The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
575.
Mr Browne
also advised that in response to Mr Blair’s visit to Iraq in
late May:
“… the
southern Iraq Steering Group has been set up, chaired by [the]
Consul
General
with participation from across departments and agencies to
co-ordinate
delivery of
a coherent strategy for southern Iraq, focused on Basra. Much of
the
work on
governance, rule of law and infrastructure will now be delivered in
a
coherent
fashion through the new UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in
Basra,
drawing
together inputs from the US, Danes and other international
partners.”
576.
The Basra PRT
was now fully staffed, but lacked funding for project
work
and would
need funding for running costs from December 2006. US funds had
not
yet arrived.
577.
The 6 July
meeting of DOP(I) discussed Mr Browne’s letter to
Mr Blair and agreed
his
proposals in principle.330
578.
Mrs Beckett
and Mr Benn said that their budgets for Iraq were fully
committed,
but were
asked to look again at reprioritising their spending to fund the
Better Basra
projects.
579.
Ministers
agreed that there was a need for a comprehensive communications
plan
to
highlight UK activity on reconstruction to politicians in Baghdad
and Basra. The plan
should
include other donors’ activity, to give a clear picture of the
totality of development
assistance
that the UK presence was bringing to southern Iraq.
580.
Ministers also
recognised the risk to locally engaged staff, who were
being
targeted.
At least three locally engaged members of staff working for the
Coalition had
been
killed. FCO and DFID locally engaged staff were being offered the
chance to
resign,
work at home, or work at a different location.
581.
Discussions on
funding the Better Basra Action Plan continued into
August.
582.
A Treasury
official advised Mr Stephen Timms, Chief Secretary to the
Treasury,
on 15
August that departments had agreed to provide a total of £20.4m
from existing
resources
to fund the Better Basra Action Plan, now costed at £26.5m (due to
the later
start for
some of the work).331
The FCO had
contributed £12.4m (of which £7m was from
the GCPP
Reserve), the MOD £4m and DFID £4m. Negotiations had been
difficult, with
the MOD
offering “considerable resistance” to the need to find its
contribution from the
core
defence budget.
583.
Mr Timms
wrote to Mr Browne the same day, welcoming the successful
conclusion
of
negotiations and agreeing to provide an additional £4m for the Plan
from the central
330
Minutes, 6
July 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
331
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chief Secretary, 15 August 2006,
‘Better Basra Plan’.
332
Letter
Timms to Browne, 15 August 2006, ‘Better Basra’.
292