONS, 8 JANUARY 2003

➥

Cabinet, 9 January 2003

➥

Security Council, 9 January 2003

➥

Growing pressure to find evidence of Saddam Hussein’s
non‑compliance

➥

MR BLAIR’S PRESS CONFERENCE, 13 JANUARY 2003

➥

512

513

514

LORD GOLDSMITH’S DRAFT ADVICE, 14 JANUARY 2003

➥

518

Mr Annan’s comments, 14 January 2003
PRIME MINISTER’S QUESTIONS, 15 JANUARY 2003

➥

Concern that the US might act at the end of January

➥

Cabinet, 16 January 2003

➥

THE DECISION TO DEPLOY GROUND FORCES

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with Dr Blix, 17 January 2003

➥

Security Council, 20 January 2003

➥

The positions of other members of the Security Council

➥

Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 24 January 2003

➥

643

644

645

CABINET, 23 JANUARY 2003

➥

647

648

650

MR BLAIR’S NOTE TO PRESIDENT BUSH, 24 JANUARY 2003

➥

INDICT

➥

Security Council, 27 January 2003

➥

President Bush’s State of the Union address, 28 January 2003

➥

740

741

➥

742

Security Council, 29 January 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, 31 January 2003
The US position

➥

Other views

➥

JIC Assessment, 29 January 2003

➥

➥

Cabinet, 30 January 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s conversations with President Bush, 29 and 30 January 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with Mr Aznar, 30 January 2003

➥

Papers produced for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush

➥

843

844

845

MOD LETTER, 29 JANUARY 2003

➥

FCO ADVICE, 30 JANUARY 2003

➥

LORD GOLDSMITH’S MINUTE, 30 JANUARY 2003

➥

861

MR BLAIR’S NOTE, 30 JANUARY 2003

➥

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK’S ADVICE, 31 JANUARY 2003

➥

Iraq letter, 31 January 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, 31 January 2003

➥

The views of Mr Blair and Sir Jeremy Greenstock

➥

Conclusions

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

1 to 13 February 2003
Parliamentary debates on Iraq, 3 February 2003

➥

3 and 4 February 2003

➥

Secretary Powell’s presentation to the Security Council,
5 February 2003

➥

Cabinet, 6 February 2003

➥

Meetings with Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei, 6 February 2003

➥

President Bush’s statement, 6 February 2003

➥

➥

THE UK’S POSITION, 7 FEBRUARY 2003

➥

168

FCO guidance on the UK’s position, 7 February 2003

Mr Annan’s speech, 8 February 2003

➥

➥

JIC ASSESSMENTS, 10 AND 19 FEBRUARY 2003

➥

➥

UK consideration of the timing and tactics for a second resolution

➥

Tripartite declaration, 10 February 2003

➥

The US position, 10 and 11 February 2003

➥

Mr Straw’s speech, 11 February 2003

➥

Discussions on the timing and content of a second resolution

➥

PRIME MINISTER’S QUESTIONS, 12 FEBRUARY 2003

➥

UK views on UNMOVIC inspections

➥

Cabinet, 13 February 2003

➥

Mr Straw’s statement, 13 February 2003

➥

Security Council, 14 February 2003

➥

360

Dr Blix’s report, 14 February 2003

➥

Dr ElBaradei’s report, 14 February 2003

➥

Security Council discussions, 14 February 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s speech to the Labour Party conference, 15 February 2003

➥

Decisions on the way forward

➥

European Council, 17 February 2003

➥

UK proposals for a draft second resolution

➥

Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 19 February 2003

➥

JIC Assessment, 19 February 2003: ‘Southern Iraq:
What’s in store?’
Security Council open debate, 18 and 19 February 2003

➥

Deployment of South African scientists to Baghdad

Mr Blair’s conversation with Dr Blix, 20 February 2003

➥

Agreement on the text of a second resolution

➥

Presentation of the UK’s strategy

➥

Response to the draft resolution of 24 February 2003

➥

Parliament, 25 and 26 February 2003

➥

Points made during the debate

➥

President Bush’s speech, 26 February 2003

➥

➥

LORD GOLDSMITH’S MEETING WITH NO.10 OFFICIALS, 27 FEBRUARY 2003

➥

822

Discussions at the UN, 27 and 28 February 2003

➥

➥

UNMOVIC report, 28 February 2003

UK attempts to secure support for the draft resolution

➥

Arab League Summit, 1 March 2003

➥

➥

IAEA position on Iraq’s nuclear programme
The positions of other members of the Security Council

➥

The UK position, 5 and 6 March 2003

➥

CABINET, 6 MARCH 2003

➥

USING THE “CLUSTERS” DOCUMENT

➥

ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ’S INTENTIONS, 6 MARCH 2003

➥

MR STRAW’S MEETINGS IN NEW YORK, 6 MARCH 2003

➥

AGREEMENT ON A REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION

➥

1084

1085

UK/US/Spanish draft resolution, 7 March 2003

➥

1089

1090

Dr Blix’s report, 7 March 2003

➥

1091

DR ELBARADEI’S REPORT, 7 MARCH 2003

➥

1093

1094

1095

Dr ElBaradei’s report, 7 March 2003

SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS, 7 MARCH 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s conversation with President Putin, 7 March 2003

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s advice, 7 March 2003

➥

1175

1176

Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 7 March 2003

➥

Introduction

➥

The end of the UN route

➥

Mr Straw’s statement, 10 March 2003

➥

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK

➥

President Chirac’s interview, 10 March 2003

➥

Events of 11 March 2003

➥

145

146

MR STRAW’S MINUTE TO MR BLAIR

➥

MINISTERIAL MEETING TO DISCUSS LEGAL ISSUES AND THE MILITARY PLAN

➥

Secretary Rumsfeld’s remarks, 11 March 2003
TELEPHONE DIPLOMACY, 11 MARCH 2003

➥

CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK

➥

Events of 12 March 2003
MR STRAW’S MEETING WITH MR BLAIR

➥

PRIME MINISTER’S QUESTIONS, 12 MARCH 2003

➥

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK’S PROPOSAL TO REVISE THE DRAFT RESOLUTION
OF 7 MARCH

➥

304

305

306

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK’S MEETING WITH MR ANNAN

➥

MR STRAW’S CONVERSATION WITH MR IGOR IVANOV

➥

319

320

MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, 12 MARCH 2003

➥

US CONCERNS ABOUT UK DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

➥

SECURITY COUNCIL OPEN DEBATE, 11 AND 12 MARCH 2003

➥

PRESENTATION OF THE UK’S POSITION

➥

CONSULTATIONS ON UK PROPOSALS TO IDENTIFY KEY TESTS FOR IRAQ

➥

FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT THE UK PRESENTATION OF PRESIDENT CHIRAC’S
REMARKS

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 12 MARCH 2003

➥

394

395

396

JIC Assessment, 12 March 2003:
‘International Terrorism: War with Iraq: Update’

Events of 13 March 2003

➥

CABINET, 13 MARCH 2003

➥

FRANCE’S POSITION

➥

MINISTERIAL MEETING TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY PLAN

➥

MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, 13 MARCH 2003

➥

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK, 13 MARCH 2003

➥

THE DIVISIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

➥

Events of 14 March 2003

➥

523

524

PRESIDENT CHIRAC’S CONVERSATION WITH MR BLAIR

➥

MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

➥

MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT LAGOS

➥

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK, 14 MARCH 2003

➥

The UK decision that Iraq had committed further material breaches
THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS OF 14 AND 15 MARCH 2003

➥

THE FCO PAPER OF 15 MARCH, ‘IRAQI NON-COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1441’

➥

Events of 15 and 16 March 2003

➥

618

619

THE FCO GAME PLAN

➥

MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, 15 MARCH 2003

➥

MR BLAIR’S CONTACTS WITH OTHER LEADERS

➥

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION, 15 MARCH 2003

➥

658

659

MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS, 16 MARCH 2003

➥

MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER BALKENENDE

➥

667

668

MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATION WITH MR ANNAN, 16 MARCH 2003

➥

670

671

672

Iraqi actions

➥

THE AZORES SUMMIT, 16 MARCH 2003

➥

Azores communiqué on Transatlantic Solidarity

➥

➥

The end of activity on the second resolution

➥

MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, 17 MARCH 2003

➥

724

725

RUSSIA’S POSITION

➥

726

727

728

SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK’S ANNOUNCEMENT, 17 MARCH 2003

➥

➥

MR IVANOV’S STATEMENT, 17 MARCH 2003

➥

754

755

756

IMPACT OF THE US MILITARY TIMETABLE

➥

The decision to take military action

➥

THE MILITARY PLAN

➥

788

789

MR SCARLETT’S ADVICE, 17 MARCH 2003

➥

Cabinet, 17 March 2003

➥

Statements to Parliament, 17 March 2003
MR STRAW’S STATEMENT, 17 MARCH 2003

➥

House of Lords debate on the legality
of the use of armed force, 17 March 2003

MR COOK’S RESIGNATION STATEMENT, 17 MARCH 2003

➥

Ms Short’s letter, 18 March 2003
President Bush’s ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, 17 March 2003

➥

Events of 18 March 2003
AUSTRALIA COMMITS TROOPS

➥

881

882

PRESIDENT CHIRAC’S STATEMENT

➥

MR BLAIR’S CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT BUSH, 18 MARCH 2003

➥

891

892

CDS’ DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

➥

893

894

Parliamentary approval for military action
DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 18 MARCH 2003

➥

DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 18 MARCH 2003

➥

Events of 19 and 20 March 2003

➥

SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, 19 MARCH 2003

➥

MILITARY OPERATIONS BEGIN

➥

Mr Blair’s “Address to the Nation”, 20 March 2003

➥

1042

1043

➥

Previous Inquiries

➥

Definition of weapons of mass destruction

➥

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

➥

Resolution 687 (1991): Iraq’s WMD obligations

➥

The UK’s assessment of Iraq’s WMD 2000 to 2001
JIC ASSESSMENT, 19 APRIL 2000: ‘IRAQ: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
PROGRAMMES’

