3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
462.
Mr Ricketts
sent a personal minute advising Mr Straw that:
“By sharing
Bush’s broad objective, the Prime Minister can help shape how it
is
defined and
the approach to achieving it. In the process he can bring home …
some
of the
realities which will be less evident from Washington. He can help
Bush make
good
decisions by telling him things his own machine probably
isn’t.”164
463.
Mr Ricketts
added that “broad support for the objective” brought “two real
problems
which need
discussing”. The first was the threat from Iraq on which Mr
Ricketts wrote,
“The truth
is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein’s
WMD
programmes,
but our tolerance of them” after 9/11.
464.
Mr Ricketts
advised:
“This is
not something we need to be defensive about, but attempts to
claim
otherwise
publicly will increase scepticism about our case …
“US
scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al Qaida is so far
frankly
unconvincing.
To get public and Parliamentary support for military operations
we
have to be
convincing that:
•
the
threat is so serious/imminent that it is worth sending our troops
to die for;
•
it is
qualitatively different from the threat posed by other
proliferators who are
closer to
achieving nuclear capability (including Iran).
“We can
make the case on qualitative difference (only Iraq has attacked
a
neighbour,
used CW and fired missiles against Israel). But the overall
strategy needs
to include
re-doubled efforts to tackle other proliferators … in other ways …
But we
are still
left with a problem of bringing public opinion to accept the
imminence of a
threat from
Iraq. This is something the Prime Minister and President need to
have
a frank
discussion about.”
465.
The second
problem was the need to define an “end state” for any military
action.
Mr Ricketts
advised:
“Military
operations need clear and compelling military objectives … For
Iraq,
‘regime
change’ does not stack up. It sounds like a grudge match between
Bush
and Saddam.
Much better, as you have suggested, to make the objective
ending
the threat
to the international community from Iraqi WMD before Saddam uses
it
or gives it
to terrorists. That is … easier to justify in terms of
international law, but
also more
demanding. Regime change which produced another Sunni general
still
in charge
of an active Iraqi WMD programme would be a bad outcome (not
least
because it
would be almost impossible to maintain UN sanctions on a new
leader
who came in
promising a fresh start).”
164
Minute
Ricketts to Secretary of State [FCO], 22 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Advice
for the Prime Minister’.
469