The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
460.
In response
to a suggestion that France and the UK should look for a
point
of
compromise, Mr Straw replied that “the key decision had to be
made in the
Security
Council” and “no one on 10 March had said that Saddam Hussein
was
complying
with his obligations. He was therefore in further material
breach.”
461.
Mr de
Villepin also telephoned Mr Straw on 13 March. The record
stated that he:
“… said
France was still willing to consider any new proposals … ready to
discuss
any
solution based on benchmarks … [and] any timetable, even a reduced
one, if
that was
‘satisfactory for you and the US’. His bottom line focused on
automaticity.
France
could work on any mechanism which contained an ultimatum as long as
it
was the
Security Council which took full responsibility at the end of any
deadline.”140
462.
Mr Straw
said that President Chirac’s statement on 10 March that “France
would
vote
against a second resolution ‘whatever the circumstances’ had caused
great
difficulties.
It was clear that France would veto.”
463.
Mr de
Villepin responded that President Chirac had “never said that”; he
“had not
meant that
France would not try to find common ground”; nor “that, whatever
happened,
France
would vote no”. His comments had been “only in the context of text
[of the draft
resolution]
on the table” on 10 March.
464.
Mr Straw
replied that:
“… he had
read the comments differently. It had made life very difficult in
the US.
They had
assumed France would vote no in any circumstances. As a result
they
were now
falling back on UNSCR 1441. The UK had, however, managed to
keep
dialogue
going through the weekend. The UK had never said that 1441
contained
automaticity
… But the UK did not want Iraq stringing things out. If things went
on
too long,
the military threat was degraded.”
465.
In response to
a request from Mr de Villepin that they should look for “a
point of
compromise”
with a meeting of the Security Council following a further report
from the
inspectors
“perhaps in one month, two months or perhaps just three weeks”,
Mr Straw
pointed
out:
“The key
decision had to be made by the Security Council. The inspectors’
role was
to provide
evidence, although others could too. It was clear that Iraq was in
material
breach.
Though there were many different positions in the Security Council,
no one
on 10 March
had said that Saddam Hussein was complying with his
obligations.
He was
therefore in further material breach.”
140
Telegram 53
FCO London to Paris, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with French
Foreign
Minister, 13 March’.
480