The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
831.
The JIC
Assessments issued since December 1998 could be described
as
authoritative.
But the gaps and uncertainties in the intelligence which
underpinned
them were
clearly identified.
832.
The evidence
set out earlier in this Section and in Section 4.1 demonstrates
that,
since the
departure of the weapons inspectors four years earlier, detailed
intelligence
had been
received on many aspects of Iraq’s activities, and it was more
extensive in
some areas
than others. The judgement that the intelligence picture was
extensive may
also have
been influenced by the reporting which had been issued since the
end of
August
2002.
833.
Mr Blair
characterised Iraq’s activities to acquire chemical, biological and
nuclear
weapons,
and a ballistic missile capability to deliver them, as a
“programme” which was
“active,
detailed and growing”.
834.
That statement
was in the draft of 23 September, and there is no evidence
that
Mr Blair
was advised to remove it.
835.
The claim that
Iraq’s WMD programme was “growing” and that it had
recently
accelerated
appeared in the briefing material produced by the FCO and No.10
at
that time.
836.
Asked whether
the JIC Assessments had said that the WMD threat from Iraq
was
growing,
Mr Blair told the Inquiry:
“Yes, it
was telling me that in two respects …
“First …
there were the September JIC assessments that talked of
continuing
production
of chemical weapons. In other words, this was a continuing
process.
But secondly
-- and this did have an impact on me at the time, although
this
particular
piece of intelligence turned out later to be wrong, but at the
time,
obviously,
we didn’t know that -- on 12 September … I was told and
specifically
briefed
about these mobile production facilities for biological weapons. So
this was
an
additional and new factor and this was very much linked to whether
and how
Saddam
might conceal his activities.”444
837.
In the context
of questioning about the intelligence reports received in late
August
and early
September and what might have been in Mr Blair’s mind when he
said that
Iraq’s
programmes were growing, Sir John Scarlett stated:
“… I think
it is important to state that that was the reporting that he was
seeing, and
he was
receiving a judgement from the JIC which said that production of
agent is
continuing
and it’s happening now.
444
Public
hearing, 2 February 2010, pages 87-88.
276