The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
with the
Iraq Ministry of Interior would benefit from greater UK assistance
but that was
determined
by the physical security risk to civilian staff. He
wrote:
“Given that
the indirect fire threat seems to pose the greatest risk … our
Counter
Indirect
Fire (C‑IDF) measures assume even greater importance.
Hardening
accommodation
is … one important aspect … but by no means a panacea.
What
is more important is to deter or defeat those who would
prosecute these
attacks
rather than rely on mitigating the consequences. And to do this we
need
greatly
improved ISTAR.
“This is
hardly new. We have known about the paucity of UK ISTAR in
both
operational
theatres for some time now and I welcome the steps we have made
with
Predator.
But this is far from being the complete answer. We need an
integrated and
layered
approach, which provides dedicated manned and unmanned
surveillance
capability
at battlegroup, brigade and divisional level. It is imperative,
therefore, that
we do not
let the Project Watchkeeper ISD slip further to the right and we
should
investigate
the possibility of an interim contracted solution to cover the next
four
years.
Rotary wing MAS [Manned Airborne Surveillance] is equally important
and we
should
ensure Project Stockwell592
remains
adequately funded. I urge early decision
and action
in this area.”
1123.
The record of
actions from ACM Stirrup’s “O” Group meeting on 3 October
stated:
“While
‘Tier 1 Enhanced’ was an acceptable level of immediate Force
Protection,
every
effort needed to be made to establish hardened bases in those areas
of
Basra where
our presence was likely for the medium term, and to minimise
manning
commensurate
with the tasks in hand.”593
1124.
On 10 October,
a PJHQ official advised Mr Browne, at his request, on
the
implications
for force protection if troops were moved to Basra Air Station
(BAS).594
1125.
Operational
analysis had indicated that there was a “negligible difference in
the
threat
posed to a larger base”. A single base would allow a concentration
of anti‑IDF
resources
and reduce the need for vulnerable road moves that currently placed
a drain
on other
valuable assets, “particularly aviation”.
1126.
The official
explained that there was a combination of Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3
at
BAS, all of
which were vulnerable to overhead attack. Trials of an overhead
system that
“may
partially mitigate against shrapnel” from an overhead blast
continued but in the
“immediate
term” it was “most important to contain the lateral threat from
IDF”.
592
Project
Stockwell aimed to deliver a deployable, robust and versatile
rotary wing Manned Airborne
Surveillance.
It later became the Rotary Wing MAS Project.
593
Note
SECCOS, 5 October 2006, ‘Record of Actions and Decisions from CDS O
Group – 3 Oct 06’.
594
Minute
PJHQ
[junior official] to APS/SofS
[MOD], 10 October 2006, ‘Iraq: Force Protection’.
192