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 1 DECEMBER 2000

➥

JIC Assessment, 1 December 2000:
‘Iraq’s Military Capabilities’

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 9 FEBRUARY 2001: ‘LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT’

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 10 MAY 2001

➥

Wider concerns about proliferation and terrorist use of WMD

➥

Assessment of Iraq’s WMD capability after 9/11
November to December 2001

➥

The decision to produce a dossier covering Iraq, Iran, North Korea
and Libya

➥

JIC Assessment, 27 February 2002: ‘Iraq: Saddam Under the Spotlight’

➥

Impact of Operation Desert Fox

➥

Public statements by Mr Blair and Mr Straw

➥

DRAFT ‘WMD PROGRAMMES OF CONCERN’ PAPER, 6 MARCH 2002

➥

CABINET, 7 MARCH 2002

➥

CABINET OFFICE, ‘IRAQ: OPTIONS PAPER’, 8 MARCH 2002

➥

JIC Current Intelligence Group Assessment, 15 March 2002

➥

➥

Draft ‘WMD Programmes of Concern’ paper, 15 March 2002

➥

➥

Decision to produce a dossier focused on Iraq
Proposal for a media strategy to prepare opinion for possible
military action

➥

Decisions to focus the dossier on Iraq but to postpone publication

➥

Mr Hoon’s and Mr Straw’s advice for Mr Blair, March 2002

➥

MOD consideration of Iraq’s ability to acquire a nuclear capability

➥

Development of the Iraq dossier, April to July 2002
Revision of the estimates of unaccounted for Iraqi material

➥

The Iraq dossier

➥

‘UN Weapons Inspections in Iraq’

➥

Conclusions

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

Late July and August 2002
Mr Blair’s meeting, 23 July 2002

➥

“Summer reading”

➥

Reservations about the wisdom of publishing the dossier

➥

Revision of the WMD paper

➥

JIC Assessment, 21 August 2002: ‘Iraq: Saddam’s Diplomatic and
Military Options’

➥

Dr Blix’s interview, 25 August 2002
Mr Blair’s position at the end of August 2002

➥

September 2002
Mr Blair’s decision to publish the dossier

➥

The FCO position on the problem posed by Iraq

➥

Mr Campbell’s meeting, 5 September 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, Camp David,
7 September 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002: ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical
and Biological Weapons – Possible Scenarios’

➥

IISS Assessment, 9 September 2002

Confirmation of Mr Scarlett’s responsibility for producing the dossier

➥

Draft dossier, 10 September 2002

➥

THE VIEW OF THE JIC

➥

OTHER COMMENTS ON 10 SEPTEMBER DRAFT DOSSIER

➥

INSTRUCTIONS FROM NO.10
Mr Blair’s speech to the TUC, 10 September 2002

➥

THE US PERSPECTIVE

➥

396

President Bush’s speech, 12 September 2002

➥

SIS report, 11 September 2002

➥

SIS report, 23 September 2002

➥

442

443

Mr Straw’s speech, 14 September 2002

Draft dossier, 16 September 2002

➥

Draft dossier, 19 September 2002

➥

Preparation of Mr Blair’s Foreword

➥

The final version of the dossier

➥

Iraq’s denial that it had weapons of mass destruction

Mr Blair’s Foreword

➥

560

Mr Blair’s Foreword to the 24 September dossier

Key points in the dossier

➥

562

563

564

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

➥

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

➥

BALLISTIC MISSILES

➥

FUNDING FOR THE WMD PROGRAMME

➥

587

588

Questions about the judgements in the dossier

➥

Defence Intelligence Staff concerns

➥

Mr Blair’s Foreword

➥

681

THREAT TO THE UK NATIONAL INTEREST

➥

CONTINUED PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL “WEAPONS”

➥

IRAQ’S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS

➥

LONGER-RANGE MISSILE SYSTEMS

➥

Publication of the dossier, 24 September 2002
Cabinet, 23 September 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s statement to Parliament, 24 September 2002

➥

ACCURACY OF THE STATEMENT

➥

The Butler Review conclusions on the JIC authorship of the dossier

➥

Conclusions

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

The UK assessment of Iraq’s position, October to
December 2002

➥

Iraq’s rebuttal of the UK dossier

➥

JIC Assessment, 11 October 2002: ‘Iraq: The Return of UN Inspectors’

➥

The US National Intelligence Estimate

➥

PRESIDENT BUSH’S SPEECH IN CINCINNATI, 7 OCTOBER 2002

➥

Security Council open debate, 16 and 17 October 2002

➥

JIC Current Intelligence Group Assessment, 28 October 2002:
‘Global Chemical and Biological Weapons Survey’

➥

Iraq’s response to resolution 1441

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 14 NOVEMBER 2002: ‘IRAQ: REGIME COHESION
UNDER PRESSURE’

➥

INTELLIGENCE UPDATE, 21 NOVEMBER 2002

➥

SECURITY COUNCIL, 25 NOVEMBER 2002

➥

FCO ADVICE, 29 NOVEMBER 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 6 December 2002: ‘Iraq: Military Options’

➥

Iraq’s declaration of 7 December and the UK response

➥

DOUBTS ABOUT THE SOURCING CHAIN FOR SIS REPORTS ISSUED ON
11 AND 23 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 18 DECEMBER 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 18 December 2002:
‘An Initial Assessment of Iraq’s WMD Declaration’

➥

152

153

154

SECURITY COUNCIL, 19 DECEMBER 2002

➥

JIC priorities
The absence of a “smoking gun”

➥

The UK’s objectives
UNMOVIC’s activities

➥

➥

Security Council, 27 January 2003

➥

Extracts from President Bush’s State of the Union address,
28 January 2003

JIC Assessment, 29 January 2003

➥

➥

Cabinet, 30 January 2003

➥

231

232

Iraq letter, 31 January 2003
‘Iraq – Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation’

➥

Secretary Powell’s presentation to the Security Council,
5 February 2003

➥

Meetings with Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei, 6 February 2003

➥

Mr Straw’s speech, 11 February 2003

➥

294

295

296

The UK contribution to UNMOVIC’s investigations

➥

The perspective of the inspectors

➥

SIS advice of 17 and 20 February 2003

➥

Briefings for Cabinet Members and Committee Chairs

➥

Would Iraq use chemical and biological weapons?

➥

Presentation of the UK position

➥

The position in March
The IAEA position on Iraq’s nuclear programme

➥

399

UK assessments of Iraq’s intentions

➥

Security Council, 7 March 2003

➥

Security Council open debate, 11 and 12 March 2003

➥

No.10 advice to Mr Blair

➥

Mr Cook’s resignation statement, 17 March 2003

➥

Mr Scarlett’s advice, 17 March 2003

➥

JIC Note, 19 March 2003: ‘Saddam: The Beginning of the End’

➥

Security Council, 19 March 2003

➥

Withdrawal of intelligence
SIS reporting of 11 and 23 September 2002

➥

THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE’S VIEW

➥

548

549

THE BUTLER REVIEW

➥

551

552

553

MINISTERIAL AWARENESS THAT THE REPORTING HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN

➥

Withdrawal of two other streams of SIS reporting

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 23 DECEMBER 2004: ‘IRAQI WMD – A REVIEW OF JIC
JUDGEMENTS MADE IN 2002’

➥

JIC DISCUSSION, 9 FEBRUARY 2006

➥

646

Reliability of intelligence

➥

A LESSON LEARNED?

➥

661

662

663

Conclusions

➥

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

Planning and preparation for the post-conflict search
for WMD

➥

Operation ROCKINGHAM

➥

Possible find of CBW agents

➥

IAEA report, April 2003

➥

Security Council debate on the future role of UNMOVIC

➥

Creation of the Iraq Survey Group

➥

Managing public expectations

➥

The investigation of possible mobile production facilities
for biological agent

➥

Resolution 1483: WMD provisions

➥

Pressure to set up an independent inquiry on pre-conflict
intelligence

➥

House of Commons debates on Iraq, 4 June 2003

➥

Dr Blix’s final report to the Security Council

➥

300

301

302

The JIC Sub-Committee on Iraq/WMD and the WMD Task Force

➥

UK concerns about the ISG’s slow start

➥

JIC Assessment, 27 June 2003: ‘Iraq WMD: The Emerging Picture’

➥

➥

FAC Report, 7 July 2003: ‘The Decision to go to War in Iraq’

➥

Mr Blair’s evidence to the Liaison Committee, 8 July 2003

➥

391

392

House of Commons debate on Iraq, 15 July 2003

➥

Uranium and Niger

➥

The ISG builds momentum

➥

The death of Dr David Kelly and the Hutton Inquiry

➥

428

Revised Directive on UK military co-operation with the ISG

➥

Preparation of the ISG Interim Report

➥

Deteriorating security and the ISG

➥

JIC discussion of the draft ISG Interim Report

➥

ISC Report, 11 September 2003: ‘Iraqi Weapons of Mass
Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments’

➥

The ISG Interim Report, 2 October 2003

➥

➥

Follow-up to the ISG Interim Report

➥

House of Commons debate on Iraq, 22 October 2003

➥

534

535

536

Impact of the transfer of ISG resources from WMD to counter‑terrorism

➥

Government responses to the FAC

➥

The transition from Dr Kay to Mr Duelfer

➥

Dr Kay’s evidence to the Senate Armed Services Committee,
28 January 2004

➥

The Hutton Report, 28 January 2004

➥

The decision to establish the Butler Review

➥

➥

Mr Tenet’s speech to Georgetown University, 5 February 2004

➥

The search for WMD, January to July 2004

➥

Preparation of the ISG Status Report

➥

The ISG Status Report, 30 March 2004

➥

The transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government

➥

Mr Tenet’s resignation

➥

The Butler and Senate Intelligence Committee Reports,
July 2004

➥

Mr Blair’s evidence to the Liaison Committee, 6 July 2004

➥

820

821

The Senate Intelligence Committee Report, 9 July 2004

➥

822

823

The Butler Report, 14 July 2004

➥

➥

The ISG Comprehensive Report, 6 October 2004

➥

➥

The Government’s response to the ISG Comprehensive Report

➥

867

868

869

Closure of the ISG and Addendums to the
Comprehensive Report

➥

➥

➥

Conclusions

➥

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

UNSCR 1441

➥

Discussion, debate and advice, November to December 2002
Lord Goldsmith’s conversations with Mr Powell and Mr Straw,
November 2002

