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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
with the Iraq Ministry of Interior would benefit from greater UK assistance but that was
determined by the physical security risk to civilian staff. He wrote:
“Given that the indirect fire threat seems to pose the greatest risk … our Counter
Indirect Fire (C‑IDF) measures assume even greater importance. Hardening
accommodation is … one important aspect … but by no means a panacea.
What is more important is to deter or defeat those who would prosecute these
attacks rather than rely on mitigating the consequences. And to do this we need
greatly improved ISTAR.
“This is hardly new. We have known about the paucity of UK ISTAR in both
operational theatres for some time now and I welcome the steps we have made with
Predator. But this is far from being the complete answer. We need an integrated and
layered approach, which provides dedicated manned and unmanned surveillance
capability at battlegroup, brigade and divisional level. It is imperative, therefore, that
we do not let the Project Watchkeeper ISD slip further to the right and we should
investigate the possibility of an interim contracted solution to cover the next four
years. Rotary wing MAS [Manned Airborne Surveillance] is equally important and we
should ensure Project Stockwell592 remains adequately funded. I urge early decision
and action in this area.”
1123.  The record of actions from ACM Stirrup’s “O” Group meeting on 3 October stated:
“While ‘Tier 1 Enhanced’ was an acceptable level of immediate Force Protection,
every effort needed to be made to establish hardened bases in those areas of
Basra where our presence was likely for the medium term, and to minimise manning
commensurate with the tasks in hand.”593
1124.  On 10 October, a PJHQ official advised Mr Browne, at his request, on the
implications for force protection if troops were moved to Basra Air Station (BAS).594
1125.  Operational analysis had indicated that there was a “negligible difference in the
threat posed to a larger base”. A single base would allow a concentration of anti‑IDF
resources and reduce the need for vulnerable road moves that currently placed a drain
on other valuable assets, “particularly aviation”.
1126.  The official explained that there was a combination of Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 at
BAS, all of which were vulnerable to overhead attack. Trials of an overhead system that
“may partially mitigate against shrapnel” from an overhead blast continued but in the
“immediate term” it was “most important to contain the lateral threat from IDF”.
592  Project Stockwell aimed to deliver a deployable, robust and versatile rotary wing Manned Airborne
Surveillance. It later became the Rotary Wing MAS Project.
593  Note SECCOS, 5 October 2006, ‘Record of Actions and Decisions from CDS O Group – 3 Oct 06’.
594  Minute PJHQ [junior official] to APS/SofS [MOD], 10 October 2006, ‘Iraq: Force Protection’.
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