The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Overseas
and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec), but there is no indication
whether or not
it was
seen by Mr Blair.10
36.
Concerns
about the differences between the UK and the US on what
would
constitute
a material breach, the US stance of “zero tolerance”, and the
debate
in the
US on “triggers” for military action were already
emerging.
37.
A debate on
what might constitute a material breach and what actions by Iraq
might
trigger a
military response had begun within the US Administration before the
adoption
of
resolution 1441.
38.
Reporting
conversations with senior officials in the US Administration
on
7 November,
Mr Tony Brenton, Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy
Washington,
reported
that the hawks in Washington saw the resolution as a defeat and
warned that
they would
be “looking for the least breach of its terms as a justification
for resuming the
39.
The US
statement after the adoption of resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002
made
it clear
that the US would regard every act of Iraqi non‑compliance as an
indication that
Iraq had no
intention of disarming.12
President
Bush had also warned that “the old game
of cheat
and retreat” would “no longer be tolerated”.
40.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised overnight on 14‑15 November that there
were
indications
that President Bush’s reference to “zero tolerance” was causing
some
members of
the US Administration to seek to lower the bar set in resolution
1441.13
That might
include Iraqi attacks on aircraft enforcing the No‑Fly Zones
(NFZs), despite
the
agreement that operative paragraph (OP)8 of resolution 1441 did not
apply to
the NFZs.
41.
Sir David
Manning subsequently spoke to Dr Condoleezza Rice, President
Bush’s
National
Security Advisor, on 15 November.14
They agreed
that recent Iraqi attacks
on UK and
US planes in the NFZs would continue to be treated as a “discrete
issue,
separate
from what would trigger military action under [resolution]
1441”.
42.
Sir David
stated that the UK and the US should not be drawn on
“hypothetical
scenarios”
about what would constitute a material breach. Reflecting
Mr Blair’s words
to
President Bush at Camp David on 7 September (see Section 3.4), that
“If Saddam
10
Manuscript
comment Manning, 14 November 2002, on Letter PS/C
to Scarlett, 14 November 2002,
‘Iraq:
Psychological Profile of Saddam’ attaching
Paper ‘Saddam Hussein, DIS Psychological Profile
Updated’.
11 Minute
Brenton to Gooderham, 7 November 2002, ‘Iraq’.
12
The White
House, 8 November 2002, President
Pleased with UN Vote.
13
Telegram
2169 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 November 2002, ‘US Moves
Towards
“Zero Tolerance”’.
14
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 15 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
12