6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

800. Sir David Manning’s private advice to Mr Blair expressed scepticism about

a number of the arguments in Mr Hoon’s minute.

801. Sir David Manning made a number of comments expressing scepticism about

some of the arguments employed:

• In response to the argument that overt preparations would reinforce a strategy

of coercion, Sir David wrote: “The opposite is also possible i.e. Saddam will

conclude that we are interested only in [war]; he will therefore not co‑operate.”

• US expectations of UK ground troops had been “fuelled because MOD almost

certainly aroused great expectations early on – without political authority”.

• Sir David questioned whether the MOD had carefully managed US expectations,

writing: “Have we? US only know about Package 3 because we talked it up.”

• The UK would be “vulnerable” to a request for substantial forces post‑conflict

whether it provided Package 3 or not.

• Sir David did not “buy” the MOD argument that failure to offer Package 3 would

change the US perception of the UK as a long‑term partner.

• Adm Boyce was “worried” about managing the impact on army morale if it did

not participate in combat operations.314

802. In addition, Sir David provided detailed advice for the Prime Minister on

16 October, flagging concerns about whether the assumptions underpinning the

package were robust, and about domestic handling issues.315

803. Sir David summarised the key arguments in favour of Package 3 as:

“• It would be a strong signal of our intent and would increase the pressure

on Saddam;

• It is what the US is hoping for;

• It would buy us influence in the conduct of the military campaign against Iraq;

• US gratitude would make Washington correspondingly more inclined to be

generous to us in other areas …

• It would reduce the risk that we would be expected to contribute large numbers

of troops to help administer Iraq after hostilities;

• The British Army would like it; and would be correspondingly demoralised if no

use were made of their war‑fighting capability.”

314 Manuscript comment Manning to Powell on Minute Hoon to Prime Minister, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK

Military Options’ attaching Paper Ministry of Defence, 14 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Contingency Planning’.

315 Minute Manning to Blair, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military Options’.

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