6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
406.
Mr Hoon
instructed MOD officials to take forward work with the FCO and
DFID.189
Mr Watkins
explained to Mr Simon Webb, MOD Policy Director:
“As he has
discussed with CDS, PUS and you, the Secretary of State is clear
that
the MOD
should act as the conduit for UK views to the US Post War Planning
Office
[ORHA]
which has been established in the Pentagon. If the UK is to
influence the
Office’s
approach, it must present it with a consistent joined-up line: we
cannot allow
individual
Whitehall departments to transmit possibly disparate messages to
their
secondees
in the Office.
“The
underlying theme of yesterday’s meeting was that all relevant
government
departments
need to contribute to what will be a major undertaking. The role
of
pulling
together the Whitehall line on this side of the Atlantic belongs
naturally to
the FCO.
Mr Hoon presumes that the FCO will now move quickly to pull
together
the views
of the relevant departments … Mr Hoon’s clear recollection is
that all
three
Secretaries of State concerned were asked to provide the Prime
Minister with
co-ordinated
advice on how the UK should structure its approach to
post-conflict
planning
and what level of contribution it should be prepared to make (not
just the
narrow UN
point …). I have spoken to No.10 and the Foreign Secretary’s
Office
accordingly.
“Mr Hoon
would be grateful if you would speak to your counterparts in the
FCO and
DFID to
ensure this work is being taken forward in the right
lines.”
407.
In his
statement of 14 January 2011, Mr Blair explained to the
Inquiry that:
“… we broke
down planning into three parts: humanitarian – the priority for
DFID;
Military –
with the MOD; and political with the FCO …
“Though the
Iraq Planning Unit was formally established in February
2003,
some
planning was already under way and co-ordinated by the ad hoc
officials
group
[AHGI] from October 2002 … but above all planning was under way
within
departments
…
“…
[I]ndividual Secretaries of State were responsible for each
separate stream.
The Cabinet
was debating the issue and there was a constant process of
exchange
at official
level passed up to me and the Ministers. As we came to recognise …
it
would have
been better to have had more integrated planning at an earlier
time; and
certainly
there is a lesson there.”190
189
Minute
Watkins to Policy Director, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Issues’.
190
Statement,
14 January 2011, pages 13-14.
379