The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
460.
The JIC judged
that Iran would continue to encourage some Shia extremists
to
attack
coalition forces with the aim of deterring further Western military
involvement in
the region.
But in pursuit of long-term stability, a Shia-led government was
likely to have
Iranian
support in tackling Sunni insurgency, including the jihadist
campaign. Although
the next
Iraqi government might be less sensitive to Iranian interests than
the ITG, the
JIC judged
that the Iranians would:
“… work
hard to maintain and if possible improve their position, keeping up
links …
with its
existing Shia allies … [and] Kurdish parties, and seeking new ones,
perhaps
even with
some Sunni Arab groups. Of all Iraq’s neighbours, Iran will
maintain the
greatest
influence.”
461.
On 1 December,
members of DOP(I) considered a paper on introducing
PRTs.215
462.
A paper
written by the IPU recommended that the UK should establish a
PRT
structure
in southern Iraq, adapting the US model to suit the circumstances
in each
province.216
The IPU
recommended creating one (“mini”) PRT in each
province,
then moving
to a “single super-PRT” in Basra. The first could be up and
running
by February 2006.
463.
The IPU
anticipated only “benefits at the margins” from the new
structure.
464.
Mr Straw
explained that the paper “proposed that we went along with the
United
States’
proposal for the creation of PRTs across Iraq but without
disrupting our own
plans for
military transition”.217
465.
Dr Reid agreed
that the UK response should be positive, but stressed the
need
to keep
control of and tailor developing PRT plans in the provinces where
the UK was
directly
involved.
466.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald held a series of meetings with senior Sunni
representatives
outside
Iraq from 7 to 8 December.218
In each
discussion, he set out that:
“The Prime
Minister wanted a stable, united, democratic and prosperous Iraq.
A
true
democracy respected the views of the majority but also protected
the rights
of
minorities. If the Sunni community wanted a fair share of power we
would work
to support
that objective. But we would not support a return to domination.
We
were under
attack primarily from the Sunni community, even though we
were
their best
guarantors of a fair outcome, as the constitutional negotiations
showed.
Sunni
violence was counter-productive. It could not defeat the MNF or
change the
215
Minutes, 1
December 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
216
Paper IPU,
28 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Provincial Reconstruction
Teams’.
217
Minutes, 1
December 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
218
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 9 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Sunni
Outreach’.
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