3.3 | Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002

363. In response to a specific question about whether, following the meeting on 23 July,

he thought that the Government’s strategy on Iraq had coalesced by the beginning of

September, Lord Wilson replied:

“I thought they were in the thick of it … ‘If you asked whether as a matter of proper

Cabinet government the Cabinet had endorsed a course that was likely to lead to

military action, I would tell you emphatically not’ … If you had said to me ‘Is the

Prime Minister … serious about military action?’ I would have said ‘There is a gleam

in his eye which worries me.’ I think I used that phrase at the time.”149

364. Lord Wilson stated:

“I think the Prime Minister was torn over Iraq … Torn between all his instincts which

were to be alongside the Americans, whatever that means, on the one hand and

his knowledge that a lot of people in his Cabinet and in public opinion and people

in Parliament would be unhappy with that. I would guess … that in the summer

holidays in August he resolved it.”150

365. In his memoir, Mr Straw wrote that he:

“… ran through the four countries that posed a potential threat to world peace

because of their unauthorised and highly dangerous weapons systems – North

Korea, Iran, Libya, and Iraq. I thought it important to raise the issue as to whether

we should contemplate not joining the US in any American military effort against

Iraq. I was concerned that the case against Iraq (why did it merit the most severe

action? what differentiated it from the other three?) had not at that stage been made:

and also about the potential consequences for Tony’s leadership, and the survival

of his government.”151

366. Following Mr Blair’s meeting, Sir David Manning asked Mr Scarlett for advice

on a number of issues.

367. It is not clear what was said about Iraq’s WMD in Mr Blair’s meeting on 23 July,

but the following day Sir David Manning explained to Mr Blair his concern that:

“… we (and I suspect the Americans) have only a hazy idea of Saddam’s retaliatory

capabilities if and when we attack Iraq. CDS was unable to say whether we would

expect to fight in a CBW environment. The answer has a crucial bearing on the

plausibility and viability of US military plans.”152

149 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, page 42.

150 Public hearing, 25 January 2011, page 49.

151 Straw J. Last Man Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan, 2012.

152 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 24 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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