The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
26.
Mr Tebbit
commissioned an analysis of that thesis, which he expected would
“show
it to be
flawed”.
27.
On 19
December, Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, held a
meeting with Adm
Boyce,
Mr Tebbit and others, to discuss the sustainability of
operations in the No‑Fly
Zones and
implications for plans for the defence of Kuwait, in the light of
reduced
patrolling
following the invasion of Afghanistan.14
28.
Mr Hoon
asked, in the context of the changed political environment since
9/11, for
further
advice “detailing the current state of operations over Iraq and the
political and
military
implications of continuing with the current patrolling patterns”
and “options for
future
action together with their political, legal and military
implications”. The options
could be
part of “a discrete operation” or “a wider campaign”, and could
range from
fewer
patrols, maintaining current operations, to an incremental increase
and “a
significant
large scale operation”.
29.
It is now
public knowledge that President Bush had asked for military
options
for action
in Iraq to be reviewed in autumn 2001; and that he had been briefed
by
Gen Franks
on 28 December 2001 and 7 February 2002.
30.
The MOD had
some knowledge of that debate, but it was not fully aware of
all
aspects of
the discussions.
31.
Admiral the
Lord Boyce told the Inquiry that “there was no contingency planning
or
thinking
about Iraq, so far as the Ministry of Defence was concerned, in
2001”.15
32.
Lord Boyce
subsequently told the Inquiry that discussions between the UK and
US
about the
conduct of joint operations to enforce the No‑Fly Zones had
continued.16
“We were
flatly saying we are not considering or contemplating military
action in
Iraq. We
were really quite strongly against that. We were certainly not
doing any
thinking
about … military adventures into Iraq in the early part of 2002,
other than
maintaining
our No‑Fly Zone capabilities and so forth.”17
34.
General
Sir John Reith, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) from August
2001 to
May 2004,
told the Inquiry that CENTCOM had had plans in place for the
invasion of
14
Minute
Williams to Cholerton, 21 December 2001, ‘Iraq’.
15
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 5.
16
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 2.
17
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 6.
18
Private
hearing, 15 January 2010, page 4.
180