➥

Cabinet, 14 November 2002

➥

“Material breach” and the need for advice

➥

The concept of “material breach”

➥

House of Commons debate on Iraq, 25 November 2002

➥

FCO advice, 6 December 2002

➥

Obtaining Lord Goldsmith’s opinion
Instructions for Lord Goldsmith to advise

➥

The revival argument

➥

108

“ARTICLE 33: INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES AUTHENTICATED IN
TWO OR MORE LANGUAGES

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s meeting with No.10 officials, 19 December 2002

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s provisional view
Lord Goldsmith’s draft advice of 14 January 2003

➥

No.10’s reaction to Lord Goldsmith’s advice

➥

Cabinet, 16 January 2003

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s meeting with Sir Jeremy Greenstock,
23 January 2003

➥

➥

Options for a second resolution

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s advice, 30 January 2003

➥

US agreement to pursue a second resolution

➥

Public statements by Mr Blair, February 2003

➥

A disagreement between Mr Straw and Mr Wood

➥

Mr Straw’s letter to Lord Goldsmith, 6 February 2003

➥

Further advice on a second resolution

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s visit to Washington, 10 February 2003

➥

Agreement on a second resolution

➥

A second resolution is tabled

➥

➥

Mr Straw’s evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 4 March 2003

➥

Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s advice on “end game options”, 4 March 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 5 March 2003

➥

499

500

501

Advice on the effect of a “veto”

➥

Cabinet, 6 March 2003

➥

512

513

514

UK/US/Spanish draft resolution, 7 March 2003

Lord Goldsmith’s advice, 7 March 2003

➥

The revival argument – a sound basis “in principle”

➥

The revival argument – the effect of resolution 1441 (2002)

➥

The first line of argument

➥

534

535

The second line of argument

➥

The significance of OP12

➥

Other arguments rejected

➥

550

551

Lord Goldsmith’s conclusions

➥

Other matters dealt with in Lord Goldsmith’s 7 March advice

➥

Media coverage during the weekend of 8 and 9 March

➥

Government reaction to Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March
Mr Straw’s statement, 10 March 2003

➥

595

596

597

Mr Blair’s meeting with Lord Goldsmith, 11 March 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting, 11 March 2003

➥

Mr Straw’s minute to Mr Blair, 11 March 2003

➥

Prime Minister’s Questions, 12 March 2003

➥

Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s discussions in New York, 12 March 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 12 March 2003

➥

Cabinet, 13 March 2003

➥

The continuing public debate
Media reports, 13 March 2003

➥

Parliamentary calls for a statement

➥

Erskine May

➥

The legal basis for military action
Lord Goldsmith’s change of view, 13 March 2003

➥

Preparing the legal case

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s meeting with Lord Falconer and Baroness Morgan,
13 March 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 13 March 2003

➥

Confirmation of Mr Blair’s view
The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003

➥

Mr Blair’s view

➥

Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 15 March 2003

➥

The presentation of the Government’s position
FCO paper, ‘Iraqi Non-Compliance with UNSCR 1441’, 15 March 2003

➥

Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s discussions in New York, 16 March 2003

➥

Preparing the legal argument

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer, 17 March 2003

➥

805

806

Text of Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003

➥

Cabinet, 17 March 2003

➥

Mr Straw’s statement to the House of Commons, 17 March 2003

➥

Conclusions
The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of
resolution 1441

Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003

Lord Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003

Cabinet, 17 March 2003

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

MOD Defence Planning Assumptions

➥

The possibility of military invasion emerges
The impact of 9/11

➥

President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech and the UK response

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 27 FEBRUARY 2002: ‘IRAQ: SADDAM UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT’

➥

THE MOD PERSPECTIVE

➥

CABINET, 7 MARCH 2002

➥

THE CABINET OFFICE ‘IRAQ: OPTIONS PAPER’

➥

Deployments to Afghanistan in early 2002

MR HOON’S ADVICE, 22 MARCH 2002

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting at Chequers, 2 April 2002

➥

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Crawford, April 2002

➥

Initial consideration of UK military options
MOD contingency planning in April and May 2002

➥

167

168

169

MR WEBB’S ADVICE, 12 APRIL 2002

➥

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE “PIGOTT GROUP”

➥

MOD ADVICE TO MR HOON, MAY 2002

➥

Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, 5 June 2002

➥

SPG paper, 13 June 2002

➥

Ministerial consideration of UK policy – July 2002
Formal military planning begins

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 4 JULY 2002: ‘IRAQ: REGIME COHESION’

➥

Mr Hoon’s proposal for a collective Ministerial discussion

➥

The MOD’s assessment of US military plans

➥

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting, 23 July 2002
CABINET OFFICE PAPER, ‘IRAQ: CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION’

➥

MOD ADVICE FOR MR HOON

➥

Definition of UK force “Packages”
MOD advice, 26 July 2002

➥

Developments during August 2002

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 21 AUGUST 2002: ‘SADDAM’S DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY
OPTIONS’

➥

THE IMPACT OF OPERATION FRESCO

➥

PJHQ ADVICE, 30 AUGUST 2002

➥

Preparations for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, Camp David

➥

SPG PAPER, 4 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

MOD ADVICE, 6 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

Attack in Iraq, 5 September 2002
The outcome of the meeting at Camp David

➥

JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002

➥

635

636

637

Decisions to offer ground forces to the US for planning
purposes
MOD planning for a UK land contribution, September 2002

➥

CABINET, 23 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

Parliamentary debates, 24 September 2002
CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING, 25 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

SPG PAPER, 30 SEPTEMBER 2002

➥

Concerns about Turkey

The MOD request to offer ground forces

➥

MR HOON’S MINUTE, 15 OCTOBER 2002

➥

NO.10’S QUESTIONS

➥

THE FCO PERSPECTIVE

➥

US Congressional authorisation for the use of force
Mr Blair’s meeting, 17 October 2002

➥

The UK’s draft strategic objectives

Mr Blair’s decision to offer Package 3 to the US, 31 October 2003

➥

CABINET, 24 OCTOBER 2002

➥

MOD CONCERNS ABOUT THE US PERSPECTIVE

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 30 OCTOBER 2002: ‘TURKEY: ATTITUDE TO AN IRAQ
CAMPAIGN’

➥

MR BLAIR’S MEETING, 31 OCTOBER 2002

➥

Why did the UK Government decide to offer ground forces?

➥

898

899

Why did the UK offer a divisional headquarters and an armoured
brigade?

➥

What was the UK’s desire to influence the US seeking to achieve, and
was it a determining factor in the decision?

➥

What factors influenced the timing of the decision?

➥

➥

Did the need to maintain the Army’s morale influence the decision?

➥

Were the other risks of offering ground forces fully identified and
considered?

➥

UK pursuit of the northern option
Discussions with the US about Turkey’s position

➥

Military planning for the northern option

➥

SPG PAPER, 6 NOVEMBER 2002

➥

Adoption of resolution 1441
US REQUEST FOR SUPPORT FROM ALLIES

➥

PJHQ’S PROPOSAL TO EXPLORE OPTIONS IN THE SOUTH

➥

MOD ADVICE FOR NO.10, 19 NOVEMBER 2002

➥

UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE NORTHERN OPTION

➥

House of Commons debate, 25 November 2002

➥

JIC Assessment, 6 December 2002: ‘Iraq: Military Options’

➥

Agreement to visible preparations for military action starting
in January

➥

Iraqi declaration, 7 December 2002

➥

Agreement to a role for the Royal Marines in the initial stages of
an invasion

➥

Mr Hoon’s statement, 18 December 2002

➥

1211

1212

1213

Continued pursuit of the northern option

➥

SPG PAPER, 13 DECEMBER 2002

➥

Proposals to increase ground combat forces and options for the
South

➥

MOD ADVICE TO NO.10, 19 AND 20 DECEMBER 2002

➥

MOD ADVICE TO MR HOON, 20 DECEMBER 2002

➥

Planning Directive for Lt Gen Reith, 30 December 2002

Mr Hoon’s statement, 7 January 2003

➥

The end of the northern option

➥

Mr Hoon’s visit to Turkey, January 2003

➥

Should the UK have addressed an alternative to the northern
option earlier and more seriously?

➥

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings
The switch to the South

➥

CENTCOM’s proposal for a UK Division in the South

➥

MOD advice to No.10 on deployment to the South

➥

Cabinet, 16 January 2003

➥

The decision to deploy ground forces, 17 January 2003

➥

The absence of collective Ministerial consideration of the decision to
deploy UK forces

➥

Planning military operations
Military discussions with the US

➥

JIC Assessment, 29 January 2003: ‘The Emerging View from Baghdad’

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, 31 January 2003

➥

Planning for an air campaign
THE UK CONTRIBUTION TO AN AIR CAMPAIGN

➥

THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

➥

349

350

Overview of international humanitarian law

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS ON TARGETING

➥

Objectives for the military campaign

➥

The Phase IV plan

➥

Iraq’s response to an invasion

➥

Iraq at the Crossroads:
State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change

➥

The Red Team

Debate on the UK role in combat operations

➥

DEVELOPMENT OF PHASE IV PLANNING

➥

➥

Commitment to military action

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting, 11 March 2003: agreement to the military plan

➥

Lord Goldsmith’s advice, 7 March 2003

➥

DIS Memorandum, 11 March 2003: ‘Basra: Post-Saddam Governance’

➥

JIC Note, 13 March 2003: ‘Saddam’s Plan for Baghdad’

➥

Two additional UK units deployed

➥

Cabinet, 17 March 2003

➥

The ultimatum to Saddam Hussein

➥

Debates in Parliament, 18 March 2003

➥

654

655

The final preparations for conflict

➥

JIC Note, 19 March 2003: ‘Saddam: The Beginning of the End’

➥

Joint minute on the UK military contribution to post-conflict Iraq

➥

➥

Rules of Engagement

➥

Guidance on targeting

➥

Sites of religious and cultural significance

➥

➥

Introduction and key findings

➥

Scales of military operation

Testing the UK’s expeditionary capability: lessons learned?

