The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
291.
One key
assumption was that, although the objective for Iraq agreed
by
Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon did not mention regime change, that would be
necessary
to secure
the objective.
292.
Other key
elements of the thinking included the need to build
international
support for
the UK effort, and judgements about Saddam Hussein’s likely
actions
which were
reflected in later JIC Assessments.
293.
In preparation
for a “Strategic Think Tank on Iraq”, to be held by the Chiefs of
Staff
on 18 June,
the SPG produced a paper on 13 June which, in the absence of access
to
US
planning, identified key judgements encapsulating the thinking at
the time in relation
to
components of a possible concept for military
operations.138
294.
The
“Military/Strategic
Implications” and
“Key
Judgements” identified
by the
SPG
included:
•
Regime
change was “a necessary step” to achieving the end state
identified
by the
UK, and there was “no point in pursuing any strategy which does
not
achieve
this”.
•
“Once it is
obvious that the US is committed to regime change, she will
have
to
prevail”, so the UK needed to “plan for the worst case” and “be
prepared to
execute
[that plan] if required”.
•
There was a
“need to acknowledge” that there would be a post‑conflict
phase
“with an
associated commitment, manpower and finance bill”, with “a
spectrum
of
commitment where the worst case is a long period with a large
bill”.
•
A “much
more detailed level of intelligence” was required.
•
“Although
Iraq’s nuclear capability (essentially a ‘dirty’ bomb)” could not
be
“dismissed”,
the “main threat” was from chemical and biological
weapons.
•
If regime
survival was at stake, Saddam Hussein would “almost certainly
use
WMD, so
there would be no deterrent equation as in 1991”.
•
“Establishing
and maintaining support”, from the international community
and
Iraq’s
neighbours, would be “the Coalition CoG [Centre of
Gravity]”.
295.
The paper
examined each of the components of the concept,
including:
•
Reviewing
the internal politics in Iraq and the options for regime change.
Iraq
was
“potentially fundamentally unstable”, and “currently held together
by the
strong
security apparatus”, which would require “considerable force to
break”.
Once it was
broken, the regime would “shatter” because of its minority
appeal.
138
Minute
MA1/DCDS(C) to PSO/CDS, 13 June 2002, ‘Supporting Paper for COS
Strategic Think
Tank on
Iraq – 18 Jun’ attaching Paper. The paper
was circulated to the Offices of the Chiefs of Staff,
Sir Kevin Tebbit,
Air Marshal French, Mr Webb and Mr Bowen.
218