The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Security Advisor, and Mr George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, in Washington

on 9 December.35

102. Sir David reported to Mr Blair that there was impatience in the US Administration

and pressure for early military action, probably in mid/late February. There were

concerns about the risks if the inspections found nothing and the difficulties of

persuading the international community to act if there were a series of “low level and

less clear-cut acts of obstruction” rather than the discovery of chemical or biological

agents or a nuclear programme, or the imprisonment or murder of UNMOVIC inspectors.

103. Sir David had said that Iraq’s declaration should be handled in a way “calculated

to maintain coalition support and to try to secure a second resolution”. He thought that

was possible. The UK needed “a convincing case based on evidence. Public defiance by

Saddam was not the same as proving non-compliance. We should work hard over the

next couple of months to build our case and secure a second resolution.”

104. During a meeting with Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, and Admiral

Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), to discuss military planning on

11 December (see Section 6.1), Sir David Manning and Sir Richard Dearlove also

briefed Mr Blair on their recent visits to Washington and “on UK attempts to secure

credible evidence that the Iraqi WMD Declaration was false” (see Section 3.6).36

105. Mr Matthew Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, recorded that

Mr Blair:

“… said that we needed to analyse the Iraqi declaration, ask pointed questions

about issues which the declaration failed to deal with … encourage Blix to ask these

questions of the Iraqis too, and continue to work on securing credible evidence that

Saddam was pursuing WMD programmes.”

106. Mr Blair would speak to President Bush and possibly Dr Blix in the next few days.

107. Mr Miller advised Sir David Manning on 13 December that the declaration was

“largely based on material already presented to the UN”, and that:

“There appears to have been no attempt to answer any of the unresolved

questions highlighted by UNSCOM or refute any of the points made in the UK or

US dossiers.”37

108. The absence of new material was described as “striking, particularly in relation

to the biological weapons programme, where UNSCOM have described previous Iraqi

FFCDs as deficient in all areas”. The Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) had also clarified

35 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.

36 Letter Rycroft to Watkins, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Preparations’.

37 Minute Miller to Manning, 13 December 2002, ‘Iraq: WMD Declaration’.

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