The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
It also raised
“serious doubts” about Iraq’s claim that it had “obliterated” the
BW
770.
UNSCOM
recorded uncertainties about the destruction of Iraq’s “special
weapons”,
warheads
for ballistic missiles filled with chemical and biological agent.
It also recorded
its
inability to verify Iraq’s destruction of seven indigenously
produced Al Hussein
missiles,
and imports of proscribed liquid propellant and major components,
particularly
missile
engines and guidance systems.
771.
The Commission
stated that actions by Iraq “in three main respects” had “had
a
significant
negative impact upon the Commission’s work”. Those
were:
•
“Iraq’s
disclosure statements have never been complete”.
•
“… contrary
to the requirement that destruction be conducted under
international
supervision,
Iraq undertook extensive unilateral and secret destruction of
large
quantities
of proscribed weapons and items”.
•
“… a
practice of concealment of proscribed items … and a cover up of
its
activities
in contravention of Council resolutions”.
772.
The annex on
“Actions by Iraq to obstruct disarmament” stated that
UNSCOM’s
work in
Iraq had been “plagued by co-ordinated efforts to thwart full
discovery of Iraq’s
proscribed
programmes” which had begun “immediately following the adoption”
of
resolution
687 (1991).302
773.
In a “brief
summary” of its “current understanding of the evolution of
these
concealment
policies and practices”, the report stated:
•
The Iraq
Presidency had “collected reports on weapons remaining with
Iraq’s
Armed
Forces” in spring 1991.
•
A “decision
was taken by a high-level committee”, of which Mr Aziz was
a
member, to
provide UNSCOM with “only a portion of its proscribed
weapons,
their
components and production capabilities and stocks”.
•
UNSCOM
“deduced” that Iraq’s policy was based on:
{{providing “a
portion of their extant weapon stocks, with an emphasis
on
those which
were least modern”;
{{retaining
“production capability and the ‘know-how
documentation’
necessary
to revive programmes when possible”;
{{concealing
“the full extent of chemical weapons programmes, including
its
VX project”
and retaining “production equipment and raw
materials”;
301
UN Security
Council, 29 January 1999, ‘Letter dated 25 January 1999
from the Executive Chairman of
the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to
paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security
Council
resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security
Council’ (S/1999/94).
302
UN Security
Council, 29 January 1999, ‘Letter dated 25 January 1999
from the Executive Chairman of
the Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to
paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security
Council
resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the President of the Security
Council’ (S/1999/94).
168