The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

of other concurrent commitments around the world including an enduring small scale

deployment in the Balkans.”

541. Gen Walker returned to the issue of resources later in his letter:

“Militarily, the UK force structure is already stretched and, with two concurrent

medium scale operations in prospect, will soon become exceptionally so in

niche areas.”

542. When he spoke to President Bush on 24 January, Mr Blair suggested that

they should maintain a very firm line that only a national unity government would

be acceptable.258

543. The decision to deploy to Helmand was approved in Cabinet on

26 January 2006.259

544. The minutes record that Dr Reid “was looking carefully at where the burden on

our troops could be reduced, including in Iraq and Bosnia and hoped to be able to report

troop and cost reductions in coming months”.

545. Mr Blair concluded that:

“The Ministry of Defence and FCO should continue to discuss with Her Majesty’s

Treasury the opportunities to draw down force levels in other operational areas,

including the Balkans.”

546. That afternoon, in a statement to Parliament, Dr Reid announced that the UK was

“preparing for a deployment to southern Afghanistan” which included a PRT as “part of a

larger, more than 3,300-strong British force providing the security framework”.260

547. Dr Reid explained that the total number of UK troops in Afghanistan would fluctuate

over the next few months, peaking at 5,700 before reducing to fewer than 4,700

and that:

“The size and structure of the task force has been guided by a careful assessment

of the likely tasks and threats that it will face. What matters is that we put the right

forces in to do the job and to do it safely and well, and I make no apology if that

requires more soldiers than some people originally envisaged.”

548. Dr Reid stated that “careful account” had been taken of the UK’s other

commitments, when determining the size of the deployment: “This deployment is

manageable alongside those other, wider commitments, including Iraq. It does not

258 Letter Quarrey to Siddiq, 24 January 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush: Middle East

Issues’.

259 Cabinet Conclusions, 26 January 2006.

260 House of Commons, Official Report, 26 January 2006, columns 1529-1533.

580