➥

The UK’s expeditionary capability by 2002

➥

Equipment preparations for the invasion (2002 to 2003)
Planning begins

➥

DETAILED PLANNING FOR UORS BEGINS

➥

The decision to deploy ground forces to the South and its implications

➥

CONCERNS ABOUT COMBAT ID

➥

PROGRESS ON UORS

➥

Reporting equipment issues from theatre

➥

The situation in the week before the invasion

➥

Issues that emerged post-invasion

➥

Table 1: The relationship between UORs for the start of Op TELIC and the
Equipment Programme

➥

477

478

Table 2: Categories of UORs for the start of Op TELIC

➥

479

Table 3: Availability of UORs before the invasion
Desert uniforms

➥

Enhanced Combat Body Armour

➥

Biological and chemical warfare protection

➥

Ammunition

➥

Combat ID

➥

Asset tracking

➥

MOD reflections on equipping the forces deployed for the conflict

➥

Training on equipment post-conflict

➥

Conclusions

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings
Pre-conflict management of information on Iraq

➥

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office

➥

The Iraq Planning Unit

➥

The Joint Intelligence Committee

➥

The Defence Intelligence Staff

➥

The Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat

➥

The Ad Hoc Group on Iraq

➥

The Department for International Development

➥

UK international development policy and the
Department for International Development

US and UK planning machinery

➥

The US approach to nation-building

➥

Initial UK consideration of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq

➥

The ‘Contract with the Iraqi People’

➥

Preparations for Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at
Crawford, 6 April 2002

➥

Government contact with the Iraqi opposition

➥

Post-conflict issues after Crawford

➥

The Future of Iraq Project

➥

The DFID Iraq programme

➥

The UN Oil-for-Food programme

➥

UK and US organisational changes

➥

The potential scale of the post-conflict task
FCO PAPER: ‘REGIONAL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY ACTION
AGAINST IRAQ’

➥

TREASURY PAPER: ‘WHAT WOULD BE THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WAR IN IRAQ?’

➥

SPG PAPER, 4 SEPTEMBER 2002: ‘UK MILITARY STRATEGIC THINKING ON IRAQ’

➥

Mr Blair’s commitment to post-conflict reconstruction

➥

Initial analysis of the issues and the Ad Hoc Group on Iraq

➥

FCO PAPER: ‘IRAQ – CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT FOR THE REGION AND
BEYOND’

➥

FCO PAPER: ‘SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF IRAQ AFTER SADDAM’

➥

STATE DEPARTMENT PAPER ON LESSONS OF THE PAST

➥

563

564

565

SPG PAPER, 30 SEPTEMBER 2002: ‘UK MILITARY STRATEGIC THINKING ON IRAQ’

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 10 OCTOBER 2002: ‘INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE
THREAT FROM IRAQ’

➥

578

579

POSSIBLE MODELS FOR ADMINISTERING A POST-SADDAM HUSSEIN IRAQ

➥

FCO PAPER: ‘VISION FOR IRAQ AND THE IRAQI PEOPLE’

➥

DFID PAPER: ‘IRAQ: POTENTIAL HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS’

➥

DFID PAPER: ‘CENTRAL/SOUTHERN IRAQ HUMANITARIAN SITUATION ANALYSIS’

➥

UK STRATEGIC POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR IRAQ

➥

AHGI STOCKTAKE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING

➥

FCO PAPER: ‘INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR IRAQ: WHAT, WHO
AND HOW?’

➥

WAR CRIMES AND THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR IRAQ

➥

UK military options: war-fighting and reconstruction

➥

Growing concern about post-conflict planning
DFID CONTACT WITH THE US AND UN

➥

JIC ASSESSMENT, 23 OCTOBER 2002: ‘IRAQ: THE KURDS AND SHIA’

➥

➥

FCO PAPER: ‘ECONOMIC ISSUES IN IRAQ AFTER POST-SADDAM REGIME
CHANGE’

➥

TREASURY PAPER: ‘ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A WAR IN IRAQ’

➥

779

GOVERNMENT CONTACT WITH UK ACADEMICS

➥

SPG PAPER, 6 NOVEMBER 2002: ‘UK MILITARY STRATEGIC THINKING ON IRAQ’

➥

First round of inter-agency talks, Washington, 6 November 2002

➥

Post-Saddam Hussein oil contracts

➥

UK military options

➥

Parliamentary debates on resolution 1441, 25 November 2002

➥

Domestic contingency planning

➥

DFID engagement with Whitehall

➥

FCO preparation for handling an “all-out crisis”

➥

FCO REPORT ON SADDAM HUSSEIN’S CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

➥

FCO PAPER: ‘INTERIM ADMINISTRATIONS IN IRAQ’

➥

FCO PAPER: ‘IRAQ: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM’

➥

FCO PAPER: ‘ISLAMISM IN IRAQ’

➥

Iraqi opposition conference, London

➥

979

980

981

Iraqi opposition meetings in the UK

➥

Military preparations gather pace

➥

SPG PAPER, 13 DECEMBER 2002: ‘UK MILITARY STRATEGIC THINKING ON IRAQ’

➥

➥

Invasion plans take shape
UK objectives for post-conflict Iraq

➥

UK military focus shifts to southern Iraq

➥

Definition and use of “Area of Operations (AO)” and
“Area of Responsibility (AOR)”

➥

Cabinet, 9 January 2003

➥

DFID involvement in UK military planning

➥

The decision to deploy UK forces

➥

Introduction

➥

Second round of inter-agency talks, Washington,
22 January 2003

➥

Follow-up to the inter-agency talks

➥

The UK Common Document

➥

Post-conflict discussions with the French

➥

UK military campaign objectives

➥

Mr Blair’s talks with President Bush, 31 January 2003

➥

➥

Official-level discussions with the US

➥

DFID humanitarian contingency planning

➥

Parliamentary discussion of post-conflict issues, 3 February 2003

➥

Creation of the Iraq Planning Unit

➥

Domestic contingency planning: the Stephens Group

➥

PJHQ planning seminar

➥

Preparing for the UK’s “exemplary” role in the South

➥

Maintaining pressure on the US

➥

Revised UK military campaign objectives

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting on humanitarian issues, 13 February 2003

➥

UN preparations

➥

The absence of a “winning concept”

➥

DFID contingency planning

➥

“Sectorisation”

➥

The post-conflict Rock Drill

➥

Seeking US agreement on the post-conflict role of the UN

➥

The potential for violence in the South

➥

A UN “badge” for post-conflict Iraq

➥

The DIS Red Team

➥

628

629

The DIS Red Team

➥

630

631

632

Obstacles to an “exemplary” UK effort

➥

The legal framework for Occupation

➥

The ‘UK Vision for Phase IV’

➥

➥

UK commercial interests

➥

The UK ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’

➥

Growing pressure for Ministerial decisions

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting on post-conflict issues, 6 March 2003

➥

The UK plan for Phase IV

➥

TREASURY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IMF

➥

842

843

DFID update on humanitarian assistance

➥

DIS Red Team report on retaining the support of the Iraqi people

➥

UK military and humanitarian co-ordination in the South

➥

MR STRAW’S STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 10 MARCH 2003

➥

880

DIS REPORT: ‘BASRA: POST SADDAM GOVERNANCE’

➥

DFID’S HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY AND IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE PLAN

➥

Extending the Oil-for-Food programme

➥

Plans and preparations on the eve of the invasion

➥

The FCO Emergency Unit

➥

Presidential approval of US post-conflict plans

➥

The UK military plan

➥

Eclipse II – the CFLCC plan for Phase IV

➥

993

994

995

UK objectives for post-conflict Iraq

➥

The Azores Summit, 16 March 2003

➥

Post-Azores concerns

➥

Parliamentary debate on Iraq, 18 March 2003

➥

Revised arrangements for Ministerial discussion of Iraq

➥

Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 19 March 2003

➥

1132

1133

Prime Minister’s Questions, 19 March 2003

➥

Security Council debate on Iraq, 19 March 2003

➥

Straw/Hoon joint minute to Mr Blair

➥

➥

The invasion

➥

The role of the UN

➥

MOD update on Phase IV planning

➥

Draft UK post-conflict objectives

➥

Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, Camp David,
26 and 27 March 2003

➥

Witness comments

➥

Conclusions
What was known on the eve of the invasion

➥

The failure to plan or prepare for known risks

The planning process and decision-making

Conclusions

The UK decision to support US military action

➥

UK policy before 9/11

➥

The impact of 9/11

➥

Decision to take the UN route

➥

Negotiation of resolution 1441

➥

The prospect of military action

➥

The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council
widens

➥

The end of the UN route

➥

Why Iraq? Why now?

➥

286

287

288

Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?

