The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
31.
No assessment
had been produced of civilian casualties arising from
“urban
operations
in Basra”. Experience from World War II suggested that between
200
and 2,000
civilians could be killed in urban operations in Basra, depending
on
“circumstances,
duration and the degree to which civilian casualties are
minimised”.
32.
Mr Blair
was briefed on the targeting aspects of an air campaign by
Mr Hoon,
Admiral Sir
Michael Boyce (Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)) and Air
Commodore
Mike Heath
(MOD Head of the Directorate of Targeting and Information
Operations)
33.
At the
meeting, Mr Blair underlined the importance of “minimising the
number of
civilian
casualties and ensuring that all targets were appropriate and
proportionate” and
that
consideration should be given to “how best to explain publicly the
scale and nature
of the
campaign”.
34.
On 19
February, at the request of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat in
the
Cabinet
Office, the JIC provided an Assessment of the situation in southern
Iraq and
what might
happen before, during and after any Coalition military
action.29
The
JIC
assessed
that the “relative weakness of Iraq’s conventional forces in the
south, and
the fact
that those forces will face the brunt of a Coalition ground attack”
meant that
southern
Iraq was “the most
likely area for the first use of CBW against both
Coalition
forces and the local population”.
35.
The JIC
identified a number of factors that could undermine popular support
for any
post‑Saddam
Hussein administration, including major civilian
casualties.
36.
In
mid‑February Mr Blair read the Adelphi Paper Iraq at the
Crossroads: State and
Society in the
Shadow of Regime Change, published by
the International Institute for
Strategic
Studies (IISS).30
37.
Several
contributors to the Adelphi Paper warned of the potential for
violent disorder
in
post‑conflict Iraq.31
The Paper
is addressed in detail in Section 6.5.
38.
The Adelphi
Paper prompted Mr Blair to ask a number of detailed questions
about
the
military campaign and post‑conflict issues, including:
“What is
our military’s assessment of the likely consequences of an attack
on Iraq;
i.e. how
many casualties; how quickly the collapse?”32
28
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting, 6 February’.
29
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What’s in
Store?’.
30
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Political and
Military Questions’.
31
Dodge T
& Simon S (eds). Iraq at the
Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime
Change.
IISS
Adelphi Paper 354. Oxford University Press, January
2003.
32
Minute
Rycroft to McDonald, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Political and
Military Questions’.
178