15.1 | Civilian personnel

487. Introducing the paper at DOP(I) on 7 December 2006, Mrs Beckett stated that

the decision to drawdown from the Basra Palace site had been right.322 Work in hand

suggested that the majority of civilian staff should be relocated to Basra Air Station,

but urgent work was needed to make it fit for purpose, and moving staff there would

undoubtedly make it a more attractive target for insurgents. Whitehall departments

needed to co‑ordinate plans and engage with the US.

488. A joint PCRU/DFID report on refocusing civilian efforts in Basra, produced on

19 December 2006, stated:

“It is worth noting that the rapid (unavoidable) drawdown from Basra Palace

did raise concerns among MND(SE) partners about civilian commitment and

the physical move to Basra Air Station has required considerable time and attention

… Construction of hardened accommodation on the FCO site at BAS is under way

… but the pace of the build may slip … Claims on accommodation must be seen in

the ‘round’ of a total demand which exceeded supply.” 323

489. Sir Peter Ricketts told the Inquiry:

“When it became clear that the Armed Forces would in due course be moving out

of the Basra Palace in the centre of Basra, and that became increasingly clear in the

latter part of 2006, I was clear that our Consulate [the British Embassy Office] had

to either shut and go back to Baghdad or operate out of the Air Station.” 324

490. On 22 January 2007, Dr Marsden reported that that the number of IDF attacks

on the Basra Palace site had been high and steady since October, but January was

set to be a record month.325 Attacks since 15 January had also been more accurate.

Dr Marsden’s OSM and Post Security Officer felt that “we are beginning to push

our luck”.

491. The FCO SOSA visited Baghdad and Basra from 23 January to 1 February.326

He reported that the security situation throughout Iraq had deteriorated significantly

since the last visit by an OSA in September 2006.

492. In Basra, indirect fire on the Basra Palace site had reached record levels that

month. Attacks on the Contingency Operating Base (COB, the renamed Basra Air

Station) were increasing, but mainly inaccurate. The SOSA was “not overly concerned”

about the security of the small UK COB compound as it was on a protected military

322 Minutes, 7 December 2006, DOP(I).

323 Letter Foy to Marsden, 19 December 2006, ‘Refocussing civilian efforts in Basra in the run up to PIC’

attaching Paper Foy and DFID [junior official], ‘Refocussing civilian efforts in Basra in the run up to PIC’.

324 Public hearing, 2 February 2010, page 11.

325 Letter Marsden to McDonald, 22 January 2007, ‘Basra Palace: Response to Increased IDF Threat’.

326 Minute SOSA to Asquith, 5 February 2007, ‘Visit to Baghdad and Basra’.

331