10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
799.
In advance of
the meeting, FCO and MOD officials produced a joint
paper
setting out
the latest “assessments and plans on security transition and the
associated
re‑posturing
and drawdown of UK troops in Basra” (see Section
9.6).462
800.
The FCO and
MOD assessed that the UK had achieved “only some” of
its
objectives
in Iraq. Iraq had “the forms of democracy” but the constituent
parts of the Iraqi
Government
were not working together to a genuine national unity agenda and
there
was no
commitment to reconciliation. In that context, the paper reported
that:
“Ministers
treat their Ministries as party and personal fiefdoms, sources of
funds
and
patronage. The writ of central Government runs weakly outside the
Baghdad
International
Zone.”
801.
The FCO and
MOD set out the process by which judgements were reached
(by
MNF
commanders and Prime Minister Maliki) on whether provinces were
ready for
PIC, and an
assessment of Basra’s progress against the four PIC conditions
(security
conditions
and threat levels, ISF capacity, the Governor’s capacity to take
responsibility
for
security, and the coalition’s ability to re-intervene if
necessary). The UK was also
monitoring
progress against an additional condition, which it judged to be
important:
“capability
of the provincial authorities to direct reconstruction, and to
spend their
budgets
wisely and accountably”.
802.
The last UK
military base in Basra city was the Basra Palace Compound
(BPC),
which the
paper described as “the most heavily mortared and rocketed place in
Iraq”.
The UK
planned to hand over the BPC to the Iraqi authorities, and withdraw
UK troops
based there
to Basra Air Station (BAS), on 31 August. That would represent the
“de facto
handover of
responsibility” to the Iraqi authorities, as UK forces would only
be able to
intervene
from BAS “in extremis”.
803.
PIC should
take place as soon after the handover of the BPC as possible: a
long
gap would
place the UK in a difficult position, “responsible for security in
Basra city, but
unable to
deliver it except at high risk”.
804.
The FCO and
MOD advised that the UK should stick to its transition
strategy,
including
PIC in Basra in the autumn.
805.
Looking ahead
to Basra after PIC, the FCO and MOD advised:
“Our
planning should assume that the UK civilian presence in Basra will
have to
be wound up
shortly before the removal of the UK military envelope which
enables
it to
operate (though if the US were to decide to move a military
presence of their
own to
Basra Air Station, and to retain a US civilian presence, we could
expect US
pressure
for us to maintain some sort of ongoing commitment to the Basra
Provincial
Reconstruction
Team).”
462
Paper
FCO/MOD, 12 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Transition in Basra’.
325