The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… the US …
do not appear to appreciate that it will be an issue for their
coalition
partners
and possibly have a substantial impact on the cohesion of the
alliance.
We should
continue to press for greater clarity at the political level and
Warsaw
[a meeting
of NATO Defence Ministers] may be an opportunity for
this.
“Interwoven
with the debate on force posture has been discussion of the
potential
value of
making an early announcement of the intention to withdraw, prompted
by
the SBMR-I
paper … Although the potential positive impact on the insurgency
is
accepted,
doubt over whether the announcement would have the desired
impact
and a
pessimistic assessment of the military risk had led [to] an
unconvincing
proposal to
make an announcement.”102
193.
Lt Gen McColl
also reported that the US saw Fallujah as a decisive point in
the
campaign
and had asked for UK assistance. Following informal discussions
between
the US
and UK military in Iraq, MND(SE) had concluded that supplying
troops to
relieve US
forces in North Babil, so that they could participate in action in
Fallujah,
was “the
most suitable option”.
194.
The US then
made a formal request for the UK to deploy troops to North
Babil
for 30
days. Lt Gen McColl advised that the UK’s aspirations to influence
the broader
campaign
needed to be supported by commitment if the UK was to “retain
leverage”.
195.
Lt Gen
McColl’s report was provided to Mr Hoon with the manuscript
comments:
“A very
thorough piece from Gen McColl – Para 10 [lack of clarity in the US
position]
is a continued
frustration.”103
196.
On 11 October,
the FCO submitted to No.10 a paper commissioned by
Sir Nigel Sheinwald
which considered contingency plans if elections were
postponed
for six
months.104
It had been
agreed with the MOD and was copied to SIS and the
Cabinet Office.
197.
The first half
of the paper considered the arguments for and against
postponement
of the
Iraqi election.
198.
A shorter,
technical delay was considered to be “difficult but manageable” but
the
paper
described the key elements of managing a longer delay
as:
•
Prime
Minister Allawi seizing the initiative and using the delay to push
a political
solution to
the insurgency;
•
pursuing
Sunni outreach;
•
a Cabinet
reshuffle (possibly to allow the entrance of former
Ba’athists);
102
Minute
McColl to CDS and CJO, 10 October 2004, ‘Report 132 of 10 Oct
04’.
103
Manuscript
comment to Secretary of State on minute McColl to CDS & CJO, 10
October 2004,
‘Report 132
of 10 Oct 04’.
104
Letter Owen
to Quarrey, 11 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Contingency Planning’ attaching
Paper FCO,
‘Iraq: Contingency
Planning’.
428