3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
124.
Dr Blix
suggested that the next quarterly report under resolution 1284,
due
on 1 March:
“… might be
the moment to set out clear, crisp questions based on the
clusters …
If he
surfaced those … questions now, Iraq would simply demand six
months
to answer
them. It would be better to use them as part of an ultimatum
…”
125.
In response to
a comment by Mr Blair that containment “was not a long term
policy,
and
sanctions caused misery to the Iraqi people”, Dr Blix
“commented that it would
be
paradoxical to go to war for something that might turn out to be
very little”. Mr Blair
replied
that “if Saddam had no or little WMD he should prove
it”.
126.
Mr Matthew
Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
reported that
Sir David
Manning had:
“…
underlined we were confident of our judgements on Iraq’s CBW. If
the inspectors
had
difficulty finding it, this was because Saddam was not
co-operating.”
127.
In response to
a question from Dr Blix about when Saddam Hussein might
crack,
Mr Blair:
“… thought
the moment of maximum pressure might be after a second
resolution
(following
a clear Blix report) when the Arab world might encourage Saddam
and
his
immediate entourage to leave Iraq. The logic was that Iraq was not
co-operating;
we should
have a second resolution saying he was in breach; and then we
should
mobilise
the international community to try and get him to leave so that we
did not
have to
resort to military action. The best way to avoid a conflict would
be to take
a very
tough line.”
128.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Dr Blix felt that Secretary Powell had done well
but was
avoiding
comment.32
Dr Blix
was “pretty cagey” and had “made clear his job was to
be
sceptical”.
Dr Blix was talking to Iraq about enhanced co-operation and
trying to resolve
the issues
of anthrax and VX: “On the remnants of old programmes they should
be able
to tell
us.”
129.
Dr Blix
had told Mr Blair that South Africa was sending a delegation
to Iraq
to
tell them how to give up WMD. The inspectors had been to some
of the places
named in
the dossier, “and it could be that they had been sanitised, but
they found
nothing”.
By 14 February, Dr Blix “would be saying they had
not found WMD but there
was
no real co-operation. He didn’t want to name scientists
for interview for fear that
they would
be killed.” Dr Blix “felt … 14 February was a little early to
report to the
UN [Security
Council]”.
32
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
201