9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
partnership
following the end of our military presence; and in Basra to
underscore
the
progress made and the surge of effort towards our
transition.”
“Overall we
have an increasingly strong story to present about Basra … The
clear
view of the
US … in Baghdad is that the key stage of the military transition
will be
… on 31
March. They want to help us to make the most of that and to
co-operate
in presenting
our key messages on what has been achieved in Basra …
“In my
view, a proper ceremony to mark the TOA [Transfer of Authority] on
31 March
will be
essential to our campaign to ‘end well’ in Basra. In June-July,
after the US
have been
in command in the South for some months, it will be harder to
distinguish
between UK
and US achievements.”
354.
Mr Miliband
described a number of obstacles to the development of a
broader
Iraq/UK
relationship, most of which stemmed from “Iraq’s own continuing
internal
challenges”:
“Security
had improved hugely but conditions for business visitors are still
far from
normal.
Political and parliamentary dispute had replaced the clash of
militias but the
government
does not yet have a monopoly of arms in society. Tensions,
particularly
between the
Arabs and Kurds, could still flare into clashes along the Green
Line. And
Iraq’s
economy is also facing its version of the global recession with the
collapse of
government
revenues after the fall in the oil price. Corruption needs to be
checked.”
355.
Mr Prentice’s
report of the visit recounted that Mr Miliband had agreed the
basis
for
negotiation of a follow-on military training agreement, handed over
a draft MOU on
Trade and
Investment and received an advance briefing from Gen Odierno on
President
Obama’s
Iraq strategy.143
356.
Gen Odierno
recommended that the US and UK should mark the transfer
of
command in
Basra at the end of March – “the easiest and best moment to shape
the
public
story over the British achievement and legacy”.
357.
Mr Prentice
commented:
“Only two
months into the New Year and your visit has completed the first
phase of
our
strategy to construct the new broad-scope bilateral relationship
for 2009: telling
everyone
how different the relationship is and will become, and agreeing on
the
processes.”
143
eGram
7488/09 Baghdad to FCO London, 1 March 2009, ‘Iraq: Your Visit to
Baghdad,
26-27
February 2009’.
441