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5  |  Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003
we should support Saudi ideas for disarmament and regime change with UN
blessing; and
the US needs to pay much more attention, quickly, to planning on ‘day after’
issues; and that the UN needs to be central to it.”117
310.  On the legal position, a background note stated:
“There are concerns that a second resolution authorising the use of force is needed
before force may lawfully be employed against Iraq to enforce the WMD obligations
in the UNSCRs. If a draft resolution fails because of a veto (or indeed because it
does not receive nine positive votes), the fact that the veto is judged ‘unreasonable’
is immaterial from a legal point of view.”
311.  In the meeting on 31 January, Mr Blair confirmed that he was:
“… solidly with the President and ready do whatever it took to disarm Saddam.”118
312.  Mr Blair said he firmly believed that it was essential that we tackle the threats
posed by WMD and terrorism. He wanted a second resolution if we could possibly get
one because it would make it much easier politically to deal with Saddam Hussein.
He believed that a second resolution was in reach. A second resolution was an
insurance policy against the unexpected.
313.  Mr Blair set out his position that the key argument in support of a second resolution
must rest on the requirement in 1441 that Saddam Hussein must co-operate with
the inspectors. Dr Blix had already said on 27 January that this was not happening;
he needed to repeat that message when he reported to the Security Council in
mid‑February and at the end of February/early March. That would help to build the case
for a second resolution.
314.  Mr Blair added that there were various uncertainties:
Saddam Hussein might claim at the eleventh hour to have had a change of
heart; and
we could not be sure that Dr Blix’s second and third reports would be as helpful
as his first.
315.  Mr Blair was, therefore, flexible about the timing of the second resolution. The key
was to ensure that we secured it. We had taken the UN route in the expectation that
the UN would deal with the Iraq problem, not provide an alibi for avoiding the tough
decisions. The resolution was clear that this was Saddam Hussein’s final opportunity.
We had been very patient. Now we should be saying that the crisis must be resolved in
weeks, not months. The international community had to confront the challenges of WMD
and terrorism now.
117 Paper FCO [MED], 30 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s visit to Camp David, 31 January: Iraq’.
118 Letter Manning to McDonald, 31 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Bush on
31 January’.
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