The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
143.
A small MOD
team would be going to Washington and the CENTCOM HQ
in
Tampa,
Florida “immediately”.
144.
The letter
concluded that Mr Hoon believed Ministers would need clarity
on:
“•
whether the
Prime Minister’s conditions are likely to be met;
•
the
viability of the proposed military action;
•
the policy
and legal framework in which military action is
justified;
•
overall,
whether the prospective outcome looked worth the risks,
costs
and losses.”
145.
The MOD
advised that military planning in the US was taking place in
a
policy void
and President Bush would be briefed on an updated plan in
August.
CENTCOM
would be in a position to activate that plan.
146.
Mr Hoon was
concerned about the US approach. He suggested Mr Blair
should call
an early meeting of Ministers to consider how best to get the
US
to address
the strategic, as opposed to the narrowly military,
dimension.
147.
On 2 July, Mr
Watkins reported to Sir David Manning that “US military thinking
is
quite well
advanced”, but US planners were assuming offensive operations to
overthrow
Saddam
Hussein “in a policy void”.67
The US “end
state to be achieved after conflict”
had not
been identified, and there seemed to be no “overarching campaign
strategy for
dealing
with Iraq”.
148.
An updated
plan would be briefed to President Bush in August, and the
US
planning
was designed “to put CENTCOM in a position to be able to activate
their plan
from August
2002 onwards”. A “de facto invitation to the UK and Australia to
participate”
was “now on
the table”. The plan would require availability of bases and
support from
Kuwait,
Jordan and Turkey.
149.
Mr Watkins
reported that Mr Hoon intended to respond positively to
the
invitation
for a small number of British planners to join US planning teams;
that was
“essential
in helping to inform the MOD’s own thinking” so that Mr Hoon could
make
recommendations.
But Mr Hoon was:
“… very
conscious that decisions about a military contribution cannot be
made in
the absence
of a coherent and integrated strategic framework. An agreed
strategy
will be key
to taking matters forward, not simply to provide justification for
military
action, but
to clarify timelines; to incorporate the Prime Minister’s
conditions for
UK participation;
and to establish the framework for an information
campaign.
The draft
public document, which you are currently considering, would
ultimately
67
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 2 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
28