9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
532.
AM Peach also
told the Chiefs of Staff: “Contrary to recent US assessments
that
AQ-I had
been defeated, the UK view remained that AQ-I, whilst severely
damaged,
retained
the ability to be resurgent, particularly if the current pressure
were to be
released.”
533.
In a message
to the FCO on 23 October, Mr Prentice urged that it should
“start
planning
how the UK will meet these commitments [in Mr Brown’s 8
October statement]
and best
protect our wider strategic interests in the medium term – from the
end of 2008
and
beyond”.254
The urgency
arose from the ongoing debate between Iraq and the US
on the
legal basis for a continued coalition presence in 2009 and
beyond.
534.
The Iraqi
Government was insisting that there could be no extension of
a
Chapter VII
resolution into 2009. Even renewal of the existing resolution for
another
year looked
set to be “a struggle”. To secure what was needed from that
continuing
debate,
Mr Prentice argued that the UK would need “to clarify now what
role we
see
ourselves playing in Iraq beyond 2008 and what legal authorities we
will require
to enable
us to do that”.
535.
Mr Prentice
continued:
“… to
ensure that we do justice to the scale and cost of the UK’s
commitment to the
Iraq
project over the last 4-5 years and secure our national interests
for the period
ahead, we
need to accept now that we are in this for some years to
come”.
536.
Mr Prentice
thought the UK role in Iraq in 2009 and beyond ought to
include:
•
capacity-building
in the judiciary and police at the centre;
•
training
and mentoring of the Basra ISF;
•
supporting
the Basra development initiatives because: “We will be judged
by
the
progress Basra makes following PIC … There is also a case for us to
be
planning a
last high profile project as visible proof for Basrawis of our
continuing
support and
as a lasting UK legacy”;
•
re-establishing
a UK Trade and Industry presence in Basra “to pursue the
huge
commercial
opportunities there will eventually be there”;
•
military
protection and active defence of the COB at Basra as the
southern
military HQ
and the home for UK/US civilian missions and the PRT;
•
defending
coalition supply and exit routes to Kuwait, including a Quick
Reaction
Force
capability;
•
support, if
requested, for ISF efforts against Iranian/militia influence;
and
•
niche
military roles elsewhere in Iraq.
254
eGram
43230/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 23 October 2007, ‘Iraq 2009 and
Beyond – Unfinished
Business’.
281