Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
he did not see how, politically, the Coalition could retain control over Iraq’s oil revenues
after transition.216
402.  Section 9.2 describes the further deterioration in the security situation in Iraq from
late March. Attacks on oil infrastructure increased.
403.  Mr Rycroft sent 19 “unvarnished accounts” of the situation in Iraq, including
one from Mr Dominic Asquith, Deputy Chief Commissioner in the CPA, on oil sector
development, to Mr Blair on 23 April.217
404.  Mr Asquith reported that oil production was rising ahead of schedule, but future
capacity was threatened by an early, mistaken focus on repair rather than modernisation
and development.218 Oil production had reached an average of 2.3m bpd by the end of
2003, against a target of 2.0m bpd.
405.  Mr Asquith also reported that discussions between the Ministry of Oil and the CPA
on raising gasoline prices continued, with the Ministry avoiding any commitment on
a politically contentious issue. Discussions on restructuring the oil industry “remained
mired in politics”. There were persistent but unconfirmed allegations of corruption in
both the State Oil and Marketing Organisation and the Ministry. Ambassador Bremer
had recently appointed a new Inspector General to the Ministry, but after transition his
capacity to monitor financial flows would be tested. International oil companies were
watching carefully, but wanted to see greater security and a stable regulatory and
investment environment before investing.
406.  On 24 May, Mr Bob Morgan, an adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil employed by the
FCO, and his bodyguard Mr Mark Carman were killed in Baghdad.219
407.  The Security Council adopted resolution 1546 (2004) on 8 June.220 Section 9.2
describes the negotiation and content of the resolution. The resolution:
endorsed the formation of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq which would
assume full responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004 for governing Iraq,
“while refraining from taking any actions affecting Iraq’s destiny beyond the
limited interim period until an elected Transitional Government of Iraq assumes
office …”
reaffirmed the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political
future and to exercise full authority and control over their financial and natural
resources; and
216 Minute Drummond to DFID [junior official], 24 March 2004, ‘Iraq Visit’.
217 Minute Rycroft to Blair, 23 April 2004, ‘15 Reports on Iraq’.
218 Telegram 183 IraqRep to FCO London, 21 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Oil Sector Development’.
219 Minutes, 25 May 2004, Iraq Senior Officials Group meeting; BBC News, 26 May 2004, Oil Expert Killed
in Iraq ‘felt safe’.
220 UN Security Council resolution 1546 (2004).
432
Previous page | Contents | Next page