12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
important
ports at Umm Qasr and Khor al‑Zubayr and expelling the
militia
ridden
Facilities Protection Service has emboldened them. Iraqi Special
Forces
were
ineffective until their US mentors were re‑inserted. In Dhi Qar’s
capital
Nasiriyah,
JAM reportedly made some territorial gains over the ISF before
their
stand down,
while in Maysan, ISF opted not to confront JAM (recognising
they
would not
be able to defeat them and leaving them in control of Al‑Amara for
the
second time
in two months).”
1453.
Assessing the
ISF’s future, the CIG stated:
“Despite
their underwhelming performance, we assess that JAM’s stand
down,
leaving ISF
holding the field, has increased the latter’s credibility among
most
Basrawis
and imbued them with greater confidence. Despite the continued
likelihood
that
Generals Mohan and Jalil will be moved on, diplomatic reporting
suggests that
the MOI may
at least continue some of their security reforms: it has already
sacked
1,000
militia affiliated members of the police. However, many will almost
certainly
re‑surface
within the system. Others, unless directed towards viable
alternative
employment,
may replenish JAM’s ranks.”
1454.
On 14 May, the
JIC stated in an Assessment that, as a result of the Charge of
the
Knights,
“public confidence in the ISF has grown”.1326
However,
“Strong JAM resistance
in the
initial phases of the Charge exposed enduring weaknesses in the
largely untested
local ISF:
inadequate planning, confused command and control structures,
feeble
logistics
and split loyalties … Basra’s police were particularly
ineffective.”
“Though the
ISF overall are improving, the Iraqi Government has recognised
that
radical
changes are needed to upgrade Basra’s security forces –
particularly the
police. The
Ministry of Interior plans to fire 6,000 security personnel for
deserting
their
positions … implementing [changes] effectively will be tricky:
militiamen
dismissed
from the army or police often find employment elsewhere in the ISF
…”
1456.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen White‑Spunner reflected on
police
performance
during the Charge of the Knights, and the different approach
taken
afterwards:
“I don’t
think the police came out of Charge of the Knights very well, if
I’m being
honest … we
do need to look at how we trained the police prior to that. I
think
we may have
erred on the side of training the police in what I would call sort
of
UK/Home
Counties policing, whereas actually what was probably wanted
was
something
slightly more robust …
1326
JIC
Assessment, 14 May 2008, ‘Iraq: the Charge of the
Knights’.
391