Executive
Summary
548.
By the time
the dossier was published, President Bush had announced
that
the US
was seeking action on Iraq through the UN, and Iraq had agreed to
the return
of inspectors.
549.
Rather than
the debate being framed in terms of the answers needed to
the
outstanding
questions identified by UNSCOM and the IAEA, including the
material
for which
UNSCOM had been unable to account, the dossier’s description of
Iraq’s
capabilities
and intent became part of the baseline against which the UK
Government
measured
Iraq’s future statements and actions and the success of weapons
inspections.
550.
As Section 4.3
demonstrates, the judgements remained in place without
challenge
until the
invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Iraq’s denials of the capabilities
and intent
attributed
to it were not taken seriously.
551.
As the flaws
in the construct and the intelligence were exposed after the
conflict,
the dossier
and subsequent statements to Parliament also became the baseline
against
which the
Government’s good faith and credibility were judged.
552.
From October
2002 onwards, the JIC focused on two main themes:
•
Iraq’s
attitude to the return of the inspectors and, from 8 November,
its
compliance
with the specific obligations imposed by resolution 1441;
and
•
Iraq’s
options, diplomatic and military, including the possible use of
chemical and
biological
weapons and ballistic missiles against Coalition Forces or
countries in
the region
in either pre‑emptive attacks or in response to a military
attack.
553.
In its
Assessment of 18 December, the JIC made the judgements in the
UK
Government
September dossier part of the test for Iraq.
554.
The judgements
about Iraq’s capabilities and intentions relied heavily on Iraq’s
past
behaviour
being a reliable indicator of its current and future
actions.
555.
There was no
consideration of whether, faced with the prospect of a
US‑led
invasion,
Saddam Hussein had taken a different position.
556.
The absence of
evidence of proscribed programmes and materials relating to
the
production
or delivery of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons was
attributed to Iraq’s
ability to
conceal its activities and deceive the inspectors and the
difficulties which it had
been
anticipated the inspectors would encounter.
557.
The JIC
Assessment of 11 October 2002 stated that a good intelligence flow
from
inside
Iraq, supporting tougher inspections, would be “central to
success”.
558.
A key element
of the Assessments was the reporting and intelligence on
Iraq’s
intentions
to conceal its activities, deceive the inspectors and obstruct the
conduct of
inspections,
particularly Iraq’s attitudes to preventing interviews with
officials who were
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