6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
headquarters
and that: “Command at 3‑star level would restore the UK lead in the
North,
and also
indicate tacit agreement for ownership of the northern Area of
Operations (AO)
in Phase
IV.”
1046.
Lt Gen Reith
advised that the northern option:
“… could
result in UK long‑term leadership of the region during
post‑conflict
operations:
a position which the US would appear to favour. It would be
a
challenging
area to control and develop, particularly in preserving regional
stability
between the
Turks, Kurds and Sunnis. Whilst the UK has the necessary
experience
and
capability, the challenges do need to be assessed in line with UK
strategic
guidance.”
1047.
In relation to
operations in the South, the paper identified three options for a
UK
division:
•
Operating
as a “manoeuvre formation” within US V Corps.
•
Operating
as a “manoeuvre formation” within US I Marine
Expeditionary
Force (MEF).
•
Operating
as a “second echelon force” within US V US Corps.
1048.
The paper
considered that:
•
Command and
Control arrangements would be “less complex than in the
North”.
•
The
“shortened and simplified LOC [lines of communication] make all
southern
COA
attractive … However, it should be recognised that US plans are
well
advanced in
the South, there is very limited logistic space available
…
deployment
would require considerable synchronisation with the
US.”
•
“A
post‑conflict positioning of the UK division in the South could be
attractive.
The range
of problems appears less‑complex and diverse, the long‑term
force
structure
requirements could be reduced and local conditions are likely to
be
more
conducive to development and influence. The northern … Gulf … is
also
a traditional
area of UK influence.”
1049.
Lt Gen Reith
concluded:
•
Four
options were “achievable” and offered “worthwhile tasks”, but the
UK
needed to
“reduce risk in its timetable for deployment and RSOI
[Reception,
Staging,
Onward Movement and Integration]”.
•
All four
feasible options would require “a UK division with integral
capability for
manoeuvre”.
•
The
northern option offered “a high profile and worthwhile role for the
UK”.
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