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14.1  |  Military equipment (post-conflict)
593.  The Inquiry asked Lt Gen Fulton why he thought the push for a medium weight
PPV had to come from Lord Drayson instead of from the Defence Board or Chiefs
of Staff:
“ … I think there’s a sort of relationship there between the commander on the ground
at whatever level, the commander in theatre, the Permanent Joint Headquarters,
the chiefs, the equipment customer and a series of examinations of what was
needed against what was … available in the sense of, you know, did it exist?
“I don’t think people were sitting on their hands saying, ‘It is all fine’. I think people
were saying, ‘this IED problem is a whole theatre problem …’”307
594.  Lieutenant General Andrew Figgures, who succeeded Lt Gen Fulton as DCDS(EC)
in June 2006, told the Inquiry that the procurement of a medium weight PPV was not
possible before 2006 because there was not a vehicle that could meet the requirement:
“… my judgement would be that every waking hour people had they were attempting
to solve the problem in this area, but if there is no technical solution to it, however
much effort you put into it, you can’t solve it.”308
595.  The Inquiry asked Lord Drayson why the military chain of command had not
identified the requirement earlier. He replied:
“I found it hard to understand why the military chain of command had not raised a
requirement for a medium weight PPV when it was clear that it was not technically
possible to procure a light weight PPV at that time with enough armour protection to
overmatch the IED then being used against our troops. The thinking of the military
throughout this period was that a small light weight vehicle of the size and weight of
Snatch was needed to patrol in the way the British Army operated in Iraq. I accepted
that buying a much bigger and better protected medium weight vehicle would not
be suitable for this type of patrolling in narrow streets but I believed that providing
commanders in theatre with the option of a bigger vehicle would allow them to
choose when and where to use it.”309
THE INTRODUCTION OF MASTIFF
596.  A variant of the US Cougar vehicle was selected as the solution to the medium
weight PPV gap. It was already in service with the US Army in Iraq.
307  Public hearing, 27 July 2010, pages 75‑76.
308  Public hearing, 27 July 2010, pages 77‑82.
309  Statement, 15 December 2010, page 6.
99
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