The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

586.  ORHA was discussed at an MOD briefing for Mr Hoon on 1 April.347 Mr Watkins

reported that:

“Considerable concern was expressed about the modus operandi of the ORHA: this

could cut across the UK Armed Forces’ so far successful ‘hearts and minds work’

within our AO. One possibility would be to invite ORHA to ‘phase in’ their operations

within our AO in a controlled way. There would need to be an early conversation

between the Secretary of State and Donald Rumsfeld …”

587.  Mr Lee was commissioned to prepare a speaking note for Mr Hoon to use with

Secretary Rumsfeld.

588.  Mr Lee briefed Mr Hoon on Phase IV issues on 2 April.348 He advised Mr Hoon to

note that:

• the Chiefs of Staff had endorsed the draft Operational Concept on 31 March;

• the Joint Commission concept was well tested in the Balkans and would be

adapted to the particular circumstances of Iraq;

• levels of consent and Phase IV tasks “remain undetermined and thus the

geographic scope of British responsibility cannot yet be decided”; and

• until ORHA’s plans were clearer, particularly in relation to future governance

structures, the relationship with ORHA needed to be managed “pragmatically

and without long-term commitment”.

589.  Mr Lee explained that:

“To a degree, initial ‘Phase IV’ operations have already begun in Iraq with

humanitarian assistance and low level civil contacts being conducted by UK forces.

There is thus a pressing need to define an operational concept for the employment

of UK forces in early Phase IV operations in Iraq …

“It is, however, early days. The strategic background to Phase IV operations remains

uncertain and changeable. Very significant decisions – eg about Iraqi governance

and the legal basis for Phase IV operations – remain to be taken. How any ‘Joint

Commissions’ will relate to Iraqi governance structures remains undecided: care

will be required that their establishment does not prejudge the development of

governance structures by ORHA. While acknowledging the merits of the ‘Joint

Commission’ model, we also need to be sympathetic to Iraqi culture and wishes.

Commanders on the ground are already implementing what has been called a ‘town

hall’ process. The key point is that ‘Joint Commissions’ should not become an alien

imposition or, in any way, a rival power base to an Interim Authority; their role should

be obviously temporary and advisory.

347  Minute Watkins to Policy Director, 2 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Ministerial Briefing: 1 April 2003’.

348  Minute Lee to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 2 April 2003, ‘Op TELIC – Draft Operational Concept for

Phase 4’ attaching Paper [unattributed and undated], ‘Speaking Notes for Call to Rumsfeld on ORHA’.

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