13.1 |
Resources
161.
Mr Brown
also received a minute from Mr Dodds which highlighted the
potential
implications
of the UK taking overall responsibility for a geographical sector
in Iraq:
“This is a
decision that will have substantial public expenditure
implications.
If there
were a UK sector we would find ourselves locked into the management
of
the
aftermath for a substantial period (perhaps as long as five years)
rather than
allowing
other countries – who will not have borne any costs of the conflict
itself –
to make
their contribution. The net additional cost to the UK is difficult
to quantify but
would
certainly be hundreds of millions of pounds a
year.”107
162.
Mr Dodds
added that there were other reasons why a UK sector would
be
unattractive.
The need to bring in expertise from the widest possible range of
sources
and to
avoid the perception that the UK was occupying “part of the Arab
world” argued
for a more
internationalist approach.
163.
Mr Dodds
advised that Treasury officials were taking every opportunity to
stress to
FCO and MOD
colleagues that Mr Brown would want to have an input to any
decision
on
sectorisation, and recommended that Mr Brown underline that
point himself with
Mr Blair,
Mr Straw and Mr Hoon.
164.
Mr Brown
and Mr Boateng received a further update on military costs
from a
Treasury
official the following day.108
The
official reported that the Treasury now had the
MOD’s first
estimates of the likely total cost of conflict in Iraq “if a
decision is made to
stay … and
provide a medium term stabilisation/peace keeping force”. The upper
limit,
based on
what was feasible in military terms, was a two‑year commitment at a
total cost
of £1.6bn.
The official commented:
“The extent
to which any of this is
optional is unclear. We think that, because of our
Geneva
convention obligations, it will be impossible to resist keeping a
substantial
force in
theatre for at least six months post the end of fighting …
In practice
the
emerging politics of a post‑conflict Iraq point to a much more
substantial
commitment
both in terms of size and length of stay.”
165.
On 6 March,
Mr Blair chaired a meeting on post‑conflict issues with
Mr Brown,
Mr Hoon,
Ms Clare Short (the International Development Secretary),
Baroness Symons
(joint
FCO/DTI Minister of State for International Trade and Investment,
representing
Mr Straw),
Sir Michael Jay (FCO Permanent Under Secretary) and “other
officials”.109
166.
In an
annotated agenda for the meeting, the Iraq Planning Unit (IPU)
invited
Ministers
to take a view on a number of key post‑conflict issues, including
whether to
107
Minute
Dodds to Chancellor, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq – “Aftermath” – UK
Role’.
108
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Update on Potential Cost and
How Should
We Present Them?’.
109
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post‑Conflict
Issues’.
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