The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
312.
Mr Prentice
told the Inquiry that after further discussion with the Iraqi
authorities,
it was
agreed that rather than proceed with the law as previously planned,
the best way
to achieve
the outcome needed in the time available would be to ask the
Council of
Representatives
to pass a legally binding resolution (rather than legislation) that
would
authorise
the Council of Ministers to enter into the necessary MOUs with all
the non-US
313.
On 21
December, Mr Brown’s Assistant Private Secretary emailed him
to say that
“the way
forward is crystallising around a resolution of the Iraqi
Parliament (one vote
rather than
three readings)”.119
A vote was
expected the following day.
314.
Mr Prentice
reported progress to the FCO on 24 December.120
He explained
that
for Iraqi
MPs, resolving the legal basis for coalition forces had been a
“side show …
as they
focused on how to remove their Speaker” after he made a series of
insulting
statements
in the chamber.
315.
Following
Speaker Mashhadani’s resignation – accepted “in an almost
unanimous
vote” – on
23 December, the Deputy Speaker read out a resolution which
authorised
the Council
of Ministers to “take all necessary measures to regulate the
presence and
activities
of the forces of the UK, Australia, Estonia, Romania, El Salvador
and NATO
from 1
January until 31 July 2009” which was then approved by “a clear
majority”.
316.
Mr Prentice
recorded: “The approval of the Resolution took three minutes
from
start to
finish.”
317.
Mr Prentice
commented that Prime Minister Maliki and his allies in the Council
of
Representatives
had been instrumental in ensuring that the resolution passed,
reflecting
that he was
in a “completely different (and much better) place” regarding the
UK:
“We now
have the opportunity to build on this better relationship in the
transition we
see to a
wider ‘normalised’ relationship with Iraq, as it recovers its full
sovereignty
from
01/01/09. First we need to achieve ‘closure’ through the completion
of our
remaining
military tasks and the drawdown of our forces with proper pride
in
their
achievements. Thereafter, we should take care to retain due focus
on Iraq’s
continuing
strategic importance to our interests and the opportunities which
will
progressively
open to us here.”
318.
Mr Watkins
advised Mr Hutton on 28 December that the resolution had
been
ratified by
the Presidency Council the previous day.121
But an
exchange of letters
between the
UK and Iraqi Governments “recording the GoI’s consent to UK forces’
tasks
118
Public
hearing, 6 January 2008, page 45.
119
Email
Catsaras to Brown, 21 December 2008, ‘Iraq Withdrawal Law Lost by 6
Votes’.
120
eGram
50868/08 Baghdad to London, 24 November 2008, ‘Iraq: Parliament
Passes Resolution
Providing
Legal Basis for UK Forces Beyond 2008’.
121
Minute
Watkins to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 28 December 2008, ‘Iraq:
Legal Basis of UK Forces’.
432