The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
477.
A JIC Note,
‘Saddam: The Beginning of the End’, which revisited
previous
JIC
judgements in the light of recent events and intelligence, was
issued by the
Assessments
Staff on 19 March after discussion by the JIC earlier that
day.177
478.
Addressing the
use of chemical and biological weapons, the Note stated that
the
JIC
judged:
•
Iraq had “a
usable CBW capability, deliverable using artillery, missiles
and
possibly
unmanned aerial vehicles”.
•
Iraq’s Al
Hussein and shorter-range missiles, “mostly with a range of 150km
or
less … may
be able to deliver CBW, although intelligence suggests that
Iraq
might lack
warheads capable of the effective dispersal of such
agents.”
479.
In addition,
the Note stated:
•
“A report
[…] in mid-March indicated that Iraq’s chemical weapons
remained
disassembled
and that Saddam had not yet ordered their assembly.”
•
The issue
of gas masks and injections for CBW antidotes indicated “Iraqi
plans
to use
CBW”.
•
“Intelligence
on the timing of CBW use is inconsistent […].”
•
Intelligence
on the deployment of CBW was “sparse”.
•
“Uncorroborated
reporting” suggested the “delivery of CW shells to
Republican
Guard units
… south of Baghdad”.
•
There was
“no evidence” that ballistic missiles destroyed by Coalition air
action
in February
“were equipped with CBW warheads”, but the JIC could not be
sure
that it
“would receive indications prior to an attack”.
•
Saddam
Hussein retained “ultimate control of CBW use”, but there
were
suggestions
that he had “contingency plans to devolve military
decision
making,
including CBW, to regional commands, if communications are
cut
with Baghdad”.
•
Saddam
Hussein “might take this decision early, once the severity of the
initial
attack
becomes clear or in the face of Kurdish or Shia uprisings”,
although the
possibility
of Saddam Hussein offering concessions to remain in power
“would
argue
against pre-emptive attacks and devolving control”.
•
An “early
strategic U-turn, once Saddam realises the intensity of the attack
…
and the
risk of losing control of his CBW capability” could not be ruled
out, and
he might
“then order early CBW attacks”.
•
The JIC
continued to judge that “in the face of death and the destruction
of his
regime”,
Saddam Hussein would “try to wreak as much havoc as possible”,
but
his ability
to do so could be limited.
177
Note JIC,
19 March 2003, ‘Saddam: The Beginning of the End’.
376