➥

The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military
action in Iraq

➥

The UK’s relationship with the US

➥

The legal basis for military action and the authority of the UN

➥

Decision-making

➥

393

394

Collective responsibility

➥

Lessons

➥

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings
The military Coalition

➥

The UK contribution

➥

UK forces already in the Gulf

➥

Command and control

➥

Appointment of the UK National Contingent Commander

➥

Figure 1: Command and control arrangements

➥

The US campaign plan

➥

Information operations

➥

The UK’s planned role in offensive operations

➥

The invasion
The decision to take military action

➥

The Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directive

➥

Offensive operations begin

➥

The launch of the main offensive

➥

Potential Iraqi opposition in southern Iraq

➥

The air campaign

➥

Battle Damage Assessments

The maritime campaign

➥

23 and 24 March: UK forces reach Basra

➥

25 to 27 March: an operational pause

➥

28 March: one week in

➥

29 to 31 March: events

➥

1 to 3 April

➥

4 April

➥

US forces enter Baghdad

➥

The wider Coalition campaign

The fall of Basra

➥

The defence of Basra and the role of irregular forces

➥

The collapse of the Iraqi regime

➥

The role of UK Special Forces

The immediate aftermath

➥

UK comments on levels of deployed US forces

The end of combat operations

➥

UK influence on the planning and conduct of the military campaign

➥

The transition to post-conflict operations

➥

499

Definition and use of “Area of Operations” and “Area
of Responsibility”
Phase IV military planning papers

➥

The relationship between the UK military and ORHA

➥

Extension of the UK AO

➥

The military Statement of Requirement for a UK AOR

➥

Alignment of the UK AOR with ORHA’s southern region

➥

Lessons

➥

Introduction

➥

March 2003

➥

The legal framework for the Occupation

April 2003

➥

UK troops enter Basra

➥

US force levels

➥

221

222

The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)

➥

May 2003

➥

US command structures and the SBMR-I

➥

Creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority

➥

The resignation of Ms Short

➥

From a short to a long Occupation

➥

de-Ba’athification

➥

362

The organisation of the CPA

➥

Joint Occupying Powers

Introduction

➥

May 2003: after resolution 1483

➥

June 2003

➥

Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani

➥

July 2003

➥

New military structures
Tour lengths

➥

Iranian activity and influence in Iraq

August 2003

➥

The UN bombing

➥

September 2003

➥

Muqtada al-Sadr and Jaysh al-Mahdi

➥

Mr Baha Mousa

➥

The assassination of Dr Aqila al-Hashemi

➥

October 2003

➥

November 2003

➥

Origins of the 15 November Agreement

➥

Multi-national force levels in MND(SE)

➥

➥

Impact of the political timetable on the CPA

➥

December 2003

➥

January 2004

➥

February 2004

➥

Kurdish autonomy

➥

March 2004

➥

790

791

Figure 1: The Transitional Iraqi Government

➥

April 2004

➥

The Fallujah Brigade

➥

Abu Ghraib

➥

The Battle of Danny Boy

➥

The Impact of events in spring 2004

June 2004
Appointing the Iraqi Interim Government

➥

Introduction

➥

July 2004

➥

August 2004

➥

September 2004

➥

Table 1: Composition of Iraqi Interim National Council

➥

Kidnap in Iraq

October 2004

➥

Mortality in Iraq

November 2004

➥

US Presidential election 2004

➥

December 2004

➥

January 2005

➥

February 2005

➥

Table 2: Iraqi election results, January 2005

➥

March 2005

➥

April 2005

➥

The Dawa Party

➥

May 2005

➥

The UK General Election

➥

Introduction

➥

June 2005

➥

July 2005

➥

The London bombings

➥

August 2005

➥

September 2005

➥

Al Qaida declares war

➥

October 2005

➥

The Iraqi Constitution

➥

The Iraqi Special Tribunal

➥

Assessment of the Constitution

➥

November 2005

➥

The kidnapping of Mr Norman Kember

➥

December 2005

➥

January 2006

➥

Table 1: December 2005 election results

➥

February 2006

➥

March 2006

➥

April 2006

➥

May 2006

➥

Loss of a Lynx and its crew in Basra

➥

Introduction

➥

June 2006

➥

The death of Abu Musab al‑Zarqawi

➥

Table 1: Key Cabinet Ministers in the first Maliki government

➥

July 2006

➥

Iran’s enrichment programme

August 2006

➥

The 2006 Lebanon War

➥

The House of Commons Defence Committee’s Report

➥

September 2006

➥

October 2006

➥

November 2006

➥

US mid-term elections

➥

December 2006

➥

The execution of Saddam Hussein
January 2007

➥

February 2007

➥

March 2007

➥

HMS Cornwall

➥

April 2007

➥

May 2007

➥

Mr Blair announces his resignation

➥

US funding for Iraq

➥

June 2007

➥

Detention by UK forces in Iraq

➥

US politics

➥

Introduction

➥

June 2007: The Brown Government

➥

Terrorist incidents in London and Glasgow
July 2007

➥

August 2007

➥

Assassinations in Diwaniyah

➥

Assassination of the Governor of Muthanna

➥

General Keane’s comments

➥

September 2007

➥

The impact of negotiations with JAM1

➥

The credit crunch

➥

October 2007

➥

November 2007

➥

December 2007

➥

January 2008

➥

The Aitken Report

➥

February 2008

➥

Kidnap of Mr Richard Butler

➥

March 2008

➥

➥

April 2008

➥

➥

Introduction

➥

May 2008

➥

June 2008

➥

100

101

102

July 2008

➥

August 2008

➥

September 2008

➥

October 2008

➥

November 2008
US Presidential Election

➥

December 2008

➥

January 2009

➥

February 2009

➥

Table 1: Number of detainees held in Iraq by the UK

➥

March 2009

➥

Table 2: Seats won in January 2009 provincial elections

➥

April 2009

➥

May 2009

➥

June 2009

➥

July 2009

➥

August 2009

➥

September/October 2009

➥

The end of Op TELIC

➥

483

484

Troop numbers 2003 to 2009

➥

485

Table 3: UK Service personnel deployed to Iraq

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

Objectives and preparation

➥

Overview of the post-conflict period

➥

Occupation
Looting in Basra

➥

Looting in Baghdad

➥

UK influence on post-invasion strategy
RESOLUTION 1483

➥

UK INFLUENCE ON THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

➥

A decline in security

➥

Sectarianism

The turning point

➥

Transition
UK influence on US strategy post-CPA

➥

Planning for withdrawal

➥

The impact of Afghanistan

➥

Iraqiisation

➥

➥

A possible civil war

➥

Force Level Review

➥

Negotiations with JAM1 in Basra

➥

155

156

Making the decision to leave Basra Palace

➥

157

158

Deciding the UK role post-PIC
The beginning of the end

➥

Did the UK achieve its strategic objectives in Iraq?

➥

Issues in the UK system
Strategy-making

➥

Optimism bias

➥

Lessons

➥

Introduction

➥

UK post-conflict objectives and planning assumption

➥

Definition and use of Area of Operations (AO) and Area of
Responsibility (AOR)

Humanitarian assistance

➥

Extending the Oil-for-Food programme

➥

Publicising humanitarian assistance

➥

Coalition-building

➥

Post-conflict reconstruction and ORHA

➥

112

113

114

Responsibility for reconstruction

➥

UK concerns over participation in ORHA

➥

The legal framework for Occupation

➥

The MOD’s Red Team

Decisions to increase UK support for ORHA

➥

Reconstruction strategy and funding

➥

Concerns over the scale of the reconstruction challenge and
ORHA’s response

➥

Resolution 1483

➥

393

394

Resolution 1483 (2003), 22 May 2003

➥

395

396

397

The return to a ‘war footing’, June 2003

➥

Advice on the UK’s responsibilities as an Occupying Power

➥

The first UK plan for reconstruction in the South, 12 June

➥

Making CPA(South) a model

➥

The focus of the CPA’s media operations

➥

557

558

559

Establishing a British Fiefdom in the South, July 2003

➥

CPA’s‘Vision for Iraq’ and ‘Achieving the Vision’ implementation plan

➥

Sir Hilary Synnott arrives in Basra, 30 July

➥

Responding to deteriorating security

➥

Pressure to provide additional funding for reconstruction

➥

Staffing the CPA and new structures in London

➥

First cross-Whitehall Strategy for Iraq

➥

Lobbying for a level playing field for UK businesses

➥

Madrid Donors Conference, 23 and 24 October 2003

➥

Priorities for the last six months of Occupation

➥

Challenging the CPA’s privatisation plans

➥

Responding to the new, shorter timetable for the transfer of
sovereignty

➥

The closure of the Oil-for-Food (OFF) programme

➥

UK concern over the CPA’s media operation

➥

DFID’s Interim Country Assistance Plan

➥

Lobbying for US reconstruction contracts

➥

Planning and preparing for the transfer of sovereignty

➥

UK contributions to the World Bank and UN Trust Funds

➥

UK Transition Plan for Iraq

➥

Basra International Airport

➥

UK Transition Plan for Southern Iraq

➥

Reports from Iraq

➥

The state of provincial administration in the South,
June 2004

Resolution 1546

➥

The state of Iraq on the eve of transition

➥

Sir Hilary Synnott’s assessment

➥

1104

1105

1106

Resources available for reconstruction

➥

1107

1108

➥

1112

UK funding for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction

➥

1113

1114

UK support for the CPA

➥

1115

1116

Reflections on the level of resources available for reconstruction

➥

Introduction

➥

The transition from Occupation to an Iraqi Government

➥

Efforts to accelerate the pace of reconstruction

➥

Reconstruction in areas regained from insurgent control, and Fallujah

➥

Lessons from Najaf

Agreement on debt relief for Iraq

➥

Taking the strain in the South, early 2005

➥

Basra International Airport reopens to commercial traffic

➥

DFID reduces its budget for Iraq for 2005/06

➥

DFID’s budget for and expenditure in 2005/06

Priorities for 2005

➥

Mr Benn’s evidence to the
International Development Committee, 10 March 2005

➥

DFID reviews its Interim Country Assistance Plan

➥

The Iraqi Transitional Government

➥

➥

The International Conference on Iraq, 22 June 2005

➥

Preparing for transition to Iraqi control in the South

➥

Responding to the new US Clear-Hold-Build strategy

➥

Preparing for the transfer of security responsibility in Maysan
and Muthanna

➥

DFID’s Portfolio Quality Review, March 2006

➥

Turning Basra around

➥

UK plans for 2007, and the US surge

➥

Major General Shirreff’s proposal for a military-led UK effort in
the South

➥

Preparing for Provincial Iraqi Control in Basra

➥

The International Compact with Iraq, May 2007

➥

Responding to the displacement crisis

➥

Table 1: Displacement of minority groups within Iraq

Reconstruction under Mr Gordon Brown’s Premiership

➥

Japanese support for reconstruction

➥

Charge of the Knights, March 2008

➥

Transition to a normal bilateral relationship with Iraq

➥

Long-Term Strategy for Iraq, February 2009

➥

Resources available for reconstruction

➥

1047

Table 2: UK expenditure on humanitarian and development assistance (£m)

