3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
settle for
consolidation of their autonomy rather than secession. The
Shia
would
attack
regime targets in the South, but they do not seek independence …
Iraq’s
territorial
integrity would be maintained.”
•
“Any
new regime” was
likely to be “autocratic
and drawn
from the Sunni
elite”. “Its
policies and methods” were “unlikely to be different from
Saddam’s.
Given
Iraq’s strategic interests in the Gulf, this will include a
long-term desire for
weapons of
mass destruction.”
•
“Pressure
would build internationally to end Iraq’s pariah status and
isolation.
The level
of pressure would reflect the extent to which the regime
appeared
to moderate
its behaviour. But Iraq’s
political rehabilitation could be rapid,
overwhelming
any voices of caution from London, Washington or
elsewhere.”11
26.
There were
concerns over both the continued legal basis for operations in NFZs
and
the conduct
of individual operations.12
27.
A further
Assessment on 1 November judged that Saddam Hussein felt
“little
pressure to
negotiate over …
resolution 1284 because the proceeds of oil smuggling
and illicit
trade have increased significantly this year, and more countries
are increasing
diplomatic
contacts and trade with Iraq”.13
“Saddam
would only contemplate co-operation with [resolution] 1284, and the
return
of
inspectors … if it could be portrayed as a victory. He will not
agree to co-operate
unless:
•
there
is UN-agreed
timetable for the lifting of sanctions.
Saddam
suspects
that the US would not agree to sanctions lift while he remained
in
power;
•
he is
able to
negotiate with the UN in advance to weaken the
inspection
provisions. His
ambitions to rebuild Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction
programmes
makes him hostile to intrusive inspections or any
other
constraints
likely to be effective.
“Before
accepting 1284, Saddam will try to obtain the abolition of the
No-Fly Zones.
He is also
likely to demand that the US should abandon its stated aim to
topple the
Iraqi
regime.”
29.
In November
2000, Mr Blair’s “preferred option” was described as
the
implementation
of 1284, enabling inspectors to return and sanctions to be
suspended.14
11 JIC
Assessment, 11 October 2000, ‘Iraq After Saddam’.
12
Letter
Goulty to McKane, 20 October 2000, ‘Iraq’.
13
JIC
Assessment, 1 November 2000, ‘Iraq: Prospects for Co-operation with
UNSCR 1284’.
14
Letter
Sawers to Cowper-Coles, 27 November 2000, ‘Iraq’.
317