12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
•
The US
should be encouraged to allow the Iraqi Government lead
responsibility
for the
National Policing Plan. That should be led by the new Minister of
Interior
in
consultation with the 18 provincial Chiefs of Police. In
progressing that, the
coalition
must of course provide expert advice and guidance and perhaps
the
suggested
draft.
•
The CPA‑I’s
successor should be re‑deployed and should function within
the
MND(SE)
command structure where he or she will be able to direct the
SSR
(policing)
effort.
•
The
judicial dimension should be fully integrated within the SSR
effort.
•
The
Strategic Taskforce should be re‑convened with the goal of creating
a
genuine
police expeditionary capability operating within a framework
that
provides
maximum support to overseas SSR (policing)
deployments.
•
The UK
should exert its influence to further embed and encourage the
concept
of joint
operating between the IPS and the Iraqi Army in areas where the
security
situation
makes this appropriate.
1013.
Sir Ronnie
Flanagan stated:
“In many
respects the challenge facing us in Iraq appears more daunting
from
London than
it does in theatre. This I attribute to the inevitable difficulty
that exists
in grasping
some of the key contextual factors.”
1014.
Sir Ronnie
wrote that his recent visit had given him “a greater appreciation”
of
the
significant threat from “rogue elements” in the Basra intelligence
agencies and “pop
up
battalions” that could jeopardise SSR if not addressed. He stated
that “the ultimate
solution”
rested with the MOI and that “the key to success” would be “the
creation of
effective
governance structures”.
1015.
Sir Ronnie
concluded:
“Notwithstanding
the reservations I have expressed about the quality of
training,
intelligence
and other factors that inhibit the SSR (policing) effort, Iraq is
on the right
path and
there is a good news story to be told. From an admittedly low base,
Iraq’s
security
forces are now recognisable as such and early signs of
self‑sufficiency are
becoming
apparent … The UK can take pride in its contribution.”
1016.
A junior FCO
official sent Dr Howells a copy of Sir Ronnie’s report
on
17 February.935
The note
also enclosed a matrix listing each recommendation and
the
department
responsible for its progress alongside it, including an additional
16 “other
recommendations”
from the report. Out of the total 33 recommendations, five
were
complete
and 11 others were in progress or being considered.
935
Minute FCO
[junior official] to Howells, 17 February 2006, ‘Review of UK
Policing Reform Work in Iraq
by
Sir Ronnie Flanagan’.
287