➥

Table 3: UK expenditure from the Conflict Pools (£m)

➥

1055

1056

Reflections on the impact of the UK’s reconstruction effort

➥

Key economic and social indicators

➥

Table 4: Iraq: selected economic and social indicators

Introduction

➥

UK policy on Iraq’s oil and oil revenues
Iraq oil reserves, production and export

➥

The Oil-for-Food (OFF) Programme
UK energy security interests, 2001 to 2002

➥

Planning and preparing for a post-conflict Iraq

➥

MILITARY PLANNING

➥

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US

➥

The invasion and immediate aftermath

➥

Negotiations with the US over the control of Iraqi oil revenues

➥

Oil policy under the Coalition Provisional Authority

➥

Study on the Political Economy of Oil

➥

The Iraq Heritage Trust

➥

Scrutiny of disbursements from the Development Fund for
Iraq (DFI) by the UK

UK policy under Iraqi Governments

➥

Table 1: Iraqi crude oil production and revenue (selected years)

UK Government support for UK business
UK commercial interests, 2001 to 2002

➥

554

555

Planning and preparing for a post-conflict Iraq

➥

Influencing the Coalition Provisional Authority and the US

➥

THE SUCCESS OF UK COMPANIES IN SECURING CONTRACTS IN IRAQ

➥

Responding to renewed commercial interest in Iraq, 2008

➥

Debt relief

➥

796

UK policy

➥

The US push for substantial debt relief, December 2003

➥

The UK seeks a better deal for the most heavily indebted countries

➥

Paris Club agrees debt relief for Iraq, November 2004

➥

Returning asylum seekers to Iraq

➥

859

860

Table 2: Asylum applications to industrialised countries and to the UK originating in Iraq

➥

Post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation

➥

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit

➥

THE PCRU AND IRAQ

➥

The Stabilisation Unit

➥

The Cabinet Office Task Force Review of Stabilisation and Civil Effect

➥

➥

The impact of the PCRU and the SU

➥

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings
Pre‑invasion planning and preparation

➥

Occupation

➥

Leadership of the UK’s reconstruction effort

➥

Failure to commit to ORHA

➥

Returning to “a war footing”

➥

UK scrutiny of disbursements from the
Development Fund for Iraq

➥

The focus on the South

➥

Transition

➥

UK funding for reconstruction
Preparation for withdrawal

➥

The Better Basra Plans

➥

A new focus on economic development in Basra

➥

Civilian‑military co‑ordination on the ground

➥

Reconstruction, strategy and planning

➥

107

108

The role of reconstruction

➥

Energy security, oil and oil revenues

➥

Support for UK business

➥

132

133

134

The Government’s approach to post‑conflict reconstruction

➥

Reviews of the UK approach to stabilisation
The impact of the UK’s reconstruction effort

➥

Key economic and social indicators

➥

Table 1: Iraq: selected economic and social indicators
Lessons

➥

Introduction

➥

The Ba’ath Party

The development of de‑Ba’athification policy

➥

Post‑invasion

➥

The CPA approach

➥

CPA Order No.1

➥

The UK role in relation to Order No.1

Implementation of de‑Ba’athification policy

➥

The Impact of Order No.1

CPA Memorandum No.1

➥

The role of the Governing Council

➥

De‑Ba’athification in the Transitional Administrative Law

➥

The Interim Iraqi Government

➥

The Amnesty Order

➥

A draft new de‑Ba’athification Order

➥

Former Ba’athists and the Sunni insurgency

➥

179

180

181

The Transitional National Assembly’s de‑Ba’athification
policy

➥

The new Government takes office

➥

De‑Ba’athification in the Iraqi Constitution

➥

Election preparations

➥

De‑Ba’athification after the 2005 Iraqi election

➥

A new government

➥

De‑Ba’athification in 2007

➥

June 2007 onwards

➥

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings
Conclusions

➥

Lessons

➥

Introduction

➥

Definition of terms

Pre‑conflict consideration of SSR

➥

Iraq Planning Unit

➥

SSR planning during the build‑up to invasion

➥

Area of Operations and Area of Responsibility

➥

Table 1: MOD estimate of costs for SSR, March 2003

➥

Planning the deployment of police officers

➥

SSR across Iraq: after the invasion

➥

The Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation

➥

Resolution 1483

➥

De-Ba’athification

➥

Views on SSR: May 2003

➥

The police structure in the UK

➥

SSR roles and responsibilities in Iraq

➥

UK policing strategy: summer 2003

➥

The UK approach to judicial reform

➥

Training of the Iraqi Police Service begins

➥

Police training academies

New Iraqi security structures

➥

The Governing Council

➥

An Iraqi intelligence service

➥

280

Global Conflict Prevention Pool Strategy

➥

281

Global Conflict Prevention Pool

➥

The departure of the UN

Policing strategy: Iraqiisation

➥

➥

International contribution to police trainers

➥

Concerns about strategy

➥

International Legal Assistance Consortium

➥

The military take control of police reform

➥

Security worsens and Iraqi Security Force weaknesses are exposed

➥

Reintegrating militias

Restructuring in advance of transfer of sovereignty

➥

Table 2: Iraqi Security Institutions

➥

430

431

Multi‑National Security Transition Command – Iraq

SSR in the South: after the invasion
Multi‑National Division (South‑East)

➥

The Basra River Service

➥

441

Problems deploying police officers

➥

THE DEPLOYMENT OF DCC WHITE

➥

Training the ICDC in MND(SE)

➥

508

509

510

SSR progress by October 2003

➥

Security incidents involving UK SSR staff

Prison reform

➥

The position in the South leading up to the transfer of sovereignty

➥

SSR across Iraq: summer 2004 to summer 2006

➥

UK, US and Iraqi plans for SSR

➥

Table 3: Summary of “Troops to Task” assessment

➥

US and Iraqi SSR funding

➥

Training the Iraqi Army
UK assessments of the Iraqi Security Forces in late 2004

➥

FURTHER CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQIISATION

➥

Global Conflict Prevention Pool strategy update
Suggestions for improvements in SSR

➥

NATO training mission – Iraq

➥

Fraud and assassinations in the Iraqi MOD

JUSTICE SECTOR CONCERNS

➥

Delays in transferring security

➥

Allegations of abuse by Iraqi police

The “Luck Review” and strategy for 2005

➥

Military Assistance Teams and Police Advisory Teams

THE “TRANSITION TO SELF RELIANCE”

➥

691

692

693

ISF performance during the January elections
2005 policing strategies

➥

EU integrated police and Rule of Law mission for Iraq

➥

TIPS hotline

➥

Training the IPS

STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT AND SSR PROJECT REVIEW

➥

The Iraqi Transitional Government

➥

Police and judicial reform

➥

Developing Iraq’s intelligence organisations

Request for an “honest assessment”

➥

Progress on disbanding militias

➥

753

754

755

Assessing readiness for Provincial Iraqi Control

Corruption, infiltration and abuse

➥

Responsibility for the security ministries moves to MNSTC‑I

THE JADIRIYAH BUNKER

➥

2006 as the “Year of the Police”

➥

The Iraqi border police

➥

798

The rise in sectarianism

➥

SSR in the South: summer 2004 to summer 2006

➥

805

806

807

Security restrictions on UK police officers

A decline in security

➥

The Iraqi Navy
Prison Service support in southern Iraq

➥

UK equipment for the Iraqi Security Forces: Project OSIRIS

➥

November Force Level Review

Police reform

➥

New Chief of Police for Basra
Considering whether to embed personnel in Iraqi units

➥

The US approach to Transition Teams
Concerns about strategy

➥

10th Division

➥

867

868

Restructuring SSR

➥

Should the UK focus be on Baghdad or the South?

➥

879

880

881

Raising concerns with the Iraqis

➥

Continued plans for a UK troop drawdown

UK equipment for the Iraqi Security Forces: Project OSIRIS II

➥

Legacy in the South

➥

Crime and power in Basra

➥

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND TRIBAL MATTERS ON THE POLICE IN THE
SOUTH

➥

936

Tribal justice

➥

937

The Jameat incident and subsequent developments

➥

938

The Jameat incident

➥

An assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces

➥

The MOD takes the lead on policing

➥

Strategic considerations in late 2005

➥

SIR RONNIE FLANAGAN’S REVIEW

➥

Reforming the Iraqi Police Service: Operation CORRODE

➥

Iraqi Navy progress

➥

Further reduction in troops

➥

Policing reviews: ACC Barton and a Strategic Task Force

➥

SSR across Iraq: summer 2006 to summer 2009
Formation of the Iraqi Government

➥

Iraqi appointments
Improving Iraqi Security Force build‑up

➥

Iraqi Air Force progress

➥

1066

An Iraqi security strategy

➥

DEALING WITH THE MILITIAS

➥

Who were the militias?
Table 6: The main militias recognised in Iraq in 2006

➥

1083

Transition to Iraqi control of security begins

➥

1084

1085

Ethno‑sectarian diversity in the Iraqi Ministry of Defence

➥

1086

1087

1088

Iraqi Security Force assessments in late 2006

➥

Enabling the police to tackle crime

Developing the Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Ministry of Defence

