The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Enforcement
(DBE) … whilst playing a supporting role in the training and
mentoring
of the
Iraqi Police Service (IPS) …
“Progress
on Iraqiisation continues. There are now 190,000 members of the
Iraqi
Security
Forces trained and equipped …
“SSR for
the Iraqi Army continues to be on track for our transition plans
…
“On
policing, the situation is less satisfactory. We need to do further
work between
MOD, FCO,
DFID and the Home Office to improve support to IPS development
at
the
strategic level … Problems of divided loyalties and militia links
can only be dealt
with by the
political will of an effective Iraqi Government …
…
“We need to
review our strategy on policing … at two levels … In Baghdad …
there
would be a
good case for providing a senior Home Office official with the
right
experience
to work with the MOI … Sir Ronnie Flanagan [will] visit
MND(SE) soon
to carry
out an audit of the effectiveness of [the] police training
programme … Part
of this
work might include an assessment of the Italians’ programme in Dhi
Qar
province.”
970.
Dr Reid’s
paper sought clarification of whether or not it was intended
there
should be a
re‑assignment of Ministerial responsibilities for policing, noting
that DOP(I)
would need
to take a collective view on the issue and that “there would be
resource
implications
if MOD were to take this on”.
971.
Gen Jackson
visited Iraq from 10 to 13 October.907
His visit
report noted that, of
the four
key strategic areas (SSR, governance, reconstruction and
counter‑insurgency
work), he
“only saw encouraging signs of progress in one: SSR” though that
progress
was still
“patchy”, with the UK’s “undoubted success with the Iraqi Army”
contrasting with
the
position of the Iraqi police:
“The events
of 19 September in Basra are merely indicative of a wider
malaise
across the
IPS as a whole. We are where we are, but it is not to our credit
that we
have known
about the inadequacies of the IPS for so long and yet failed to
address
them. We
must do so now … Whatever the eventual remedial plan is, it must
be
resourced
and led properly. It must also address the specific needs of an
Iraqi police
force
facing Iraq’s current security climate. More UK Police trainers are
not the
answer. I
have heard not one complimentary word about their involvement
during
my last two
visits. We, the military, must be prepared to shoulder an extra
training
burden
here.”
907
Minute CGS
to CDS, October 2005, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq: 10‑13 Oct
05’.
278