The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
action who
will add up the number of judgements on which we do not
have
absolute
clarity.”
•
“… [T]here
are two key sections … which will need to be given
proper
prominence
… Why Are We Concerned and the Conclusions.”
•
“I think it
would be helpful to draw together the state of advancement of
both
chemical
and biological capability, with military thinking and the delivery
means.”
•
“It would
be helpful if there was more about where ballistic missiles are
likely
to be
targeted rather than what countries are in range.”165
“Finally
the question which we have to have in the back of our minds is ‘Why
Now?’.
I think we
have moved away from promoting the idea that we are in imminent
danger
of attack
and therefore intend to act in pre-emptive self defence. The
approach
is rather
that Saddam has failed to abide by the UNSCRs and his flouting
of
international
law and continuing acquisition of WMD cannot be tolerated any
longer.
This
difference is important because the focus shifts to Saddam’s
continuing efforts
to equip
himself with WMD, which is what the evidence shows.”
351.
Mr Bowen’s
comments on the draft Foreword are addressed later in this
Section.
352.
Asked whether
he had felt under pressure to firm up the judgements in the draft
as
a result of
Mr Bowen’s comments, Mr Scarlett told the Inquiry that he
had “no memory”
of seeing
the document and no action had been recorded on it.166
353.
Mr Sedwill
asked the UK Permanent Mission in New York for advice
on
whether the
UK should table the dossier in the Security Council in
support
of a US resolution
on Iraq.
354.
In advice for
No.10 on 27 August, Mr Straw had addressed a possible
draft
resolution
containing an ultimatum to Iraq to readmit inspectors, and what
President
Bush might
say in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 12 September as
part of a
wider
challenge to the UN to demonstrate that it could tackle the problem
of WMD in the
hands of
rogue states.167
He
suggested that a subsequent Security Council
discussion
might
provide “a peg for publishing via the UN the long-awaited ‘Iraq
Dossier’”.
355.
On 11
September, Mr Sedwill reported that he had sent the draft
dossier to
Mr Straw’s
“party” in New York, to check whether they think it is along the
right lines”.168
He had also
asked Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to
the
United
Nations in New York, to advise on whether any or all of it might be
tabled in the
Security
Council to support the UK intervention when the US tabled their
resolution.
165
Minute
Bowen to Scarlett, 11 September 2002, ‘The Iraq
Dossier’.
166
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 58-60.
167
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 27 August 2002, ‘Iraq:
Ultimatum’.
168
Email
Sedwill to Gray, 11 September 2002, ‘Dossier 10/9 Version
-
Comments’.
180