The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
685.
The draft was
subject to “intensive consultations at official level in the
MOD
686.
In the FCO, Mr
Ricketts sent the draft to Mr Straw’s Private Office with
the
comment:
“This is a
clear note on a crucial issue. If the Secretary of State [Mr Straw]
could
OK it (I
showed him a slightly earlier draft this morning) it can go to
No.10 tonight,
for
discussion at the PM’s meeting at 0830 on 20
March.”247
687.
In the MOD,
the draft was cleared by Adm Boyce and Sir Kevin
Tebbit.
688.
Sir Kevin
commented:
“In terms
of our military capacity, with an eye to the aftermath, it would
clearly be
preferable
to confine ourselves to SE Iraq and not bite off more than we can
chew.
I accept,
however, that we should be prepared, initially, for our forces to
be fairly
widely
dispersed across Iraq, depending on how Phase III goes, because
without
successful
Phase III, Phase IV becomes harder, if not academic. The trick will
be
to be able
to regroup in a smaller area of SE Iraq once hostilities are
ended.
“I also
agree that we should be clear about our medium/long term scale of
military
commitment.
While we are putting all we can into the war effort, we should
plan
ahead to
stay broadly within … [Strategic Defence Review
guidelines].248
“What
concerns me most is the process of transiting from a primarily
military effort
to the
civil-led longer term humanitarian and reconstruction phase. Recent
history
does not
offer too much encouragement and we shall have to work hard to
avoid
‘dependence
culture’ on the Armed Forces to do things which should be for
civil
departments
– initially through aid, subsequently through Iraqi own efforts.
The
politics of
the issue do, I believe, point in the same direction. To meet the
PM’s wish
for us to
play an exemplary role, we shall need to remember that memories of
the
UK in the
region from the 1920s are not all positive, and we should make
clear our
desire to
hand over and withdraw on the right basis as early as we
can.”249
246
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], [undated], ‘Iraq: The UK’s
Military Contribution to
Post-Conflict
Iraq’.
247
Manuscript
comment Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], [undated], on Minute
Chilcott to Private
Secretary
[FCO], [undated], ‘Iraq: The UK’s Military Contribution to
Post-Conflict Iraq’.
248
It is not
clear whether Sir Kevin Tebbit referred to the SDR or the Defence
Planning Assumptions.
The MOD has
been unable to provide a version of Sir Kevin Tebbit’s manuscript
note including the
missing words.
249
Manuscript
comment Tebbit on Email DCMC CRISIS 04-S to CDS/PSO-S, 19 March
2003,
‘Joint
Defence and Foreign Secretaries Minute to PM on
“Sectors”’.
496