6.5 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003

160. Nor did Mr Blair take prompt action after his conversation with President

Bush. His next interventions on post-conflict planning were:

• to tell Cabinet on 6 February that post-conflict planning “needed greater

emphasis”; and

• to convene a first Ministerial meeting on humanitarian issues on

13 February, a meeting that did not address wider post-conflict concerns.

161. Mr Blair did not raise post-conflict issues again with President Bush until his

Note of 19 February and did not discuss the subject with him until 5 March.

162. During the talks in Washington Dr Rice handed Sir David Manning two documents:

• ‘Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Planning’, a document dated 7 January prepared

by Mr Abrams’ inter-agency Humanitarian Working Group; and

• ‘Immediate Post-War Concerns’, a document dated 31 January incorporating an

updated version of the US strategy document ‘Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy’

(see Section 6.4).85

163. Sir David Manning asked the FCO, the MOD, the Joint Intelligence Committee

(JIC) and the Cabinet Office for comments on the two documents. DFID was not

consulted.

164. Mr Drummond proposed using a special meeting on “aftermath” scheduled to

replace the AHGI on 7 February to co-ordinate a response.86 He suggested that the

agenda also cover:

• “State of preparedness” on a range of issues including the political process, oil,

humanitarian issues and SSR;

• “Timetable for completion of work”; and

• “Gaps”.

165. The meeting on 7 February appears to have focused on preparing key messages

on post-conflict issues for Mr Hoon and Sir David Manning to put to Secretary Rumsfeld

and Dr Rice in Washington on 12 February.87 The Inquiry has seen no evidence that it

addressed the other agenda items.

85 Letter Manning to McDonald, 2 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Post-War Reconstruction Planning’ attaching Paper

[unattributed], 7 January 2002 [sic], ‘Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Planning’ and Paper [unattributed],

31 January 2003, ‘Immediate Post-War Concerns’.

86 Letter Drummond to Chaplin, 4 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Aftermath’.

87 Letter Drummond to Chilcott, 10 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Key Messages’.

339