5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
•
we should
support Saudi ideas for disarmament and regime change with
UN
blessing;
and
•
the US
needs to pay much more attention, quickly, to planning on ‘day
after’
issues; and
that the UN needs to be central to it.”117
310.
On the legal
position, a background note stated:
“There are
concerns that a second resolution authorising the use of force is
needed
before
force may lawfully be employed against Iraq to enforce the WMD
obligations
in the
UNSCRs. If a draft resolution fails because of a veto (or indeed
because it
does not
receive nine positive votes), the fact that the veto is judged
‘unreasonable’
is
immaterial from a legal point of view.”
311.
In the meeting
on 31 January, Mr Blair confirmed that he was:
“… solidly
with the President and ready do whatever it took to disarm
Saddam.”118
312.
Mr Blair
said he firmly believed that it was essential that we tackle the
threats
posed by
WMD and terrorism. He wanted a second resolution if we could
possibly get
one because
it would make it much easier politically to deal with Saddam
Hussein.
He believed
that a second resolution was in reach. A second resolution was
an
insurance
policy against the unexpected.
313.
Mr Blair
set out his position that the key argument in support of a second
resolution
must rest
on the requirement in 1441 that Saddam Hussein must co-operate
with
the
inspectors. Dr Blix had already said on 27 January that this was
not happening;
he needed
to repeat that message when he reported to the Security Council
in
mid‑February
and at the end of February/early March. That would help to build
the case
for a
second resolution.
314.
Mr Blair
added that there were various uncertainties:
•
Saddam
Hussein might claim at the eleventh hour to have had a change
of
heart;
and
•
we could
not be sure that Dr Blix’s second and third reports would be as
helpful
as his
first.
315.
Mr Blair
was, therefore, flexible about the timing of the second resolution.
The key
was to
ensure that we secured it. We had taken the UN route in the
expectation that
the UN
would deal with the Iraq problem, not provide an alibi for avoiding
the tough
decisions.
The resolution was clear that this was Saddam Hussein’s final
opportunity.
We had been
very patient. Now we should be saying that the crisis must be
resolved in
weeks, not
months. The international community had to confront the challenges
of WMD
and
terrorism now.
117
Paper FCO
[MED], 30 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s visit to Camp David, 31
January: Iraq’.
118
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 31 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President Bush on
31
January’.
59