16.1 |
The welfare of Service Personnel
112.
In mid-April
2004, the US made an informal request to the UK to send
additional
troops to
Iraq.79
Section 9.2
describes the Government’s consideration of that
proposal,
which
focused on the question of the contribution that those troops might
make to
achieving
strategic success.
113.
On 12 May,
Lieutenant General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of Defence
Staff
(Commitments)
(DCDC(Commitments)), advised the Chiefs of Staff meeting that
the
effect of
an additional deployment on “Harmony”, previously identified as one
of the main
concerns,
was now assessed to be “less stressing”.80
114.
Lt Gen Palmer
wrote to Lt Gen Fry the following day:
“You know
my serious concerns about increasing the current level of
commitments …
At best,
deployment of an additional brigade would reduce average unit
separation
from our
target of 24 months to 12 months. Within this, some trades and
individuals
(including
pinch point trades) will inevitably suffer considerably shorter
tour intervals.
While
recruitment and retention currently remain satisfactory in most
areas, the
situation
is potentially fragile not least because the risk is difficult
to quantify.”81
115.
Lt Gen Palmer
suggested that, if a “do nothing” option was judged to
be
unacceptable,
the MOD should develop a “battlegroup only” option which
would
minimise
“the stretch on our people”. He also highlighted the difficulty of
following a
decision
for an additional deployment with the announcement of planned
measures
to reduce
manpower costs.
116.
The Chiefs of
Staff considered the US request for additional UK military
assets
to Iraq on
19 May.82
Although
they recognised there were risks and benefits to all
the
possible
options, they agreed that the “best military option” was the
deployment of
HQ Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC) and a brigade to replace US forces
in
the provinces
of Najaf and Qadisiyah (option six).
117.
During the
meeting, Lt Gen Fry cautioned against the long-term effects
on
the Armed
Forces of an additional deployment, which militated against that
option.
Lt Gen Palmer
rehearsed the arguments he had set out in his 13 May minute
to
Lt Gen Fry,
adding that he feared a “precipitant retention
problem”.
79
Letter
Baker to Rycroft, 21 April 2004, ‘Iraq: US Approaches for
Additional UK Forces’.
80
Minutes, 12
May 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
81
Minute
DCDS(Pers) to DCDS(C), 13 May 2003, ‘Expanding MND(SE) – People
Implications’.
82
Minutes, 19
May 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
23