➥

The National Police

Reform of the Facilities Protection Service

➥

Creation of the Iraqi national counter‑terrorism capability

Iraq Forward Plan

➥

Iraqi Air Force progress

Focus on the Iraqi Army

➥

Expansion of the Iraqi Security Forces

➥

Machinery of Government under Mr Brown

➥

1126

1127

1128

Iraqi border police progress

The justice sector

➥

Mid‑2007 assessments of the Iraqi Security Forces

➥

1153

1154

1155

Counting the police
US views on the progress of Iraqi Security Forces

➥

Multi‑National Security Transition Command –
Iraq reorganisation

Improvements in Iraqi Security Force capability during 2007 and 2008

➥

The Sons of Iraq

➥

The UK’s future bilateral relationship with Iraq

➥

The strategy for 2009

➥

SSR AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF UK TROOPS

➥

SSR in the South: summer 2006 to summer 2009
State of emergency

➥

Provincial Iraqi Control

➥

1224

1225

Delivering a Better Basra

➥

Problems with the 10th Division – mutiny and looting

➥

Operations SALAMANCA and SINBAD

➥

The Warren

➥

CIVILIAN DRAWDOWN

➥

TACKLING THE SERIOUS CRIMES UNIT: OPERATION THYME

➥

EARLY ASSESSMENTS OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCE PERFORMANCE IN
OP SINBAD

➥

10th Division called to Baghdad
Planning to leave Basra City

➥

Understanding the murder rate in Basra

➥

CONTINUING CONCERNS WITH THE BASRA JUSTICE SYSTEM AND IRAQI
POLICE SERVICE

➥

UPDATED BETTER BASRA PLAN

➥

NATIONAL INFORMATION AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY RAID

➥

ASSESSMENTS OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCE READINESS FOR PROVINCIAL
IRAQI CONTROL

➥

Iraqi appointments

TRANSITION IN BASRA

➥

A new Iraqi Army division for Basra

➥

The security situation after British withdrawal

➥

THE ABSENCE OF A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN BASRA

➥

1421

1422

1423

Withdrawal and Provincial Iraqi Control for Basra

➥

Charge of the Knights

➥

Iraqi Navy progress
Basra ‘Sons of Iraq’ programme

➥

1462

1463

1464

The UK starts embedding troops with the Iraqi Army

➥

Iraqi appointments

➥

1473

1474

The future of the Iraqi police in Basra

➥

The US takes over SSR tasks in the South

➥

Training of 14th Division completed

➥

1497

1498

1499

SSR in Maysan province

➥

UK police officer numbers 2003 to 2009

➥

1543

1544

Table 7: Estimated number of police officers deployed to Iraq 2003 to 2009

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

Pre‑invasion planning and preparation
What is SSR?

➥

Occupation

➥

CPA Order No.2: ‘Dissolution of Entities’

➥

Initial problems deploying UK police officers

Iraqiisation

➥

The Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC)

➥

THE US MILITARY TAKE THE LEAD ON POLICE REFORM

➥

SECURITY DECLINES

➥

The justice sector

Transition

➥

The MOD takes the lead for policing

➥

Preparation for withdrawal
“Good enough”

➥

BETTER BASRA

➥

MiTTs

➥

Security Sector Reform strategy

➥

Measuring success

➥

Lessons

➥

Introduction

➥

The cost of the UK’s intervention in Iraq

➥

Figure 1: Direct cost of military operations and civilian activities by financial year (£m)

➥

How the UK’s intervention in Iraq was funded

➥

The roles of the Treasury and the Chancellor, and the
Ministerial Code

➥

Table 1: Departmental settlements, 2002/03 to 2009/10 (£bn)

➥

Table 2: Size of the Reserve, 2002/03 to 2008/09 (£m)

➥

Estimates and arrangements for funding military operations

➥

Agreement on arrangements for funding Urgent Operational
Requirements

➥

Agreement on arrangements for reclaiming NACMO

➥

Cash contributions to Operation GRANBY

➥

Estimates and allocations for non‑military activities
Humanitarian assistance and reconstruction

➥

THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE ESTIMATE OF COSTS, 19 FEBRUARY 2003

➥

Table 3: The Treasury’s estimate of the direct cost of conflict, February 2003 (£bn)

➥

MR BLAIR’S 6 MARCH 2003 MEETING ON POST‑CONFLICT ISSUES

➥

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN THE UK’S AREA OF OPERATIONS

➥

DFID SECURES ADDITIONAL FUNDING FROM THE RESERVE

➥

Funding for a British Embassy and security

➥

Accuracy of pre‑conflict estimates of costs

➥

Funding for military operations in the post‑conflict period
Cost of the UK’s post‑conflict military presence

➥

Impact on operations of the MOD’s financial position, 2002 to 2004

➥

Table 4: 2002 Spending Review: MOD settlement, £bn

➥

399

400

401

Resource Accounting and Budgeting

➥

402

403

Table 5: 2002 Spending Review, MOD settlement, cash spending estimate £bn

➥

THE MOD REFLECTS ON THE REASONS FOR ITS INCREASED CASH
REQUIREMENT

➥

THE IMPACT OF THE TREASURY CONTROLS

➥

MR BROWN’S EVIDENCE TO THE INQUIRY ON INCREASES IN THE MOD’S
CORE BUDGET

➥

476

Table 6: Defence expenditure in near‑cash terms, 2001/02 to 2008/09(£bn)

➥

➥

Table 8: Funding approved for UORs for Iraq, 2002/03 to 2009/10 (£m)

➥

483

Table 9: Total NACMO for Iraq, 2002/03 to 2009/10 (£m)

➥

Funding for civilian activities in the post‑conflict period
Initial funding for reconstruction

➥

Initial funding for Security Sector Reform

➥

Pressure for additional funding, autumn 2003

➥

541

542

PRESSURE FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION
AND SECURITY

➥

PRESSURE FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR RECONSTRUCTION

➥

Debt relief
Funding military equipment for the Iraqi Security Forces

➥

Better Basra Plan, July 2006

➥

New funding mechanisms for civilian operations

➥

Reflections on the allocation of funding

➥

650

Table 10: Departmental settlements, 2002/03 to 2009/10 (£bn)

➥

651

652

Differences in funding military operations and civilian activities

➥

Funding civilian activities

➥

Scrutiny of UK expenditure in relation to Iraq

➥

US oversight of expenditure on reconstruction

➥

704

705

Table 11: UK expenditure in Iraq, 2002/03 to 2009/10 (£m)

Cost of accommodation, security, medical services and life support

➥

➥

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings
Estimates of the cost of the UK’s involvement in Iraq

➥

The decision to take military action against Iraq

➥

Mr Brown’s discussions with Ministers on the likely
costs of the UK’s involvement in Iraq

➥

Arrangements for funding military operations and
civilian activities

➥

Funding for humanitarian assistance

➥

The imposition of Treasury controls on the MOD

Resources and strategy

➥

Lessons

➥

Introduction

➥

Background
The procurement process

➥

Figure 1: The stages of equipment acquisition

➥

Roles and responsibilities for addressing capability gaps

➥

The need for an expeditionary capability

➥

Preparing for the post‑conflict phase

➥

Improvement in the MOD’s procurement process during Op TELIC

➥

Protected mobility and the developing threat to UK troops
Initial deployment of Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPVs) in Iraq

➥

What is a Protected Patrol Vehicle (PPV)?

➥

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

DEPLOYING PPVS TO IRAQ

➥

What is an Improvised Explosive Device (IED)?

➥

The appearance of Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs) and the
UK’s response

➥

PROJECT DUCKBOARD EVOLVES

➥

THE IMPACT OF THE 2004 SPENDING REVIEW ON FRES

➥

A “TYPE B” VEHICLE

➥

Table 1: The requirement for three types of PPV, July 2004

➥

THE THREAT IN MID‑2004

➥

A PPV FOR AFGHANISTAN

➥

Was there a 45 percent cut?

➥

343

344

345

Response to the increase in the threat

➥

THE IMPACT ON WIDER CIVILIAN OPERATIONS

➥

Decisions on the wider protected mobility capability for the Army

➥

PROJECT VECTOR

➥

THE DECISION TO PROCURE ADDITIONAL VEHICLES FOR IRAQ

➥

THE INTRODUCTION OF MASTIFF

➥

The Cougar vehicle

➥

CHANGES TO THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IDENTIFYING AND FUNDING UORS

➥

Protected mobility between late 2006 and mid‑2009

➥

Capacity to improve the UOR system

➥

INTRODUCTION OF A NEW PROCESS TO DETERMINE THE ACCEPTABLE LEVEL
OF RISK IN OPERATIONS

➥

THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN “URBAN” PPV

➥

FRES AS A DISTINCT REQUIREMENT

➥

CALL FOR A PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO THE USE OF SNATCH

➥

Legal action taken by families over the use of
Snatch Land Rovers

SNATCH AFTER IRAQ

➥

The impact of Afghanistan on the equipment available in Iraq

➥

Existing capability gaps before 2006
ISTAR

➥

The impact of savings measures between 2004 and 2005
on ISTAR provision

➥

SUPPORT HELICOPTERS

➥

Table 2: UK helicopters deployed during the invasion

➥

The availability of ISTAR and support helicopters from 2006 onwards

➥

THE DOC’S THIRD REPORT, 4 APRIL 2006

➥

Force Protection Engineering (FPE)

➥

The Lynx helicopter crash, 6 May 2006

➥

1035

1036

RE-ALIGNING ASSETS AND UNDERSTANDING THE SHORTFALLS

➥

MR BROWNE’S CONCERN

➥

The eight modified Chinooks

➥

THE INCREASING THREAT OF INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS

➥

An interim UAV solution – Scan Eagle

➥

Upgrading battlefield helicopters to “theatre entry
standard”

➥

CONSIDERING WHETHER TO DEPLOY REAPER TO IRAQ

➥

THE DRAWDOWN OF UK FORCES

➥

Moving JHF‑I to Kuwait

➥

THE REMAINING LEVELS OF HELICOPTER AND ISTAR SUPPORT IN MND(SE)

➥

Table 3: ISTAR availability in MND(SE), January 2008

➥

The £1.4bn reduction in helicopter spending

➥

Introduction

➥

Key findings

Addressing post‑invasion capability gaps
Defining the capabilities required
Countering the IED threat

