3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
would be
your view. I would check with you as soon as possible. The second
part of
the draft
resolution was an integral part of the strategy.”
491.
Dr Rice
told Sir David that “‘speaking very frankly’, there was a
timing problem”.
The
timetable he had set out “risked running well into next year before
we could clear
the decks
for military action (assuming Saddam’s continued
obstruction)”.
492.
Sir David
told Dr Rice that the US and UK should refuse to accept
the:
“… ideal,
but too leisurely, UNSCOM timetable. Once we had a resolution
stipulating
the return
of the inspectors, we should get teams in quickly to look at
carefully
chosen
targets. We should insist that they tackled the job right away.
[Dr] Blix could
build up to
full strength in slower time.”
493.
Dr Rice
also said that the US was looking at giving the inspectors a
Security
Council
label, which Sir David resisted because it would “look
restrictive and alienate the
wider UN
membership”. It might be possible to associate the Security Council
with the
teams, and
that “could be advantageous” if it was “sold” to Russia “as a way
of ensuring”
it was
“fully consulted and implicated”.
494.
Dr Rice
said she would feed Sir David’s views into the White House
debate and
asked for
Mr Blair’s views by the end of the day.
495.
Sir David
commented:
“The
pressure on Bush to try a quick fix through the ‘material breach
ploy’ will be
Cheney’s
attempt to rewrite the Camp David conclusions. I pushed back hard
and
made it
clear that this would not run.”
496.
Sir David
subsequently discussed the issues with Mr Blair
who:
“…
emphasised the need to play Iraq cleverly. We must look reluctant
to use force,
making it
clear that we saw the current situation as a challenge to the
credibility
of the UN,
and to the international community. You [Mr Blair] were
increasingly
convinced
that, in the end, people would come round to accepting the
need
to deal
with Saddam, if we had made full and willing use of the UN route.
You
were
confident that we could get the Security Council behind us once we
had
demonstrated
clearly that Saddam remained in violation. But if we appeared to
be
riding
roughshod over the UN or taking it for granted, opinion would be
very difficult
to shift.
We should move step by step. Once we had a new resolution … we
would
be putting
the onus on Saddam as Bush wanted. But this would only work if
the
Americans
resisted the Cheney temptation to go to the UN with what
amounted
to a take
it or leave it resolution, and with the clear intention of early
resort to
military force.”
177