The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1220.
Addressing the
option of dropping the northern option and telling the US that
the
UK wanted
to switch to the South, Mr Johnson’s minute
stated:
“•
Advantages:
Reduces risk of wasting our time and getting bogged
down
in negotiation.
Improves chances of getting into the South in time for
February/March.
•
Disadvantages:
Although General Franks has said that he will fit us into
the
South if
required, we have no US political guarantee that they will fix it,
or that
they will
give us a role in the main effort. And it would perhaps be odd to
rule
Turkey out
when we have not asked them the question ourselves.”
1221.
The minute
advised that the US priority would be getting its own forces
into
Turkey. The
UK was “likely to come under increasing US pressure to look at
going
elsewhere”.
As time passed, the US might “feel less bound to try and meet
our
preferences
for a substantial role in the South”.
1222.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit commented on a draft of the note that “depending on
how
Copenhagen
goes, plus CDS soundings of [General Hilmi] Özkök [Chief of the
General
Staff of
the Turkish Armed Forces]”, Mr Hoon would need to visit and
that he would
probably
accompany him.477
1223.
Sir Kevin
wrote that European forces on Turkish soil would be “harder” for
them
than US
forces, although Turkey was “better disposed” towards the UK. Other
issues
included
the impact on Turkey’s relations with the Kurds and the UK’s
attitude to the
Kurds in
1920‑32.
1224.
The SPG
paper of 13 December concluded that a medium scale
land
contribution
would be the maximum the UK could provide concurrently
with
Op FRESCO
and provided a new analysis on urban operations.
1225.
On 13
December, the SPG produced a sixth version of the ‘UK Military
Strategic
Thinking on
Iraq’ paper.478
1226.
The paper
stated that a contribution at medium scale “in each
environment
(Package
3)” would be “the maximum achievable concurrently with Op FRESCO”.
It
would take
129 days for deployment to Turkey to be completed. The UK was
“likely to be
two months
late for 1st echelon operations unless resources [were] committed
now”.
1227.
The need for a
“coercive” information operations campaign to “help create
the
conditions
for Iraqi regime collapse” had been added to the list of UK
Military Strategic
477
Manuscript
comment Tebbit on Email Sec(O)‑Iraq‑S to DG OpPol‑S, 10 December
2002, ‘Draft note
on Turkey
Strategy for SofS’.
478
Paper
[SPG], 13 December 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
358