➥

Requirement for a medium weight PPV

➥

A FAILURE TO ARTICULATE THE REQUIREMENT

➥

Attempts to articulate the PPV requirement

ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PROCESS FOR IDENTIFYING REQUIREMENTS

➥

FUNDING AND THE FUTURE RAPID EFFECT SYSTEM (FRES)

➥

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR)

➥

The pressure of running two medium scale operations
concurrently

➥

SUPPORT HELICOPTERS

➥

Lessons

➥

Introduction

➥

Terms used in this Section
Civilian outreach event

➥

Pre‑invasion planning and preparation

➥

ORHA

➥

DFID humanitarian advisers

➥

The British Embassy Baghdad

➥

MOD civilian support to Op TELIC

➥

UK civilian presence during the Coalition Occupation of Iraq

➥

UK civilian deployments to ORHA

➥

The CPA and the return to a “war footing”

➥

The impact of deteriorating security

➥

The British Offices in Baghdad and Basra

➥

Preparations for the transfer of sovereignty

➥

The post‑CPA UK civilian presence in Iraq

➥

Departmental reviews of staffing levels

➥

The Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team

➥

Reassessment of risk and duty of care

➥

The move from the Basra Palace site to Basra Air Station

➥

Sustaining the UK civilian presence during 2007

➥

The Charge of the Knights and the UK military drawdown

➥

Attracting volunteers

➥

Seniority

➥

Skills

➥

Tour length and continuity

➥

Learning operational lessons

➥

Staff welfare

➥

The Iraq Reconstruction Service Medal

➥

Locally engaged staff

➥

Table 1: FCO LE staff in Baghdad and Basra, 2004‑2008
The Locally Engaged Staff Assistance Scheme

➥

Table 2: Iraqi citizens settled in UK under the Locally Engaged Staff Assistance Scheme

UK civilian deployments to Iraq: statistics

➥

Figure 1: Civilians deployed to Iraq by the FCO,
DFID
and the MOD,

➥

879

880

Table 3: UK police officers deployed to Iraq, 2003‑2009
The UK civilian deployment during the CPA period, May 2003 to
June 2004

➥

881

882

883

Table 4: UK secondments to the CPA

➥

The post‑CPA UK civilian deployment, July 2004 to July 2009

➥

Figure 2: FCO and DFID deployments to Iraq, 2004‑2009

➥

897

898

Figure 3: FCO and DFID deployments to Baghdad and Basra, 2004‑2009

➥

Figure 4: DFID staff and contractors deployed to Basra, 2003‑2009
UK share of the Coalition civilian deployment

➥

Table 5: Composition of CPA support in Baghdad, April 2004

➥

Table 6: US and UK civilian deployments to Iraq, 2005‑2009
UK civilian contractors

➥

920

Figure 5: DFID staff and contractors deployed to Iraq, 2003‑2009

➥

921

922

923

Table 7: Civilians deployed to Iraq by the FCO, the MOD and DFID, 2003‑2009

Table 8: FCO and DFID deployments to Iraq, 2004‑2009

Table 9: DFID staff and contractors deployed to Basra, 2003‑2009

Table 10: DFID staff and contractors deployed to Iraq, 2003‑2009

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings
Overview

➥

Pre-invasion planning and preparation

➥

Meeting the initial demand for civilian personnel in Iraq

➥

Duty of care and risk management

➥

Civilian-military co-ordination

➥

Locally engaged staff

➥

Language skills

➥

Lessons

➥

Introduction

➥

The military covenant and the Harmony Guidelines

➥

Table 1: Harmony Guidelines, 2003

➥

Early priorities and concerns
Operational Welfare Package

➥

Review of allowances

➥

Delivery of the Operational Welfare Package

➥

The free parcel service

➥

THE AIR BRIDGE

➥

Concerns over the effect of Operation TELIC on retention

➥

Supporting Reservists

➥

Increasing pressure on Service Personnel, 2004 to 2008
The decision not to deploy a headquarters and brigade to Iraq,
June 2004

➥

The decision to deploy troops to Afghanistan

➥

Concern that the Army is “running hot”, autumn 2006

➥

Introduction of the Operational Allowance

➥

Reports on recruitment and retention

➥

The impact of operations on the Harmony Guidelines

➥

Rebuilding the military covenant

➥

Introduction

➥

System for providing medical care for Service Personnel

➥

Medical care during the combat phase of operations
Planning and preparing to provide medical care

➥

Structure of medical support to operations

➥

Arrangements for supporting mental health

➥

Delivery of medical care

➥

Table 1: Admissions to Role 3 hospitals during Op TELIC 1

➥

Support for injured Service Personnel and their families

➥

Table 2: Casualties and aeromedical evacuations relating to Op TELIC
Establishing a Military Managed Ward at Selly Oak hospital

➥

Improvements at Headley Court

➥

The role of charitable organisations

Handling complex cases

➥

Clinical developments during Op TELIC

Support for mental health
Research into the physical and psychological health of
Operation TELIC personnel

➥

Over-Arching Review of Operational Stress Management
Decompression

➥

Variations in the level of support after an operational deployment

➥

First reports from the King’s Centre study

➥

Reserves Mental Health Programme

➥

Concerns over mental health issues, late 2006

➥

Trauma Risk Management

➥

138

139

Further findings from the King’s Centre study

➥

140

141

The Harmony Guidelines and mental health

➥

142

143

144

Compensation

➥

Support for veterans

➥

Mental healthcare for veterans

➥

Community mental health pilots

➥

163

164

Priority treatment within the NHS

➥

Introduction

➥

Table 1: Service Personnel and MOD civilian fatalities
serving on Op TELIC, 2003 to 2009

Planning and preparing for fatalities
Estimates of UK military fatalities

➥

Repatriation policy

➥

Preparing to hold civilian inquests
The legal frameworks for inquests

➥

Support for bereaved families
The Casualty Notification Officer and Visiting Officer

➥

Immediate remedial action on bereavement procedures

➥

Joint procedures and a Joint Casualty Co‑ordination Cell

➥

TRAINING AND SUPPORT FOR CASUALTY NOTIFICATION OFFICERS AND
VISITING OFFICERS

➥

The experience of bereaved families

➥

Early concerns about military investigations

➥

Impact of a study on military inquiries and investigations, March 2004

➥

Review of Service Police investigations, October 2004

➥

The deaths of six RMP Personnel at Majarr al Kabir

➥

Changes to MOD processes

➥

Creation of the Army Inquest Cell

➥

Reducing the number of redactions in BOI reports released to families

➥

Creation of the Defence Inquests Unit

➥

Introduction of Service Inquiries

➥

Efforts to reduce the backlog of inquests, 2005 to 2007
Support for the Oxfordshire Coroner

➥

DISCUSSIONS ON FUNDING

➥

PROGRESS IN CLEARING THE BACKLOG OF INQUESTS

➥

246

247

248

Table 2: Progress in clearing the backlog of inquests in Oxfordshire

➥

249

250

251

Efforts to transfer more inquests to local coroners

➥

Support for the Swindon and Wiltshire Coroner

➥

Efforts to improve the inquest process, 2006 to 2009
US participation in inquests

➥

Legal representation at inquests

➥

The Coroners and Justice Act, 2009

➥

Fatal Accident Inquiries in Scotland

➥

Honouring the dead
Repatriation ceremonies

➥

ROYAL WOOTTON BASSETT

➥

Letters of condolence

➥

Commemoration in Parliament

➥

Memorial services

➥

Armed Forces Memorial

➥

The Elizabeth Cross

➥

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

The pressure on Service Personnel

➥

Medical care

➥

Planning and preparation

➥

Improvements in the provision of care

➥

Investigations into the deaths of Service Personnel

➥

Service Police investigations

➥

Boards of Inquiry

➥

THE CONCERNS OF BEREAVED FAMILIES

➥

Inquests

➥

Delays in military investigations and civilian inquests

Support for bereaved families

➥

Support for Service Personnel and their families

➥

The Operational Welfare Package

➥

Support for Reservists

➥

100

101

Introduction and key findings

➥

Key findings

➥

Consideration of Iraqi civilian casualties before the conflict
Statements on the human cost of not intervening in Iraq

➥

Child mortality in Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime

➥

Assessments of Iraqi civilian casualties during initial
combat operations

➥

Civilian casualties during initial combat operations
Provision of medical care to Iraqi citizens

➥

Reports on civilian casualties

➥

Battle Damage Assessment

Case study of a bombing in a Basra suburb, 5 April 2003

➥

Responding to demands to count civilian casualties

➥

Indirect effects of conflict on public health

➥

Table 1: Civilian fatalities by category

➥

➥

The WikiLeaks Iraq War Logs

Witness comment

➥

Records and estimates of the number of Iraqi fatalities
Approaches to determining fatalities due to conflict

➥

Non‑Iraqi civilian fatalities

➥

Conclusions

➥

➥

Britain, Basra and al-Faw

➥

Anglo-German rivalry

➥

War and conquest in Mesopotamia

➥

Insurgency and the British Mandate for Iraq

➥

Britain and the Iraqi monarchy

➥

The first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 1922

➥

British bombing policy

➥

The Mandate years

➥

Defending Iraq

➥

The second Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 1930

➥

Iraqi independence, 1932

➥

Rashid Ali’s revolt, 1941

➥

The third Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 1948

➥

The continuing British contribution

➥

The fall of the monarchy, 1958

➥

Kuwaiti independence

➥

Map 1. Iraq: Provinces, 2003

Map 2. Ethnic distribution

Map 4. Baghdad

Map 6. Basra

➥

Use of bold text

➥

Cross-referencing

➥

Duplication of text

➥

Use of evidence

➥

Documents published by the Inquiry

➥

Redacted evidence

➥

Unusual document types

➥

FCO telegrams

➥

FCO eGrams

➥

FCO teleletters

➥

Valedictories

➥

Hauldown reports

➥

Private Secretary letters

➥

Names and ranks

➥

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: HTML version

Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 6 July 2016

Full Table of Contents