4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
495.
In an email to
Mr Campbell and Mr Scarlett on the afternoon of 19
September,
Mr Powell
wrote that he agreed with Mr Campbell that the Conclusion
should
•
asked what
headline “we want” in the Standard
on the day
of publication; and
•
pointed out
that the statement that Saddam Hussein was “prepared to
use
chemical
and biological weapons if he believes his regime is under threat is
a
bit of a
problem”, because it backed up the argument that there was “no
CBW
threat and
we will only create one if we attack him”.
“My memory
of the intelligence is that he has set up plans to use CBW on
western
forces and
that these weapons are integrated into his military
planning.”
498.
In further
comments later on 19 September, Mr Campbell raised three
further
points in
relation to nuclear weapons.247
499.
In relation to
the time required to produce a nuclear weapon, the draft
text
on nuclear
timelines (paragraph 23) stated:
“In early
2002, the JIC assessed that UN sanctions on Iraq were hindering the
import
of crucial
goods for the production of fissile material. The JIC judged that
while
sanctions
remain effective, Iraq would not be able indigenously to produce a
nuclear
weapon. If
they were removed or proved ineffective, it would take Iraq at
least five
years to
produce a weapon. But we know that Iraq retains expertise and
design data
relating to
nuclear weapons. We therefore judge that if Iraq obtained fissile
material
and other
essential components from foreign sources, the timeline for
production
of a
nuclear weapon would be shortened and Iraq could produce a nuclear
weapon
in between
one and two years.”248
500.
Apologising
for not having spotted the point earlier, Mr Campbell
wrote:
“If we are
saying that it would take between one and 2 years for them to build
a
nuclear
weapon by illegal means, why would it take 5 years with no
sanctions? A lay
reader may
assume that no sanctions would mean he could do what he wanted
and
therefore,
presumably, what he needed between 1 and 2 years
“If the
answer is that it would take 5 years to go from planning to
reality, whereas he
could
purchase ready-made material from overseas, and so cut the
timelines, I think
that should
be made explicitly clear”.
246
Email
Powell to Campbell, 19 September 2002, ‘RE:
[untitled]’
247
Email
Blackshaw to Scarlett, 19 September 2002, ‘Re final points for your
5pm meeting’.
248
Paper
Assessments Staff, 19 September 2002, ‘Iraq’s Programme for Weapons
of Mass Destruction:
The
Assessment of the British Government’.
207