3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
526.
Mr Blair
had “insisted that it must be the Security Council” which
decided
whether
Saddam Hussein had co-operated, not the inspectors.
527.
President
Chirac asked to speak to Mr Blair on 14 March.176
528.
Drawing the
report of Mr Straw’s conversation with Mr de Villepin on
13 March
to
Mr Blair’s attention before the telephone call with President
Chirac, Sir David
Manning wrote:
“No
surprises: will probably complain we are misrepresenting him; will
offer new
effort
based on the shorter time line but no automaticity. You can
certainly point
to his
frenetic efforts to block us at every turn.”177
529.
President
Chirac told Mr Blair that France was “content to proceed ‘in
the logic of
UNSCR
1441’; but it could not accept an ultimatum or any ‘automaticity’
of recourse to
force”.178
He proposed
looking at a new resolution in line with resolution 1441,
“provided
that it
excluded these options”.
530.
Mr Blair
“said that we needed clear, specific ‘tests’ to measure whether
Saddam
was
co-operating”. Of the six tests proposed by the UK, “five were from
the Blix ‘clusters’
report and
the sixth had been proposed by the inspectors and was intended to
provide
a mechanism
for junior Iraqi officials and scientists to co-operate with the
inspectors”.
531.
President
Chirac “suggested that the UNMOVIC work programme might
provide
a way
forward. France was prepared to look at reducing the 120 day
timeframe it
envisaged.”
532.
Mr Blair
responded that “still did not get round the problem that if Saddam
was
found to be
in breach, all the [sic] followed was more discussion and we were
back
where we
started. It must be clear that … action would ensue.”
533.
In response to
a question from President Chirac about whether it would be
the
inspectors
or the Security Council who decided whether Saddam had
co-operated,
Mr Blair
“insisted that it must be the Security Council”.
534.
President
Chirac agreed, “although the Security Council should make
its
judgement
on the basis of the inspectors’ report”. He “wondered whether it
would be
worth”
Mr Straw and Mr de Villepin “discussing the situation to
see if we could find some
flexibility”;
or was it “too late”?
535.
Mr Blair
said “every avenue must be explored”.
176
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with President Chirac,
14 March’.
177
Manuscript
comment Manning to Prime Minister on Telegram 53 FCO London to
Paris, 13 March 2003,
‘Iraq:
Foreign Secretary’s Conversation with French Foreign Minister, 13
March’.
178
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with President Chirac,
14 March’.
491