The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
724.
In a video
conference with President Bush on 16 May, Mr Blair said that
the UK felt
the Iraqi
Government was beginning to “shape up well”.351
The next
step would be for
the US and
UK to present, jointly with Prime Minister Maliki, a strong
programme for the
government,
including “a very clear forward perspective on security
transition”.
725.
The following
week insurgents in MND(SE) detonated a command wire
Improvised
Explosive
Device (IED).352,353
This was
the first successful such attack in Iraq since
December
2005 and the first instance of an IED of this type in MND(SE). Maj
Gen
Cooper
observed that this reversion to an older form of technology
represented a
change in
the insurgents’ tactics, possibly in response to MNF counter-IED
advances.
726.
On 20 May,
Prime Minister Maliki presented his Cabinet (minus the Ministers
for
Interior,
Security and Defence) to the Council of
Representatives.354
All were
approved.
727.
Mr Patey
described the Maliki government as a “genuine government of
national
unity”.355
Although it
was, in his view, “not quite the technocratic powerhouse we
hoped
for”, he
was clear that it included “a fair number of highly competent
individuals in
key positions”.
728.
Gen Jackson
visited Iraq from 15 to 18 May and observed:
“The key
challenge is governance …
“Yet even
given a backdrop of good governance, the security challenges are
still
daunting …
With our understandable focus on the relatively peaceful MND(SE),
it is
easy to
forget the extreme levels of violence that are common place in
Baghdad and
its
environs …
“Whilst
there is no doubt that the US Military will do ‘whatever it takes’
to contain the
security
situation … Lieutenant General Chiarelli [Commander of the
Multi-National
Corps –
Iraq] remarked that another 50,000 troops would be needed to
really
improve
security in Baghdad alone … This is a precarious position to be in
…”356
729.
Gen Jackson
went on to describe a growing US frustration with perceived
UK
objectives:
“My final
point from Baghdad is rather unpalatable but, given the strength
with which
it was put
across to me and the fact that it has never been far from the
surface on
previous
visits, I feel compelled to raise it here. The perception, right or
wrong,
in some –
if not all – US military circles is that the UK is motivated more
by the
351
Letter
Banner to Hayes, 16 May 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President
Bush, 16 May:
Middle East issues’.
352 An
Improvised Explosive Device detonated by the user through a
hard-wired electrical cable.
353
Minute
Cooper, 17 May 2006, ‘Iraq: Update’ attaching ‘GOC MND(SE) –
Southern Iraq update –
17 May
2006’.
354
BBC
News, 20 May
2006, Iraqi
Parliament approves Cabinet.
355
eGram
19337/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 22 May 2006, ‘Iraq: The New
Government’.
356
Minute CGS
to CDS, 22 May 2006, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 15-18 May
06’.
608