The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1039.
On 12 June,
Lt Gen Houghton wrote to Gen Granville‑Chapman
summarising the
operational
requirement for battlefield helicopters in Iraq and
Afghanistan.550
While
there
was an
endorsed requirement for an uplift in support to Afghanistan, on
Iraq he wrote:
“At present
there is no endorsed requirement for an increase in BH
[battlefield
helicopters]
support to Op TELIC, but operations have been constrained at
times
by a lack
of available BH support. This is partly related to the limited
performance
and
reliability of the Sea King Mk4 when compared with larger and more
modern
BH. Any
potential benefits from transition in Op TELIC may be fully
absorbed
by emerging
requirements to support Operational Overwatch and OGDs
[Other
Government
Departments].”
1040.
Lt Gen Houghton
added that the withdrawal of Italian forces in Iraq “could
present
an
additional requirement for battlefield helicopter lift and ISTAR in
Dhi Qar Province”.
Further
work was being done to define that.
1041.
Lt Gen Houghton
concluded:
“With no
reductions on the horizon in Op TELIC and escalating requirements
in
Op HERRICK,
our national aviation requirements now need departmental scrutiny
to
determine
the concurrent requirement to resource both theatres and define how
our
national
aviation resources should be realigned.”
1042.
Air Chief
Marshal Sir Joseph Stirrup became CDS in April 2006. A record
of
ACM Stirrup’s
“O Group” meeting on 16 June stated in relation to
Iraq:
“The UK
required its own persistent surveillance capability if it was to
deliver mission
success.
CDS’ clear preference was for an ‘off the shelf’ solution which
could be
delivered
quickly. VCDS [Gen Granville‑Chapman] had work in hand
addressing this
shortfall
which was due to report in mid Jul.”551
1043.
On 21 June,
Gen Jackson wrote to General Sir Richard
Dannatt,
Commander in Chief
Land Command, stating:
“It is
probably worth re‑emphasising the lack of ‘flying hours’ for our
operational
helicopter
fleets is an issue that is gaining momentum up here in the Main
Building.
In my view
the current problems are merely symptomatic of the broader lack
of
investment
in our ‘lift’ capability. However – and this is my concern – people
up here
seem fixed
solely on providing a palliative for the current symptoms, rather
than
really
tackling the Defence‑wide balance of investment decisions that need
to be
taken if we
are to have forces appropriately structured for what they
are actually
550
Minute
Houghton to MA/VCDS, 12 June 2006, ‘Quantifying Battlefield
Helicopter (BH) Requirements
on Operations’.
551
Note SECCOS
to VCDS, 19 June 2006, Record of Actions & Decisions from CDS O
Group – 16 June
2006’.
176