Executive
Summary
217.
The initiative
was pursued through intensive diplomatic activity to lobby for
support
between
London and the capitals of Security Council Member
States.
218.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry:
“It was
worth having one last‑ditch chance to see if you could bring people
back
together on
the same page ... [W]hat President Bush had to do was agree
to
table a
fresh resolution. What the French had to agree was you couldn’t
have
another
resolution and another breach and no action. So my idea was define
the
circumstances
of breach – that was the tests that we applied with Hans Blix –
get
the
Americans to agree to the resolution, get the French to agree that
you couldn’t
just go
back to the same words of 1441 again, you had to take it a stage
further.”100
219.
In a
discussion on 9 March, Mr Blair told President Bush that he
needed a second
resolution
to secure Parliamentary support for UK involvement in military
action.101
He sought
President Bush’s support for setting out tests in a side statement,
including
that the
vote in the Security Council might have to be delayed “by a couple
of days”.
220.
President Bush
was unwilling to countenance delay. He was reported to have
told
Mr Blair
that, if the second resolution failed, he would find another way to
involve the UK.
221.
Mr Blair
told President Bush the UK would be with the US in taking action if
he
(Mr Blair)
possibly could be.
222.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that Dr Blix was prepared to work with the
UK
on identifying
tests but had reminded him that UNMOVIC still lacked clear evidence
that
Iraq
possessed any WMD.102
223.
Mr Blair
spoke twice to President Lagos on 10 March in an attempt to find a
path
that
President Lagos and President Vicente Fox of Mexico could
support.
224.
In the second
conversation, Mr Blair said that he thought it “would be
possible to find
different
wording” on the ultimatum to Iraq. Timing “would be difficult, but
he would try
to get
some flexibility” if the first two issues “fell into
place”.103
225.
Mr Straw
reported that Secretary Powell thought that there were seven solid
votes,
and
uncertainty about Mexico, Chile and Pakistan.104
If there
were fewer than nine, the
second
resolution should not be put to the vote.
100
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 127.
101
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 9 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 9 March’.
102
Telegram
391 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Resolution’.
103
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Calls with Lagos, Bush
and Aznar,
10 March’.
104
Letter
Straw to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘Conversation with US Secretary of
State, 10 March’.
31