The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
889.
Ambassador
Bremer also said that Mr Richmond had been put in charge of
the
operational
aspects of the CPA’s “Sunni strategy”. That included up to US$250m
in
project
funding.
890.
Mr Cannon’s
record of the meeting asked for a note for Mr Blair on how the
political
process
would develop through the transition, how and when the UN could
best be
involved,
and what civil and military structures the UK envisaged being in
place after the
June
transition.
891.
The Annotated
Agenda for the 22 January meeting of the AHMGIR stated that
the
introduction
of a single, more secure and more conveniently denominated currency
had
been
completed on 15 January:
“The
exchange has been a success for Coalition economic reconstruction,
and for
the UK.
There was significant UK input at all stages, from policy-making,
to logistics
and the
information campaign, which underpinned a smooth
process.”516
892.
On 22 January,
Mr Straw’s Private Secretary sent a paper to Mr Rycroft
on how the
political
process would develop through the transition.517
No.10 had
requested the paper
on 5
January.
893.
The paper,
entitled ‘Iraq: The Next Six Months’, identified four key UK
objectives:
“•
a smooth
transition of executive power on 1 July to a sovereign Iraqi
transitional
Government
…
•
a security
agreement which allows Multinational Forces the freedom they
need
to operate
…
•
UN Security
Council endorsement of the above and an expanded UN
role;
•
an
improving economy and infrastructure that will maximise the
prospects of a
successful
transition.”
894.
The paper
stated that the CPA’s Sunni outreach programme was
gaining
momentum,
underpinned by job creation.
895.
The paper
briefly considered civilian structures after the transition.
Following the
“Afghanistan
model”, the FCO envisaged a “small but growing” UN office to
co-ordinate
international
assistance and “underpin/lead” the constitutional process.
Officials were
developing
costed options for British representation after transition; they
anticipated the
need for a
large British Embassy in Baghdad and a smaller British Embassy
Office in
Basra, both
with “significant DFID elements”.
896.
On economic
reconstruction, the paper stated that the new timetable for
the
transfer of
sovereignty had led to programmes with the potential for political
unrest
(“mass
privatisation, removal of subsidies on food and energy”) being
dropped. The
516 Annotated
Agenda, 22 January 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
517
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 22 January 2004, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper,
[undated],‘Iraq: The Next Six Months’.
154