4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
•
“…
production of biological agents has continued; facilities formerly
used for
biological
agents have been rebuilt; equipment has been purchased for such
a
programme;
and again Saddam has retained the personnel who worked on
it
prior to
1991. In particular, the UN inspection regime discovered that Iraq
was
trying to
acquire mobile biological weapons facilities … Present
intelligence
confirms
that it has now got such facilities.” The UK believed Iraq could
produce
anthrax,
botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin, which “all eventually result
in
excruciatingly
painful death”.
•
Saddam
Hussein’s previous nuclear programme had been “shut down
by
the
inspectors” and “known remaining stocks of uranium” were “held
under
supervision”
by the IAEA. Key personnel who used to work on the
nuclear
weapons
programme were “back in harness”. “But we now know”
that
Saddam Hussein
has also:
{{“bought
or attempted to buy” items that could have a use in a
nuclear
programme;
and
{{“been
trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa,
although
we do not
know whether he has been successful”.
•
Iraq’s
ballistic missile programme was required for the delivery of its
chemical,
biological
and nuclear weapons. It was “clear that a significant number
of
longer-range
missiles were effectively concealed from the previous
inspectors
and remain,
including up to 20 extended-range SCUD missiles … and, by
this
year,
Iraq’s development of weapons with a range of more than 1,000km
was
well under
way; and that hundreds of people are employed in that
programme,
facilities
are being built and equipment procured – usually
clandestinely.
Sanctions
and import controls have hindered the programme, but only
slowed
its progress.
The capability being developed, incidentally, is for
multi-purpose
use,
including with WMD warheads.”
“That is
the assessment, given to me, of the Joint Intelligence Committee.
In
addition,
we have well founded intelligence to tell us that Saddam sees his
WMD
programme
as vital to his survival and as a demonstration of his power and
influence
in the
region.”
“There will
be some who dismiss all this. Intelligence is not always right. For
some
of the
material, there might be innocent explanations. There will be
others who say
rightly
that … it could be several years before Saddam acquires a usable
nuclear
weapon –
though if he were able to purchase fissile material … it would be
only
a year
or two.”
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